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i. Abstract 
In the distinct fields of valuation, and in particular in Equity Research, theory and practice 
should be accurately combined as way to obtain the most consistent outcome which adheres 
to reality. The present dissertation aims at answering this need through bridging the review of 
relevant literature with the valuation of the leading telecommunications operator Portugal 
Telecom in practical terms. The year-end 2012 price target derived from the company’s stock 
is 5,01Euro per share, implying a Buy recommendation. Caixa Banco de Investimento’s 
research is additionally analyzed and used as basis for comparison for both the methodologies 
followed and results yielded. 
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1. Introduction  
It is the purpose of this dissertation to value Portugal Telecom, a leading operator on the 
telecommunications industry in Portugal, holding an increasing international exposure in 
distinct geographic areas. Aiming at fulfilling this task, some guidance is provided resorting to a 
DCF-based Sum-Of-The-Parts valuation, as well as a year-end 2012 recommendation on the 
stock price. 
This dissertation is structured into two main parts referring to its two main objectives: 
reviewing the fundamentals of the state of the art through a careful but comprehensive 
literature selection; and combining this theoretical knowledge with the methods that best fit 
the company profile and thus allow for a robust valuation. 
In this sense I have tailored the necessary research to what I pursed as the most valuable from 
a scientific perspective, and as the most significant for the equity research process, taking into 
account the company’s type of assets, the international investments, the industry specificities, 
and the nature of its business model.  
Accounting for all the details, the dissertation proposal is as follows. It begins with the 
literature review (chapter 2) and its followed by an overview of the macroeconomic 
environment (chap. 3). In chapter 4 the main characteristics of the telecommunications 
industry are presented, trends and competitive structure are analyzed, as well as the key 
drivers for the sector. The business profile and the company’s strategy (chap.5) are then 
presented into an attempt to make an overview on PT. In chapter 6 the main risks and 
uncertainties related to PT’s operational and financial performance are covered, followed by a 
description of the regulatory background in force (chap.7). 
Chapter 8 -Portugal Telecom Valuation- exposes the assumptions and its linkage to the main 
value drivers. The approach is presented, the sensitivity analysis is described, and the IB 
valuation comparison and the derived final conclusions are also among the topic addressed 
under this title. The valuation results are derived in this chapter and a multiples valuation is 
also performed. Finally, the Investment Case for PT is built, based on the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that influence the stock performance. 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions. Additional information on the company, including the 
financial statements forecasts, is compounded on the Appendix (chap. 10). The overall work is 
completed by the information detailed on the Glossary (chap.11), followed by the used 
References (chap.12). 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Comprehensive Framework 
In corporate finance it is explicitly assumed that managers’ primary concern is to create value 
for the shareholders (Neves, 2002). Since the 1980’s that the enterprises’ financial reports 
increasingly reflect this desideratum, and more often the business managers publicly assume 
for that to be their role. 
In this sense, company valuation, corporate strategy’s valuation and managers’ performance 
valuation in creating value for the shareholders are matters that continuously occupy the 
agenda of general business and demand for the mastery of the respective financial 
instruments. 
The firm valuation techniques in Portugal have also gained prominence as a result of the 
changes occurred in the corporate structure in various fields, including the privatizations, the 
development of the capital market, by the creation and development of a market for mergers 
and acquisitions, the processes of recovery and liquidation of companies with equity 
participation of third parties, the dissent among shareholders, by the participation of venture 
capital funds in companies, agreements to repurchase shares to companies of venture capital 
and private equity funds, the projects of creation of companies (start-up) and for its financing, 
among others. 
In addition, the valuation and simulation techniques can be used in the evaluation of the 
strategies to be adopted. Operating companies and companies being created (start-ups) need 
to adopt criteria for the selection of their strategies, and value creation is the most consistent 
criterion with financial theory, economic efficiency and the interests of the shareholders 
(Copeland, 2000). The explosion of companies from the called “new economy” with high 
growth expectations, stressed more the paradigm of the insufficiency of discounted cash flows 
in the presence of real options. 
In the same line of thought, Fernandez (2007) argues that valuation is a key component of 
corporate finance literature, recognizing the importance of valuation as a mean to identify 
sources of economic value creation and destruction within the company. Furthermore, 
Damodaran (2006) utters that valuing companies is at the heart of what is done in finance, 
recognizing the importance of valuation to ensure efficient markets, effective corporate 
governance and appropriate capital budgeting decisions. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Since great importance is attributed to valuation within the financial world, it could be 
expected that there was a simple and well-structured way to follow and in the end the desired 
outcome would be easily obtained. In reality, the broader scenario involves a greater deal of 
complexity. There are several different methods carrying their own advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Managers, investors, owners and researchers of corporate finance are looking for several 
decades to provide a technical answer to determine the value of a company. However, the 
results are not totally satisfactory, since the value of a company or an asset is the result of the 
balance between what buyers are willing to pay for the purchase and what the sellers accept 
as the sale price as before the alternatives they have. Thus, in the valuation process intervene 
not only objective factors but also subjective and contingent phenomena. In this way, by 
seeking to streamline the process of calculating the value through specific techniques, the 
analyst should look forward to know the environment in which the valuation takes place. 
Under Luehrman’s (1997) view, every valuation method includes three fundamental factors – 
cash, timing, and risk – although each specific situation presents different challenges. 
Virtually all the valuation approaches are similar in the sense that every single one is no more 
than a different way of expressing the same underlying model (Young, 1999). 
As stated by Modigliani & Miller (1958), “though different in outward appearance, the various 
formulas can be shown to be equivalent in all essential aspects.” 
According to Young and Sullivan (1999), there is not one single theoretically correct model and 
no single approach is likely to be consistently more reliable. Moreover, it should be the 
robustness to data imperfections governing the choice between approaches. In the end, the 
solution could go through considering many approaches and not just one. 
Another relevant issue to be taken into account in choosing a model concerns the adoption of 
the one that better addresses the scenario under analysis. In the same line of thought, it is 
argued by Young (1999), that a possible reason for the existence of numerous approaches to 
valuation is related to the fact that different models enhance different aspects of the valuation 
at the expense of obscuring other aspects.  
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2.3 Valuation models  
It is consensual that the spectrum of approaches to valuation is vast and it would be of no 
practical use to treat them all extensively in this section. In this sense, the following discussion 
of valuation approaches will be narrowed to the most relevant ones under the topic-related 
specificities. 
Bringing some structure, (Damodaran, 2002) and (Fernandez, 2007) propose a clear 
segmentation to valuation models. In broad terms, there are four main approaches to 
valuation.  
The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation, relates the value of an asset to the present value of 
expected future cash flows on that same asset. The Relative Valuation estimates the value of a 
company or group of assets by using comparable firms’ common variables like earnings, cash 
flows, book value or sales. The Asset-Based Valuation is built through valuing existing assets of 
a firm, considering the accounting estimates of value or book value often used as a starting 
point. And finally, the Contingent Claim valuation or Real Option valuation, which takes into 
consideration option pricing models to measure the value of assets that contain option 
characteristics. 
Notwithstanding, the relevance of the last two approaches is limited in the context of this 
dissertation. In what takes to the Asset-Based Valuation, the choice to disregard it is based on 
the fact that usually this approach does not reflect the value of expected growth potential. As 
Damodaran (2005) defends, “liquidation valuation is likely to yield more realistic estimates of 
value for firms that are distressed, where the going concern assumption underlying 
conventional discounted cash flow valuation is clearly violated. For healthy firms with 
significant growth opportunities, it will provide estimates of value that are far too 
conservative.” 
Regarding Contingent Claim Valuation, it derives from the DCF model and is especially valuable 
to estimate the value of operating and strategic flexibility, which includes for instance, 
abandoning operations, opening and/or closing plants, or natural resources exploration and 
development (Copeland, 2000), which does not reflect PT’s reality. Furthermore, as advocated 
by Keenan and Copeland (1998), the majority of attempts to apply the mentioned method 
have been too simplistic to address the complexity of the decisions faced by managers. 
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Figure 1 : Valuation Models 
 
Source: Damodaran, 2002 
2.3.1 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
The DCF is generally regarded as the best technique to estimate the value of corporate assets 
(Luehrman, 1997). According to Vernimmen (2005), the DCF valuation consists of applying the 
investment decision techniques regarding Net Present Value (NPV) to the estimation of the 
firm’s value. It basically states that the value of an asset as of today equals the expected future 
cash flows that the asset is expected to generate, discounted back at a rate that properly 
reflects the riskiness of those streams. 
Valuing a company resorting to the DCF may presume the use of different expected cash flows, 
which carry different risks and, therefore demand different discount rates. Since we are 
making a valuation of the same firm, we should get the same result, independently of the 
expected cash flows in use (Fernandez, 2004). Moreover, another aspect shared by all the DCF 
approaches is related to the existence of two distinct periods that compose the analysis: the 
explicit forecast period, when the cash flows are estimated and discounted accordingly; and 
the period characterized by the cash flows stabilization, giving rise to the basis to predict a 
stable growth rate that stands in the essence of the terminal value concept. 
According to Damodaran (2002) DCF analysis can be sectioned in three main types: the 
Adjusted Present Value model, which uses the unlevered cost of assets as the discount rate; 
the Free Cash Flow to the Firm, using WACC as the appropriate discount rate, and the Free 
Cash Flow to the Equity model using as discount rate the Ke. 
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2.3.1.1 Firm Valuation 
 
2.3.1.1.1 Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)  
The FCFF is the most commonly accepted version of the discounted cash flow method. 
In the words of Damodaran (2005), “The value of the firm is obtained by discounting the free 
cash flow to the firm at the weighted average cost of capital. Embedded in this valuation are 
the tax benefits of debt (in the use of after-tax cost of debt in the cost of capital) and expected 
additional risk associated with debt (in the form of higher costs of equity and debt at higher 
debt ratios).” 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the minimum rate required by the firm’s 
sources of funding (Vernimen, 2005). In other words, it is the cost of capital to the firm. 
Furthermore, it assumes that, the risk involving the tax shields and debt is the same. It can be 
calculated through the use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which determines the 
value of the needed components.  
The CAPM builds on the model of portfolio choice developed by Harry Markowitz (1959). It is 
the most commonly accepted model dealing with the relationship of risk and return, which 
measures the market risk through the company’s beta measured relative to a market portfolio 
(Fama and French, 2004). This model is based on the assumption of a well-diversified investor 
whom requires a compensation for the risk added to his portfolio, which is calculated through 
the company’s beta (Damodaran, 2002). 
This is regarded as one of the most frequently used valuation methods, mainly due to the 
simplicity associated with the WACC concept. As stated by Graham and Harvey (2001), one of 
the reasons it has been so consensual and rottenly adopted is that it works without significant 
disruption in a target debt-to-equity ratio scenario, representing the case of most companies.  
On the other hand, and supported on a similar reason, its effectiveness has been widely 
criticized by several academics and practitioners due to the model’s inflexibility when faced 
with a changing capital structure. Though applicable, the company value would need to be 
constantly revised, since the WACC depends on value weights, further hindering the WACC 
estimation (Ruback, 2002). 
If the capital structure changes, the WACC will change to, through the debt-to-equity ratio and, 
consequently, the cost of equity. Accordingly, an increase in leverage will increase the risk 
faced by equity-holders given the priority of debt payments over cash flows to equity. 
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Consequently, the cost of equity will increase, since the company’s levered beta reflects the 
company’s risk (Koller, 2005). 
It should also be noted that FCFF is an indirect valuation method, meaning that non-equity 
claims shall be subtracted to the enterprise value to know how much equity is worth (Koller, 
2005). 
2.3.1.1.1.1 Beta (β) 
The calculation of the beta is a major obstacle in the use of the CAPM model. In an efficient 
portfolio, a diversified one, what is left in terms of risk (the “non-diversifiable risk) is 
commonly known as systematic risk. It is exactly this part that is measured by beta 
(MacQueen). 
In the process of obtaining the appropriate beta it should be considered that “for well 
diversified investors, it is not the isolated equity risk of the individual corporation that counts, 
but rather its contribution to the risk of a diversified equity portfolio. The risk of almost all 
managed equity portfolios looks very much like the risk of the market portfolio of all equities; 
that is, their risk is very highly correlated with the risk of a market index.” (Rosenberg and 
Rudd, 1982). Since there is no such thing as an index that encloses all the equities, a proxy like 
S&P500, a broad stock market index, is employed. 
Several methods can be applied on estimating the accurate value for the beta. Within those 
the Method of Similars can be counted. It is one of the most used, and is basically the result of 
a weighted average of the betas from companies that operate in the same business and have 
an overlap of characteristics. Relying on such premises, this method encloses some limitations, 
being the most evident, the arbitrariness and possible inconsistency in attaining a solid group 
of comparable firms. Farther, the criticism does not stop here, with some voices arguing that 
this approach is unduly dependent on the historical behaviour. Even if the leverage or the 
business mix remains unaltered, firms tend to grow across time, which creates the basis for 
operating structures to change, implying a different beta (Damodaran, 2002). For that very 
reason, the Bayesian approaches presents itself as a valid alternative for estimating the beta, 
being achieved through a weighted average of the historical beta and a beta of 1.0. 
Adding to the list, it is proposed by Rosenberg and Rudd that the beta movements are 
correlated mainly with four factors, these being, growth, earnings variability, financial 
leverage, and size. 
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2.3.1.1.1.2 Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 
The risk premium is a fundamental and critical component in valuation. It can be influenced by 
a set of determinates enclosing: investor risk aversion, behavioural components and 
macroeconomic volatility (Damodaran, 2008). 
Three approaches that can be used to estimate risk premiums shall be presented, these being: 
“the survey approach, where investors or managers are asked to provide estimates of the 
equity risk premium for the future, the historical return approach, where the premium is based 
upon how well equities have done in the past and the implied approach, where we use future 
cash flows or observed bond default spreads to estimate the current equity risk premium” 
(Damodaran, 2008). Hence, the estimated premium can vary widely across approaches.  
Some theorists hold a different view over these matters, and they argue that the country risk 
should be reflected in the cash flows projections and not in the discount rate, by considering 
different scenarios. As developed above, Damodaran (2008) disagrees with this prespective 
advocating that creating different scenarios for the cash-flows will lead the expected cash-flow 
outcome to be riskier and thereby, claiming for an extra risk adjustment.  
 Goedhart (2003), considers that there is not a single correct method that has proven to be 
appropriate for every scenario, and in this sense the choice depends on the valuation at issue 
and its specificities, given that what is valid on the short-term may not be in a longer run.  
Damodaran (2002) suggests using a market risk premium for developed economies that ranges 
between 5 and 5.5 per cent, value that is commonly used by analysts.  
 
2.3.1.1.1.3 Risk-free Rate (Rf) 
For an investment to be considered as being risk-free, it has to fulfil two conditions. The first is 
that the cash flows should carry no risk of default with them. The second presupposes the 
nonexistence of reinvestment risk in the investment. Accordingly, the actual return is always 
equivalent to the expected return in such an investment. 
 The significance of the risk-free rate in what takes to valuation rests on the cost of equity and 
cost of debt estimation. 
Based upon the previously described criteria, the effective risk-free rate to be used in order to 
attain the expected returns should be a default-free zero coupon rate that is matched when 
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the cash flows that are being discounted occur. In the words of Damodaran (2008), “in 
practice, however, it is usually appropriate to match up the duration of the risk-free asset to 
the duration of the cash flows being analysed. In corporate finance and valuation, this will lead 
us towards long-term government bond rates as risk-free rates”. 
Aligned with the described view, Copeland (2000) advises the use of a 10-year Treasury bond, 
mainly for three reasons. The first is that when compared with a 30-year bond, it is has a lower 
liquidity premium, being less sensitive to inflation. The second is that, the 10-year Treasury 
bond is preferred to a short-term Treasury Bill, given that it is a long-term rate that frequently 
gets near the duration of the cash flow of the firm into consideration. And the third, this rate 
approximates the duration of the stock market index portfolio, reinforcing its consistency 
when bringing to the formula the beta and market premiums accounted. 
However, problems contemplating the risk-free rate estimation can arise, and may these 
undergo the cases when long-term government bonds are not traded, or whenever these bond 
rates have some default risk affiliated. In order to quell these problems, Damodaran (2008) 
proposes doing the valuation in a different currency or still estimating the risk-free rate from 
forward markets or fundamentals. As for the second issue, the default spread should be 
deducted from the risk-free rate. 
 
2.3.1.1.2 Adjusted Present Value (APV)  
APV has its foundations on the work performed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), and it has 
been further developed by Myers (1974), following a consistent rational. 
As Luehrman (1997) advocates, the APV model enforces a separation between the intrinsic 
value of the assets-in-place, and the value created by a favourable financial structure. The real 
strength of this approach lies in the relevant information it can provide, given that it allows not 
only to see how much an asset is worth but also whence the value comes from. The APV 
disaggregates the value of operations from the value of the financing side effects. 
Aligned with the above perspective, Damodaran (2006) utters that in opposition to typical DCF 
valuations, which reflect in the discount rate the effects of debt financing, APV initially values 
the company excluding debt and adding afterwards the benefits (tax shields) and costs of 
borrowing. 
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In this sense, the choice for the APV method in place of the WACC should essentially rely on a 
firm’s capital structure. When this crucial attribute is expected to change substantially over 
time, the APV appears as the most credible solution, the solution to be adopted, since this 
method permits to decompound the value of the firm into different parts, value them 
separately and sum them in a final phase, thus providing a clean and more informative value 
metric (Kottler, 2005).  
Establishing a link with other approaches, Luehrman (1997) advances that, the DCF method, 
which adopts the WACC as the discount rate is deprecated, mainly because APV works when 
WACC does, and sometimes when WACC does not, since the APV does not require such 
restrictive assumptions as WACC. WACC is suitable only for the simplest and most static capital 
structures. In other cases (that is, in most real situations), it needs to be adjusted extensively. 
On the other hand, and stating that either the WACC equation or the equity cost has to be 
consistent with the assumed APV model, Booth (2007) argues that “it is a judgement call 
whether WACC is “better” than a particular APV model, but knowing one, we can always get 
the other”.  
It should be noted that when a company opts for funding its operations resorting to debt it is 
making use of the tax deductibility of interest expenses, incorporating a tax benefit. However, 
on the other hand, by increasing the level of debt, the firm is also increasing the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
One of the most difficult aspects to circumvent when adopting this methodology has to deal 
with agreeing on the most accurate discount rate, the one that better reflects the riskiness of 
the tax shields as well as the remaining components of the financing side effects.  
 
2.3.1.1.2.1 Tax Shields 
This topic is regarded as controversial within the existing literature, in the sense that there is 
no consensus around the right way to compute the value of tax shields. 
Brought to discussion by Modigliani and Miller (1963), the first authors considering the benefit 
from debt financing, it was initially proposed to be obtain through discounting the tax savings 
at the risk-free rate, when looking at a no growth scenario. 
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Developing on this early work, several different approaches were presented. Harry and Pringle 
(1980), assuming that interest tax shields have the same systematic risk as the firm’s cash 
flows, suggested the use of the unlevered cost of equity, whereas Miles and Ezzell (1980) 
recommended a firm with a fixed debt-to-equity ratio to use the cost of debt in the first year 
and the unlevered cost of equity in the following periods. 
Offering a different perspective, Myers (1974) and Damodaran (2006), building on the 
assumption that the risk of the tax savings is equal to the one of debt, suggested using the cost 
of debt as the appropriate discount rate. 
Ultimately, the estimation of the value of the tax shields can be seen as depending on the debt 
policy appropriated by the firm. 
2.3.1.1.2.2 Bankruptcy Costs 
Damodaran (2006) is pointed out as pioneer in what takes to considering the effects of 
bankruptcy costs in the final value of the firm. Subsequently, he divides this costs into two 
categories: the direct costs, those related with liquidation costs when the first approach 
bankruptcy, and the indirect costs, including the continual costs which are not related to 
bankruptcy but derive from the firm leverage.  
The trouble in estimating those costs stems from the difficulty identifying the costs itself and 
its associated probability of occurrence.  
According to Vernimmen (2005) the historical default rates supplied by the rating agencies, 
which associate a probability of default for each debt level, can be used to obtain the 
probability at issue. 
Another possible approach, as advocated by Damodaran (2006) can go through at each level of 
debt, estimating a bond rating and use the empirical estimates of default probabilities for each 
rating, which is computed with recourse to the interest coverage ratio. 
The expected bankruptcy costs can be determinant on the definition of the capital structure of 
a firm. 
 
2.3.1.1.3 Excess Return Models 
Excess return models have their roots in capital budgeting and the net present value rule. 
Actually, an incurred investment only add value if it NPV is higher than zero, what may imply 
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that cash flow growth as well as earnings are only valuable when they are escorted by excess 
returns, meaning this, returns on equity capital that surpass the cost of equity. Those models 
assimilate this conclusion further exploiting it and calculating the value of a firm as a function 
of the excess returns (Damodaran 2005).  
Excess Return Models’ primary idea is to interpret the value of a business as being the sum of 
the invested capital and the excess return from both existing and future projects. This trait 
permits analysts to savvy whether the company is creating or destroying value. 
It can de condensed into two main approaches, the Economic Value Added (EVA) and the 
Dynamic ROE. 
 
2.3.1.1.3.1 EVA 
“EVA is the financial performance measure that comes closer than any other to capturing the 
true economic profit of an enterprise. EVA also is the performance measure most directly 
linked to the creation of shareholder wealth over time” (Stewart, 1991). The Economic Value 
Added measures the excess return raised by an investment or by a set of investments 
(Damodaran, 2002). In order to make this model viable, it requires the articulation of three 
main building blocks: the return on capital, the capital invested, and the cost of capital 
(Burksaitiene, 2009). 
Damodaran (2005) as many other authors, assert that the NPV and EVA are related. 
2.3.1.1.3.2 Dynamic ROE 
The Dynamic ROE is nourished by the same premises in which the EVA model builds. Its main 
difference is that it focuses on the equity side, being the excess returns the result of the 
difference between returns and cost of equity. Hence, this model enables us to verify when 
the company generates value for the shareholders (Damodaran, 2002). 
 
2.3.1.2 Equity Valuation 
 
2.3.1.2.1 Free Cash Flow to the Equity (FCFE) 
The Free Cash Flow to the Equity is a direct valuation method which values the equity stake of 
the company. It consists in discounting the expected cash flows to shareholders (the cash flow 
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from assets after debt repayments and reinvestment needs), at a rate of return (cost of equity) 
applicable to the level of risk in the firm (Damodaran, 2006). 
This model is aligned with the FCFF in what takes to its main handicaps. In both cases, the cost 
of equity will be influenced by changes in the capital structure through the company’s levered 
beta. 
However and according to Damodaran (2006), when compared to FCFF, the FCFE model is 
more prone to errors. In fact, the FFFC is a pre-debt cash flow whereas the FCFE takes into 
account debt repayments and new issuances, being more vulnerable to the effects of the 
financial structure. As de author advocates, those components are harder to foresee than an 
optimal debt-to-equity ratio, crucial to perform the WACC calculations. 
Nonetheless, in theoretical terms, and considering consistent assumptions in respect to debt 
financing, it can be asserted that both methods are equivalent (Fernandez, 2004).  
 
2.3.1.2.2 Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
The Dividend Discount Model rests on the assumption that through the acquisition of shares, 
an investor aims to receive a selling price at the end of the holding period, and another type of 
cash flow, dividends (Damodaran, 2006).  
This particular model reaches the value of equity through calculating the present value of the 
expected dividends, delineating consistent assumptions on the earnings future growth and 
payout ratio. If so, it can fail to be truly representative in situations where the company 
instead of distributing as much dividends as they can, opt to hold cash, which originate a 
scenario of misestimating the actual equity value (Damodaran, 2002) 
DDM is widely appreciated by investors if we consider the dividends high level of tangibility 
when compared to distinct cash flows. Ultimately, and respecting all the enunciated premises, 
this could constitute one of the most accurate DCF models. 
Despite all this, this approach can give rise to scenarios of overestimation of the results, 
particularly in cases where companies fund themselves to distribute dividends or, on the other 
hand, when holding cash that was available to be distributed to stockholders (Damodaran, 
2006). 
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2.3.2 Contingent Claim Valuation  
The Contingent Claim Valuation, or Option Valuation, is particularly relevant for its ability to 
value flexibility. It is also relevant when valuing projects or individual businesses that entail 
substantial levels of uncertainty and opportunities associated (Vernimmen, 2005). Even though 
it is not a regularly used method to value the entire business, it yields concrete advantages 
when applied to companies that only commercialize one type of product, that are in financial 
distress, or in a commodity based industry (Koller, 2005).    
Option valuation is often used to make decisions such as whether or not to explore an 
opportunity, regarding for instance, natural resources, new technologies or, R&D investments. 
It is therefore a crucial component in some businesses’ decision-making process (Luehrman, 
1997). 
Reinforcing the previous observation Damodaran (2002) states that “real options offer the 
right but not the obligation, to change an investment project and, in particular, when 
information on its prospective returns becomes available”.  
There are several valuation models, including the binomial model or, the Black-Scholes model, 
which derives from the first. 
 
2.3.3 Relative Valuation 
In regard to relative valuation, an asset is valued taking into account the way other assets with 
similar characteristics are priced in the market. According to Damodaran (2006) this process is 
composed by three connected steps. First, one should look for similar assets which are priced 
in the market; second, it is important to scale the market prices to a common variable in order 
to obtain comparable standardized prices; and the third calls for adjusting for differences 
across assets when collating the standardized values. 
The use of multiples yields some advantages when compared to other valuation methods. It 
overpasses the inherent difficulty in determining in an independent way the future cash flows, 
since when the basis of substitutability can be accurately determined; there are verily 
comparable publicly traded transactions available and; when the multiple can be estimated 
reliably, this particular method would end up being superior to other valuation metrics, such 
as the discounted cash flow.  It also avoids the issues associated with applying the discounted 
cash flow method of picking a theoretical-based model of the proper discount rate, which uses 
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historical data to estimate it, since the method of multiples adopts current market measures of 
industry growth rates and required returns (Baker and Ruback, 1999). 
Following the same authors’ view, the relative valuation also contemplates some handicaps. 
One problem related to its implementation as to deal with finding the best basis of 
substitutability, which varies from industry to industry because the underlying value drivers 
also differ across industries. This is commonly chosen on a qualitative way as a measure of 
financial performance (including revenues, earnings before interest taxes and depreciation, or 
cash flow), or as a measure of operating performance (like established reserves or 
subscribers). Another one, regards measuring the multiple, what is typically done through the 
use of the simple mean or median of the multiples implicit in the market pricing of a group of 
publicly traded comparable firms or transactions. The last handicap, relates to the choice of a 
consistent peer group, inclosing truly comparable firms.  
If by one side, through the use of multiples as a valuation metric, the practitioners may forfeit 
some of the benefits associated to the use a complete pro-forma analysis; on the other, they 
get a handy valuation heuristic that provides accurate results without incurring extensive time 
and effort costs. In fact, in accordance to Bhojraj and Lee (2002), it is possible to overcome the 
limitations in terms of information evidenced by this approach through a careful and 
consistent selection of comparable firms. It is further argued that the composition of such 
group should be a function of the variables that drive cross-sectional variation in a given 
valuation multiple.  
Hence, Cheng and McNamara (2000), Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and Bhojraj et al. (2003) argue 
that “picking comparables using a combination of industry categorization and fundamentals 
such as total assets yields more precise valuations than using just the industry classification”. 
Furthermore, this selection should include that apart from competing in the same market, 
those companies are subject to the same macroeconomic forces, and have similar profitability, 
growth, and returns on capital (Foushee, Koller and Mehta, 2012). 
In what comes to deciding which type of multiples to use in performing the valuation, it is a 
fact that some multiples are considered better than others when comparing performance is 
the goal. In Foushee, Koller and Metha’s (2012) words, and by way of example, the P/E ratio is 
affected by differences in capital structures and non-operating items (such as write-offs and 
one-time events), which can be responsible for ambiguous conclusions if no adjustments are 
performed. Therefore, and by the fact that they are not by distortions affecting earnings, many 
analysts use other multiples like EV/EBITDA. In general, asset based multiples tend to be more 
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accurate and less biased in estimating the final values than sales and earnings multiples. The 
appropriateness and consequent superiority of enterprise-value multiples is advocated given 
the fact that both equity and debt are valued and in this sense, are less vulnerable to changes 
in capital structure. 
Taking an opposite, supported by several studies, Liu (2002,2007) utters that the choice on the 
right multiple to use should lie on earnings multiples given that the resulting valuations are 
more accurate for the majority of the companies, supported by the increased availability of 
earnings forecasts. The same author advises the use of forward earnings instead of historical 
ones, since those explain stock prices well for a considerable number of firms.   
Reconciling relative valuation with the discounted cash flows ones, it is relevant to stress that 
the difference in value from those methods arise from market inefficiency. In relative valuation 
it is assumed that the markets are correct on average, even if making mistakes on individual 
stocks, whereas in discounted cash flow valuation it is assumed that the market makes 
mistakes, which are corrected over time, and that these mistakes can occur across sectors or 
even the entire market (Damodaran, 2005). 
Moreover, the discounted cash flow and the relative valuation, when used separately, can 
yield convergent results if the market is correct. 
 
2.3.4 Cross Border and Emerging Markets’ Valuation 
The rationale behind the deepening of this topic relates to the Portugal Telecom’s 
international expression. 
It is of great relevance to begin by declaring that the major principles of valuation that apply to 
the conventional domestic capital budgeting are on their essence, equal to those conducting 
cross border valuations. Hence, the only applicable change concerns the application of the 
widely used standard valuation techniques. 
Though, currency conversion is a great concern embodied on those types of valuation and 
therefore, should be incorporated into the analysis. This issue can be overcome by “explicitly 
forecasting exchange rates, converting foreign-currency cash flows, and then discounting at an 
appropriate home-country discount rate; or by appropriately incorporating the expected rate 
of change in exchange rates in the discount rate when discounting foreign currency cash 
flows” (Kester and Morley, 1997). 
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Apart from the exchange rate there are other components deserving some attention when 
dialing with such valuations, counting within many others: the choice of which cash flows, 
earned or remitted, to discount; possible divergence of the reporting standards; adjusting for 
foreign currency; the relevant tax rate and the amount of taxable income; capturing special 
financial benefits and costs associated with cross-border investments; and adjusting for 
various types of country risk (Kester and Morley, 1997). 
As previously mentioned, the basic procedures used to estimate future cash flows discounted 
at the appropriate rate, are basically equal in every case. Yet, when emerging markets are 
equated, the ampleness of the involved risks may be considerably higher. According to Koller 
and Timothy (2000), not only the methods need to be adapted but also often require making 
arbitrary adjustments that are sustained by limited empirical evidence and even by gut feel.  
As pronouncedly stressed by Goedhart and Haden (2003), emerging markets are characterized 
by their exposure to some additional risks, among which are included, high levels of inflation; 
macroeconomic volatility; political distress; exchange rate fluctuation; regulatory change and; 
adverse fiscal laws. These set of factors influence decision making and involve changes to the 
traditional format of business valuation. However, “while individual risks in each country may 
be high, it is important to keep in mind that they have low correlations with each other. As a 
result, the overall performance of an emerging-market portfolio can be quite stable if 
investments are spread out over several countries”(Goedhart and Haden, 2003). 
Commonly accepted is the fact that country-specific risks might affect different businesses 
differently, leading to very different valuations. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
After presenting the main valuation methods and approaches it is crucial to identify the one 
that best suits the purpose of this dissertation. In this sense, it is of great importance to 
determine the company’s characteristics and frame it on the referring industry as a way to get 
the sense of the entire picture. 
Aligning these thoughts with empirical evidence, the choice will relapse on an explicit 
multiperiod DCF method. Furthermore, since Portugal Telecom holds several investments in 
distinct geographical areas and has more than one business, a Sum-Of-The-Parts (SOTP) 
valuation should be used. 
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Exercising its influence on the decision-making process is also, among other factors, the 
available data and the adopted financial policy. Once more, taking into account the relevant 
academic research, the DCF technique based on the WACC is largely preferred when dealing 
with stable, large, and not really high growth companies, which detain a defined dividend 
policy and a sustained target capital structure. Additionally, since this an acknowledged 
methodology within managers and other type of practitioners, it becomes considerably easier 
and at some extent less complex to established value added comparisons between company’s 
valuation outputs in broad terms, and more specifically in what takes to its main drivers and 
fundamentals. 
Complementing the developed reasoning, it is worth noticing that despite the fact that 
multiples valuation is most of the times, and counting on the yielded advantages over other 
methods, the one adopted by practitioners, DCF can provide accurate results with a higher 
degree of adherence to reality, depending on the consistency of its fundamentals. 
However, the multiples valuation will also be utilized as a way to validate the results obtained 
through the discounted cash flow approach, and to value the international investments hold 
by PT.  The chosen multiple -EV/EBITDA- is one of the most commonly used valuation metrics 
and, among other reasons, it as an Enterprise Value multiple allow for direct comparison of 
different firms, opposing to the Equity multiples which are influenced by leverage.  
 
 
3. Macroeconomic Environment 
3.1 International Economic Background 
Eurozone, over the last past years, has been clearly distressed by the sovereign debt crisis, 
which has severely affected the Southern European regions, in particular. Several 
developments arise directly from this problematic phenomenon, such as the need from some 
countries like Greece, Ireland and posteriorly Portugal, of financial external support from the 
European Union (EU) through the commonly denominated “Troika”, composed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European 
Commission (EC). The dissemination and collateral effects of this crisis also affected other 
more peripheral economies such as Spain and Italy, and even though in minor proportions, 
some economies regarded as core, like France or Austria.  This sovereign debt crisis not only 
contributed to a devastating reduction in liquidity in monetary and credit markets, as it 
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increased the risk aversion within the investors’ frame, which materialized in (a.) a decrease on 
the yields of some healthy economies like the German (ten-year bond declined from 2,963% in 
2010 to 1,829% in the end of 2011), (b.) on the Euro’s depreciation against the US dollar (-3% 
in 2011), and  (c.) on the increase of spreads of sovereigns considered to be riskier against the 
German Bond ; pronouncedly modifying the market trends. 
Figure  2: GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
As a way of responding to the described situation, the ECB embraced a less restrictive policy, 
made effective through a reduction on the reference interest rate (two cuts of 25bp in the last 
quarter of 2011) and an injection of liquidity on the financial system, whereas the distinct 
European policy setters betted on budget control and fiscal consolidation. 
Equity markets through reporting generalized losses throughout the main European indexes 
also evidence the importance attributed to this crisis. Portuguese Index, PSI20, was penalised 
by a 27,6% decrease. Less impacted were the US markets, given their better future economic 
prospects, and the ability to put into practice a more expansionary monetary policy by the 
hands of the Federal Reserve (FED). In other non-European markets such as the Brazilian, the 
declining pattern was once more followed, mainly due to their focus on inflation and price’s 
control (Bovespa declined 18,1%). 
Accounting for other indicators such as inflation, it is possible to identify a declining pattern in 
late 2011, supported by a continuous fall in raw materials’ prices. Other indicator, the Brent oil 
price, increased from 94,91US dollars on the end of 2010 to 106,3 US dollars on the end of 
2011, thanks to lower expectations on the global demand (see Appendix 1.1). 
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Figure 3: Main Economic Indicators 
 
Source: IMF 
 
3.1.1 Economic and Monetary Union – EUROZONE 
After a period characterized by strong investment, which translated into an economy’s 
acceleration, the Eurozone faced a gradual slow down throughout the year, resulting in a 
contraction of the activity in the last quarter of 2011. Even though facing this scenario, the 
annual GDP growth in European economic area was 1,5%, registering a slight decrease when 
compared with the previous year’s of 1,9%. For this fact contributed a constant spectrum of 
heterogeneity that characterized this particular geographic area. In fact, if by one side the 
strongest economy in the Eurozone - Germany - kept growing at a 3% pace, on the other, the 
Southern European countries did not perform that good as a result of a strong fiscal 
consolidation effort, registering negative GDP growth in cases like Portugal or Greece, and 
dejected growth in Italy and Spain.  In fact, this deceleration in growth and activity contraction 
are due to a tightening of fiscal policy and inherent fiscal consolidation (deficit decreased from 
6,2% in 2010 to 4,1% of GDP in 2011); a break in the exports trend, given the lack of demand in 
emerging economies; and the deterioration of other GDP components such as the private 
consumption and investment that succumb to higher levels of unemployment and to a more 
restrictive policy in what takes to credit access. 
 
 
 
2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E
Portugal: GDP 1,38 -1,47 -3,25 0,35 2,1 1,9 1,9 1,5
Inflation 2,16 3,79 2,65 1,30 1,55 1,47 1,47 1,47
Unemployment Rate 10,8 12,74 14,43 13,96 13,16 12,38 11,7 11,1
Eurozone: GDP 1,87 1,44 -0,32 0,89 1,4 1,6 1,66 1,67
Inflation 2,21 2,75 1,86 1,46 1,65 1,72 1,76 1,81
Unemployment Rate 10,12 10,13 10,87 10,82 10,47 10,10 9,60 9,10
Brazil: GDP 7,53 2,73 3,03 4,15 4,00 4,12 4,10 4,10
Inflation 5,91 6,50 4,96 5,02 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50
Unemployment Rate 6,74 5,97 6,00 6,50 7,00 7,00 7,00 7,00
Angola: GDP 3,41 3,40 9,66 6,75 6,67 6,63 6,06 6,16
Inflation 15,33 11,39 10,00 7,00 6,00 6,00 4,50 4,50
Main Indicators 
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Figure 4: Eurozone GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
Despite of this tardy growth, the core inflation in the Euro area was 1,4%. As for the annual 
average inflation rate, it increased from 2,2% in 2010 to 2,7% in 2011, mainly due to an 
increase in the energy and food prices. In line with this, the European Central Bank decreased 
the reference interest rates to 1% in the second half of 2011. In addition, the European 
monetary authority as response to the low levels of liquidity in the interbank markets and the 
lack of confidence evidenced by the various economic agents, took further action under the 
shape of acquisition of sovereign debt securities with resort to the secondary market and 
injection of liquidity in the banking system.  
Embracing this overall situation, the Euro ended the year of 2011 devaluing against the US 
dollar, closing at 1,296 US dollars, after a period (first half of the year) when it strengthened.  
 
3.2 Economic Activity in PT’s Main Geographies 
3.2.1 Portugal 
Deeply immersed in the economic and financial crisis, in 2011 Portugal faced the effects of 
declining economic growth and a costly financial external assistance program, the last resort to 
sustain the difficult period that the country is going through after the worsening of the funding 
conditions in the primary markets and an unstable environment well expressed by an 
increasing risk aversion among investors in respect to the Portuguese sovereign debt. Align 
with the described scenario, the rating agencies have spoken out, downgrading the Portuguese 
sovereign debt, leading to a huge increase (from 6,6% in 2010 to 13,36% in 2011) in the yield 
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of the Portuguese sovereign 10-year bonds, reaching a spread of 11,54% against the 10-year 
German bund.  
Figure 5: Portuguese Deficit as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Finance 
Managing its 78 billion bailout, the Portuguese government had to impose some severe 
measures in order to reach a set of pre-determined objectives.  Following its implementation 
in May 2011 the financial adjustment program has been subject to several positive reviews by 
the Troika, composed by European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Commission. In what concerns fiscal consolidation the process is being relatively well 
driven with the deficit numbers declining from 9,8% of GDP in 2010 to around 4 % in 2011. 
Aside from a group of extraordinary measures that were implemented (particularly the 
transfer of pension funds from banks), the fiscal consolidation process rests on a sustained 
effort to reduce expenditures, and a favorable tax revenue, respecting the forecasts. It is the 
government conviction that Portugal will return to the markets in over 2014. 
Some structural reforms have also been carried into practice namely those involving the rental 
and the labor markets, as others targeted to stimulate competition in various markets. 
This general process headed by the fiscal consolidation measures allied to a worsening of 
credit conditions resulted in a shrinking demand and consequently to a decline in the 
consumption patterns (public and private, of approximately 3% on average in 2011) and 
investment (around 11%). In what takes to the trade balance the deleveraging process 
continued, with the exports leading the process by registering a sustained growth of around 
7% (in real terms) in the trading volume concerning the emerging markets, with emphasis on 
Africa, Asia and Latin America; and the imports lowering, what contributes to mitigate the 
external deficit. 
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3.2.2 Brazil 
After growing 7,5% in 2010 the Brazilian economy showed a consistent performance despite 
the difficult environment affecting the international landscape, growing at 3% in 2011 as a 
result of a soaring middle-income class that has been gaining influence, and an effective effort 
targeting an income redistribution. In fact, the overall panorama in Brazil continues to be 
marked by a set of favorable conditions ravaging different aspects of the economy as it is the 
case of the labor market, which registered a low unemployment rate of about 6%, and at the 
same time saw the wages increasing by 5,2% in real terms. 
Figure 6: Brazil GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
Taking advantage of the willingness to buy of the emerging economies together with the 
developed countries’ liquidity injection on their central banks, the Brazilian economy was also 
able to enhance its exports (increasing by 26,8% and reaching record figures), favoring in this 
way its external trade balance (increase in trade surplus of around 47,8%) which mirrored 
higher commodities prices.  Such attractive scenery can be even sounder if considering the 
future prospects driven by hosting major sporting events and the inherent dynamism linked to 
the necessary infrastructures, which will generate more opportunities and have a positive 
impact on the economy by attracting foreign investment. 
Trying to take full advantage of this positive economic cycle the Brazilian Central Bank changed 
strategy incurring in an expansionary policy, decreasing the SELIC reference rate to 9,75%, as a 
way of defending the economic activity. Reflecting the strengthening process, inflation 
respected the later projections, reaching the 6,5% target for the year. 
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3.2.3 Africa 
African economies in general have responded quickly and effectively to the slowdown caused 
by the international crisis and are expected to grow at approximately 3,7% in 2011. A 
particular region deserves to be extolled for its consistent economic performance, the Sub-
Saharan Africa. Many countries within this geography are showing solid recoveries sustained 
by growing rates that are practically the same as the pre-crisis figures, however, some 
downside risks are make themselves more visible, namely the increasing exposure to 
commodity price swings and inflation. 
3.2.3.1 Angola 
As one of the forerunners of the African continent in terms of growth, Angola presents a 
growing economic activity (grew about 3,7% in 2011) sustained by a quality performance of 
the oil sector, being Angola the second largest player in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is possible 
primarily because of an expressive recovery in what takes to prices and its demand. 
Figure 7: Angola GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
Responsible for this economic growth is also the component of investments, mainly directed 
to building infrastructures in many distinct areas.  Angola is nowadays one of the biggest 
receivers of foreign investment in Africa. 
This overall picture aligned with improvement on the credit front, contributed to enhance the 
confidence in such country, which was translated in upgrades on the sovereign rating by the 
main rating agencies. 
In what concerns other macroeconomic indicators, inflation kept its high figures in 2011, 
registering a considerable increase, which is due to prices of food and beverages (mainly 
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affected by difficulties in logistics and distribution). Regarding the currency, the Kwanza has 
valued against the Euro and did not oscillate much against the US dollar. Departing from this 
framing, the monetary authorities as a way of boosting the economy adopted an expansionary 
policy based on a discount rate reduction (see Appendix 1 for additional information). 
 
 
4. Industry 
4.1 Global Telecommunications Sector 
The global telecommunications sector is characterized by a set of well-defined trends that 
constitute the basis for a changing environment. 
Within these trends we count a considerable transformation of consumer habits which is 
mainly driven by technology. This event is the result of an increasing number of players in 
areas like telecommunications, media or technology that bet on internationalization and 
innovation. The focus of their strategy allows for a wider spectrum of intervention as well as 
greater offer in terms of products and applications forcing the appearance of new needs. This 
is further enhanced by the inherent promotion of interactivity materialized through the social 
networks, fostering the use of new and more devices. 
Figure 8: Number of Devices in Portugal 
 
                              Source: PT Innovation Conference,2012 
The development of new networks and access technologies is only possible through 
considerable investments. Such investments are carried in specific plans contemplating 
technologies that are known to be more efficient in data transmission (allowing for higher 
access speed with lower costs associated), the New Generation Access Networks (NGAN), 
which include on the side of fixed business, the Fiber-To-The-Home networks (FTTH), and the 
Long Term Evolution (LTE/4G) on the mobile business side. These prospects are originating 
exponential data consumptions through various types of equipment (compatible with video, 
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data and voice) that call for new services. It is forecasted that globally the consumption of data 
will drastically increase in the medium term (5 times in the wireline and 65 times in the 
wireless, until 2014). 
Figure 9: Worldwide Data Consumption: Fixed Accesses        Figure 10 : Worldwide Data Consumption: Mobile 
Accesses 
 
                                                                                                                                             Source: PT Consolidated Annual Report,2011 
The consumption patterns are in this way being driven under new premises. The fast pace 
assumed in the technological world allied with the increasing availability of new devices is 
contributing to incremental internet users and linked usage, which is responsible for a higher 
bandwidth consumption, enhanced by the convergence of devices like TV, PC and mobile 
handset. This conjoint reality permits the brake through of the triple-play multi-screen concept 
in this industry, increasing the ability to be much of the time connected to the internet. 
Figure 11: Worldwide Connected TV Penetration 
 
                                                Source: PT Consolidated Annual Report,2010 
The telecommunications sector is expected to keep its growing patterns and in this way to set 
new competitive boundaries. Connectivity is therefore a key term in this new shape assumed 
by the sector, realized through the emergence of cloud-based services which join players from 
different areas that contributed for the same output (internet providers, equipment 
manufacturers, and media). Notwithstanding the solid emergence of this trend allowing for 
the creation of new brands and players in the personal and residential services, and also 
covering the corporate (SMEs and SOHOs), the bet on traditional services is to keep. 
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Figure 12: Internet Users (in Millions) 
 
Source: PT Consolidated Annual Report,2011 
4.2 European Telcos at a glance: Cash Flow and Dividends Under Pressure 
The European Telecommunications sector has underperformed the wider European equity 
market by around 7%, positioning itself as the third worst performing sector in Europe, just 
behind Mining and Oil&Gas. This poor performance can be attributed mainly to two key 
factors. Firstly the European Telco sector suffered from a poor last quarter of 2011 reporting 
season with outlook commentaries from a number of incumbents implying meaningful 
downward forecasts to most of the players. This sector has on average seen EPS estimates 
falling 6% YTD, which constitute a much severe scenario than that from the wider market. 
With competitive pressures in some core mobile markets having intensified meaningfully, this 
has raised understandable concerns that deflationary pressures will continue to weigh on the 
sector to a great extent. Additionally, the possible forecasts downgrades combined with credit 
rating pressures, have forced some of the incumbent operators to lower their shareholder 
return commitments in 2011 and 2012. 
It is regarded as a fact that the Telecommunications sector’s financial leverage is significantly 
higher than that of the wider market, which together with considerable off balance sheet 
adjustments, such as pensions and leases, leaves several players close to breaching their 
current ratings criteria and hence being subject to credit rating downgrades. This can have an 
immense effect on the companies’ strategies (including revising their dividend policy). 
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Figure 13:European Telecommunication Leverage Evolution: Net Debt/EBITDA 
 
Source: JP Morgan  
Another relevant trend that raged the sector has to deal with EBITDA declines and its 
compounding effect on the impact of credit rating risks. After the recent dividend cuts, pay-out 
ratios tend to be more sensible, which over time would seem to allow for some modest 
reductions in net debt. However, what actually happens is that for most companies a resulting 
benefit on reported leverage ratios is completely neutralized by ongoing EBITDA decreases. 
 
The cash flows associated to the Telecommunications sector have fallen by circa 20% since 
their 2007 peak, including a 6% decline in 2012. As a consequence, the sector’s EFCF yield has 
decreased from a historical level of between 12 to 13% to 10%, as of September 2012.   
 
4.3 Telecommunications Context in Portugal 
The telecommunications sector in Portugal is being marked by a continuous consolidation of 
bundled offers. The last four years were craved by a bet on the bundled offers by the majority 
of the players performing in this market, which are increasingly turning attentions to the joint 
reality of broadband, TV and voice, the so called triple-play. This action is mainly characterized 
by the presence of copper operators in TV segment, and the exploitation of the voice segment 
by cable operators. As a response to these new necessities, the main operators in Portugal 
33 
 
focused part of their efforts in improving the business related to data and voice, where PT 
stands as one of the most successful cases, achieving co-leadership in the pay-TV market. 
The Portuguese telecommunications reality does not distune from the trends evidenced 
throughout Europe, adapting its landscape with resort to investments directed towards fiber. 
In this field, Portugal Telecom, benefiting from a changed regulation (geographical 
segmentation approach), should be highlighted since it covers around 1,6 million households 
with its FTTH service (refer to Appendix 2 for PT’s Positioning). 
Figure 15:Service Revenue Composition for Leading European and US Mobile Operators 
 
                                                                                                Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank  
4.4 Competition 
PT competes in a sector that since 2000 (year when it was fully opened to competition) 
characterized as challenging and highly competitive. Detailed information comprising all 
business areas where PT act will be presented below. 
 4.4.1 Competition Facing Portugal Telecom’s Portuguese Operations 
As a player inserted in the telecommunications world, PT faces intense competition from 
diverse operators. The main competitors in Portuguese soil enclose ZON, Vodafone (the 
Portuguese subsidiary), Sonaecom (more than half owned by Sonae, SGPS), Cabovisão (owned 
by a private equity group), Oni Telecom- InfoComunicações, SA, AR Telecom, and Colt. 
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As verified at a global level, in Portugal the telecommunications sector has also followed the 
trend and became more challenging and aggressive in what takes to competition. This is 
mainly due to the entrance of mobile operators on the fixed market business, and inversely to 
the emergence of fixed services providers within the mobile’s domain. Other factors like the 
increasing bet on diversification through the adoption of the bundled offers centered on the 
triple play (3P) services, have also contribute to the entrench of such environment. This has 
been adopted as a core part of most players’ strategy, with emphasis to PT (registered an 
increase of around 32,9% from 2010) and ZON (10,3% growth in relation to 2010), which 
record a membership of 36,9% and 60,1% of their fixed-line customers to 3P, respectively. 
Note that PT drives its competition based on price. 
Residential Customers. This particular segment does not constitute an exception in the sense 
that competition is fierce and tends to intensify, thanks to the fact that it comes from both 
sides, fixed and mobile services providers. Nowadays, as a result of the convergence in the 
existing offers, mobile network operators are able to match PT’s fixed line telephone offer and 
in this way target the same group of customers. Those operators have already gone further 
and are in position to practice lower prices through the creation of low-cost brands, which will 
not only impact the fixed-line business, as it will also attempt to reach the lower end of the 
market. 
One end leads to the other, and as a response to the increase in competition, operators come 
up with new solutions. In what concerns the international telephone service, which has been 
watching its revenues being damaged owing to, for instance, competition from calling cards, 
and declining call prices, the answer goes through providing unlimited communications to all 
national numbers and to a large range of international fixed locations. This overall framing 
keeps pushing PT towards an international fixed line telephone price reduction. 
The Portuguese fixed voice market is traditionally a direct access market and this trend is well 
consolidated as ANACOM’s figures show, pre-selection has registered the lowest number of 
lines in this configuration of the past ten years. According to the same source, PT has a 58,7% 
market share in this market, a slight decrease from 2010 (60,4%). PT also has around 56,7% 
market share in what concerns the outgoing traffic. 
Based on the same source’s estimations, in 2011 PT has approximately 49,4% market share, 
and is the number one provider of fixed broadband Internet services, a sector with visible 
potential (more than 2 million users) that is already growing. 
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Figure 16: Portugal Fixed Broadband Market Share 
 
                                                                              Source: Bernstein Research 
PT also performs well in other viable markets as it is the case of Pay-TV. This is an especially 
good example of a market that is characterized by a fierce competition which contributed to a 
recent change in strategies. It was initially regarded as a high-value market, but nowadays the 
strategy goes through creating new low-end offers, and opting for a price skimming tactic 
making it affordable to all the market segments, and at the same time, in order to keep the 
high-value customers, offering new free quality content (such as video-on-demand). This is a 
market which enclose around 3 million customers (around 51,7% of the total households), 
where PT detains a 35% market share (meaning a 5,1% increase from 2010), being the second 
player in this market just behind ZON who keeps being the market leader despite its decrease 
of 4% in market share from 2010 (current market share of 53,9%). The remaining direct 
competition has been struggling to keep its residual scores. 
The figures presented above are the result of different strategies carried out by the various 
players. In PT’s case there has been a clear bet on a strategy based on a FTTH roll-out which 
proved effective enough to reach a number around 1 million households in 2011. ZON 
embarked on a different path turning its efforts towards its coaxial networks, aiming at 
upgrading those. Cabovisão assume a similar strategy whereas Sonaecom abreast Vodafone 
focused on developing their IPTV (leasing PT’s lines), centering their actions on fiber based 
networks in Lisbon and Oporto. The main common ambition transverse to all the players 
concerns retaining and in some cases acquiring customers at the expense of providing higher 
speed Internet. 
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Personal Customers. Portugal has one of the most dynamic markets in what takes to the 
mobile business. With more than 150 active mobile cards per each group of 100 habitants, this 
market performance has been remarkable as a result of the innumerous offers available which 
cover most of the customer needs in this field. In this market PT competes through its mobile 
operator -TMN- with two major opponents: Vodafone and Optimus which benefit from their 
multinational status that translates into higher resources availability, a set of well spread best 
practices, and cost synergies, to make tuff competition to TMN, on the mobile market, and 
broadly to PT thanks their capacity to improve performance in fixed-line services. There are 
also two recently founded Mobile Virtual Networks Operators (MVNO), named ZON Mobile 
(tutored by Vodafone), and Phone-ix (launched by the CTT and supported by TMN). 
Figure 17: Voice Revenue Forecast per Operator  
 
                                                           Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
In 2011, TMN assumes a leadership position with around 44% market share as a result of a 
strategy focused on strengthening its share, even more when its main competitors are betted 
on gaining territory in a near future, marketing its services belligerently.  
A revolutionary development that transformed this market in an even more competitive 
reality is linked to the introduction of the called “tribal plans” (introduced by Optmius first and 
followed by the remaining operators). Those plans consist of on-net pricing plans adaptable to 
each type of customers’ reality (TMN’s plan is known as “Moche”). Other innovative plans 
followed under the form of post-paid services and bundles including Internet. In TMN’s case 
this trend was materialized under the name of “e- e nunca mais acaba”, which allowed for all 
customers to adhere, increasing the number of minutes of usage on one hand, and negatively 
impacting per minute revenues on the other. 
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Figure 18: Voice Pricing Trends in Leading European Markets 
 
                                                                                                     Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
The same landscape fits the mobile broadband services. It presents constant evidence of 
declining revenues not only resulting from the high level of competition but also by the tight 
regulation imposed in the telecommunications industry. An illustrative example is the constant 
terminations rates reduction, which has been a trend since 2007 (68,2% decline in the past 
four years), and will still be decreased on upcoming periods. Other examples comprise roaming 
and retail data. 
Figure 19: MTR Trends in Leading European Markets                Figure 20: ARPM versus MTR Trends in Portugal 
 
Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
Similarly, a great deal of relevance has been attributed to marketing, driving consumption in 
terms of usage but injuring retail revenues. A considerable spectrum auction (800MHz, 1,8GHz 
and 2,6GHz) targeting the launch and further expansion of the 4G LTE networks (for 
38 
 
smartphones and modems), was placed in Portugal and consumed by the three major 
operators in the market.  TMN is expected to reach as far as 80% of the consumers. 
Enterprise Customers. Seemingly to what happens on other segments, PT faces an intense 
competition derived mainly from ZON, Vodafone, Sonaecom, AR Telecom, Oni Telecom and 
Colt. The aim of such interaction relates to the intention of consolidating interesting positions 
in market share within the business world (which is by standard a heavy and high volume 
user), through providing voice, data and Internet services. As a result of such competitive 
environment, PT was forced to decrease leased line prices. 
PT bases its activity in this business area on the use of leased lines, but competition can be 
made by using many other alternatives such as, the company’s own infrastructure, network 
infrastructure leased lines, or satellite-based networks. As a way to leverage performance in 
this particular branch, PT is turning its attention to efficient solutions linked to the IP VPN 
(Internet Protocol Virtual Private Networks). 
Additionally, PT’s strategy goes through potentiating its past investments and canalize the 
output towards providing efficient services on a field in which it is pioneer – cloud services. 
This type of services is very much appreciated by business customers and constitutes a good 
opportunity to successfully reach a wider group of customers allowing for a higher retention 
and consequently for an increase in revenues. This is a way of developing a service that is 
expected to register a considerable growth in a near future, making use of its modern Data 
Center and its extensive FTTH network. 
Wholesale Services. Now that most operators are adopting new alternatives to the use of PT’s 
network, direct competition in wholesale services segment is increasing, thus negatively 
impacting PT’s revenues. Most internal operators (both mobile and fixed) are using foreign 
providers of international connections to enhance their performance on this business area. 
The strongest operators are also adopting new courses of action with the same results to PT, 
they are installing their own wireline networks. 
 
4.4.2 Competition Facing Oi in Brazil 
Looking at the Brazilian Telecommunications landscape, Vivo, which has been acquired from 
PT by the largest Spanish telecommunications company, is Oi’s (PT’s presence in the Brazilian 
market) biggest competitor. Within the rest of the competition we count Claro, GVT and TIM 
(almost all part of multinational groups). Accordingly, Oi faces intense competition 
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exacerbated by the fact that most of its competitors are able to internalize important benefits 
arising from belonging to large groups. 
4.4.2.1 Residential Services Segment 
Local Fixed-Line Services.  As in Europe, the local fixed-line services market has been shaken by 
growing trends that contribute to the intensification of the competition climate. Mobile 
telecommunication services are making themselves more visible, leading to a constant transfer 
of customers from the fixed-line reality to the mobile one. This trend has been magnified by 
their ability to price their services on a really low base, further stimulating customers to 
substitute the fixe-line services for the mobile ones. The mitigation of such market is not only 
the result of the described factors but also by a change in patterns regarding the type of 
customers to involve. This is historically a market directed to corporate customers, in which 
most companies have focused their attention in. But even this has changed, and competitors 
started adapting their strategies to the low-income market end, investing on economic 
bundles. Adding to this, there was a flow of price decreases in telecommunications services led 
by a decrease in the interconnection rates. This rate decrease was an incentive for new players 
to use the other providers’ existing networks instead of investing in the construction of their 
owns, allowing them to practice more competitive prices than the incumbent players.   
The Brazilian market is divided in three different regions that follow a different market share 
structure, resulting from different performances from the various players. According to 
ANATEL (data from 2011), Oi is the market leader in the fixed-line business with an estimated 
market share of around 72,7%, followed by Embratel with 17,4% and GVT, which has been 
investing in this area, with approximately 5%. Considering region 2, Oi keeps its leading 
position accounting for roughly 66,4% of the market, compared to the 18,5% detained by GVT, 
and the 11% of Embratel, company from which Oi expects an increasingly intense competition 
in a near future. This belief is sustained by the capacity of Embratel to provide a competitive 
price bundle which includes cable television that is made accessible to the audience in regions 
1 and 2 through NET’s widespread cable network, a Embratel’s subsidiary. Another 
development that is meant to threaten Oi’s reign is linked to GVT and Embratel’s recent bet on 
expanding fixed-line network in some of the largest cities in Brazil, such as Rio de Janeiro. 
Other players aim at figuring within the top positions on this market, constituting examples, 
Vivo and TIM (has a 1,2% market share). Those companies make their presence felt through 
the offering of wireless fixed-line services which are only operational when associated to a 
specific radio base station.   
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 Competition is expected to come from other points such as mobile service operators which 
are gaining territory. The number of mobile subscribers in region 1 increased by almost 18% 
from 2010 t0 2011, in region grew by 14%, and in region 3 by 16% in the same period. This 
occurrence allied to the low rates associated to mobile services is expected to have a 
continuing negative impact in the number of fixed-line users and consequently on the traffic 
volume too. Traffic migration from fixed-lines is a consolidating process that is probable to be 
amplified by the difference in prices within the mobile network when compared to the fixed-
line one. Oi expects a decrease in revenues from this market as a result of the use of mobile 
devices over the fixed-line ones. 
Heading against the above predicted scenario, PT believes that other innovative services such 
as instant messaging will deepen the fixed-line declining trend. 
Figure 21: Oi Wireline Net Revenue Growth 
 
                                                                Source: Bernstein Research 
Long-Distance Services.  The long-distance services market is not an exception in what takes to 
the high level of competition registered. Historically Oi’s main competitor in this market has 
been Embratel, but more recently due to an intense discount policy, TIM assumed that 
position. Under ANATEL’s estimates of the number of long-distance minutes (data from 2011), 
in region 1 the top player is TIM with a market share of 57,4%, followed by Embratel with 
29,8%. Oi only accounts for around 9,1%. Regarding region 2 the same ranking prevails, with 
TIM registering a 48% market share, Embratel a 26,1%, and Oi having a market share of 17,4%. 
The same framing characterizes region 3. This time TIM has approximately 34,5% market 
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share, Embratel has around 29%, Telesp (the incumbent player in this region) has a 
considerable 20,3% market share, and Oi registers a 10,1% mark. 
As in many other geographies, in Brazil the communication rates generally drive consumption, 
this is true for long-distance calls as well. Together with the increasing offer of plans that 
include free minutes in calls to other subscribers, this may enhance customer migration and 
thus affecting Oi’s revenues. On the other hand, many customers started buying more than 
one SIM card tied to different operators in other to maximize the number of calls to all the 
operators with the least possible cost associated, which can be exploited by Oi in order to 
expand its customer base. 
Other countries need to add to the list of possible threats to these market new technologies 
such as VoIP, but this is not the case in Brazil. Long-distance calls are not supposed to suffer 
the impact of such services since the existence of broadband is limited making these 
alternatives unviable. 
Data Transmission Services. When compared to previously presented markets like the fixed-
line, the data transmission one is considerably less regulated, allowing in this way to less 
significant barriers to entry which translates into higher competition from other services 
(emphasis on the fixed-line communications). Oi’s main competitors in this market are 
Embratel, Intelig and GVT. 
In what concerns the broadband market, the cable television providers make their influence 
felt mainly through the offer of integrated packages inclosing broadband, television and voice 
services to the cable television subscribers. Moreover, Oi’s predicts a continuous bet on the 
expansion of networks incurred by its competitors which will promote a price reduction and 
the subsequent margin shrink.  
DTH services. In Brazil, subscription television has low penetration (20,8%) and limited growth 
prospects as a result of the high quality services provided by television broadcasters. 
The main subscription television suppliers in regions 1 and 2 are NET, which provides this 
service through the use of coaxial cable, and Embratel (under the “Claro TV” brand) and SKY 
that provide DTH service.  Oi has only recently expanded this service to all states of regions 1 
and 2 following a staged process. 
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4.4.2.2 Personal Services Segment 
Oi faces a tremendous competition on the mobile telecommunications services market, 
especially from Vivo, Telecom Americas (through the brand named “Claro”), and TIM. 
Competition is based on promotions offered to both pre-paid (under the form of traffic 
subsidies) and post-paid (traffic and handset subsidies) customers, and is targeted at reaching 
as much market share as possible. 
According to ANATEL, in 2011 the market share structure was as follows: in region 1 Oi was 
ranked in third place with 23,2% market share, after registering an addition of mobile 
subscribers during 2011, behind Vivo (27,2%) and TIM (26,7%),but in front of Claro which has a 
22,5% share. In region 2, Vivo kept the leader position with a 30,8% share, followed by Claro, 
accounting for 28,6%, and TIM with 26,3% market share. Oi in turn has around 14,2% market 
share in this region. In what takes to region 3, the hierarchy is the same as in region 2, with 
pretty close figures. Vivo is the number one player with 33% of the market, followed by Claro 
with approximately 26,1%, and TIM with 26,3%. Oi has circa 14,5%. 
 
4.5 Telecommunications Context in Africa 
Recently, Africa has surpassed Asia in what concerns to growth in number of mobile 
connections. Following this trend, the continent is expected to reach the 700 million mark by 
the middle of 2012. Recent data about the market (which counts with more than 1 billion 
people, roughly 14% of the world’s population) points to a penetration rate of more than 62%. 
It should be noted that the average growth of the continent was of about 19% in 2011, which 
meant a 26 million connections increase in the first half of 2012. 
Even though the remarkable growth is a reality throughout the continent, different areas 
evidence different rhythms. The southern region of Africa, which has a 113% penetration, 
keeps a growth record of 21% a year, whereas the eastern part, with a 42% penetration rate, 
responds for a 26% growth. At the same time, the northern market, namely Egypt, counting on 
a 101% penetration rate, gives no sign of saturation.  
The African market is pulled by the large increase on the pre-paid connections, representing 
more than 95% of the total connections. This is one of the main factors contributing for the 
ARPU in Europe to be of about 27Dollars, and in Africa, of only 8Dollars. However, it should be 
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included onto this analysis that according to the World Bank in 2010, the European GDP per 
capita was more than 25 thousand Dollars, whereas, in Africa it was around 1500 Dollars. 
In what takes to the EBITDA margin, it varies from 27% in Europe to 45% in Africa. The first has 
been registering a slowly decrease, whilst it has been increasing in Africa (in 2001 the margin 
was of 34%). These trends can be explained by one side, by the high costs associated to the 
considerable amount of regulation in Europe, and on the other, the reduce costs of operating 
in large scale into the African continent. 
Even if setting apart the great potential to enlarge the services scale, the African market has 
considerable room for important investments, since 89% of the connections is 2G, and only 1% 
corresponds to LTE technology. Moreover, the annual growth of 2G is of 14%, while the 3G 
technology grows at 44%, representing the projected future of convergence. 
On the eyes of investors, the telecommunications represent an attractive market to invest in, 
considering the low risks associated, especially in markets with low penetration and reduced 
number of players. In this sense, the incumbent investments tend to be the most rewarding, 
allowing for higher returns. Allied to all that, a market supported on the pre-paid business has 
to deal with reduced problems of credit. The attractiveness of such scenario justifies the fact 
that four of the five main investor groups in this market are from outside the continent. 
4.5.1 Angola’s Case 
Following the Angolan’s economy growth rhythm, the telecommunications sector has been 
boosting its activity in quality and quantity in terms of its offer, counting with more 
sophisticated instruments of communication. 
However, the challenges towards the sector’s development are sundry. There is the need to 
create conditions to the natural development of this dynamic sector on its several formats 
(fixe, mobile, Internet, and other services), and an additional effort resulting from the process 
of social and economic reconstruction faced by the country, a reality generative of specific 
opportunities and challenges. 
Wireline business. The fixed communications are not just phone lines, namely in Luanda. There 
are also a cable television (TV Cabo) infrastructure operating since 2003, which has been 
enriching its portfolio of channels and services provided. Furthermore, this is being converted 
to fiber, making way for the emergence of new voice, image and data services. As an example, 
Angola Telecom has in hands an investment plan of more than 2,4 thousand US Dollars, until 
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2013, targeted at promoting the wireline business. It stands, the installation of 500 thousand 
phone lines and, 7 thousand Kms of fiber. 
Mobile business. The mobile communications market was opened to competition in 2001, with 
the launching of the GSM network by Unitel. Since then, the mobile business has registered 
remarkable growth rates and the number of mobile subscriptions overpassed the one from 
fixed communications in less than one year, representing a current 30 to 1 proportion. 
Both networks, Movicel (belonging to Angola Telecom) ad Unitel, operate in broadband 
offering 3G services. It is estimated the existence of more than 10 million of mobile 
communications subscribers, representing a penetration rate of 57%. The prices charged are 
still relatively high, mainly due to the absence of competition. The lower economic growth 
pace from 2009 and the improvement of the services rendered on behalf of the fixed 
communications and Internet are the elements responsible for a slowdown to be registered in 
this market. However, the increase on the ongoing geographical coverage, allied to the higher 
competition expected with the entrance of the third player, will continue to stimulate the 
Angolan market for mobile communications. 
 
 
5. Portugal Telecom’s Overview  
5.1 Business Profile 
PT operates in many geographies in a market characterized by a rapid technological change in 
a highly competitive environment. The Company is positioned as a holding, contemplating a 
set of direct and indirectly held subsidiaries. The main companies which belong to PT are as 
follows:  (1) PT Comunicações, which operates in the wireline market. It has the largest 
telecommunications infrastructure in Portugal, the biggest client base in the sector, comprising 
more than 4 million telephone connections and a team driven by experience and know-how. It 
also offers an integrated service of voice, internet and television, through its brand Meo, 
representing a key driver for success in what takes to the residential segment. Meo assimilates 
the company’s value proposition allowing for every customer to access the intended content 
through different interfaces.  (2)TMN (Telecomunicações Móveis Nacionais, S.A.)operating on 
the mobile telecommunications sector, being the market leader in Portugal. And, in what takes 
to the operations in Brazil, (3) Oi. The idea is to expand PT’s success in the European 
telecommunications market to Brazil, as PT’s mobile business is well positioned, thanks to is 
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continuous innovation-based strategy. This is made possible through valuable partnerships, 
and important investments, mainly on innovation and technology. Taking into consideration 
the weigh of Oi in the Brazilian market and its high future growth potential, this is considered 
to be crucial for the group’s financial and operational performance. 
Additionally, PT has integrated certain functions across the company, in particular research 
and development capabilities (PT Inovação), information systems (PT Sistemas de Informação), 
central purchasing capabilities (PT Compras), back office activities (PT Pro), and call centre 
operations (PT Contact). 
Figure 22: PT’s Businesses 
Source: PT Offering Circular, 2012 
The main markets where PT operates are Portugal and Brazil, reporting revenues in four 
different segments, the residential, personal, enterprise, and wholesale. It still has some 
relevant interests in other telecommunications companies in Africa and Asia, namely in 
Angola, Namibia, Cape Verde, São Tomé & Príncipe, East Timor and Macau. 
In 2011, around 42% of the Company’s consolidated revenues were from its Portuguese 
operations, whereas the remaining 58% came from the international ones. 
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Figure 23: PT’s Businesses Split 
 
                                                                    Source: Bernstein Research 
Operations in Portugal. In Portuguese territory the services are made available depending on 
the need of the group of customers in question. When dealing with the Residential category, 
the services at issue are in most cases provided by PT Comunicações. The type of services 
involved include integrated networks inside the customers’ home, which permit for multiple 
devices to be connected, such as TV, Internet, fixed-line telephone and a sort of technological 
tools. 
                     Figure 24: Mobile Service Revenue Growth                                    Figure 25:  Wireline Revenue Growth 
 
Source: Bernstein Research 
Personal category involves mobile services provided to individuals through the group’s 
subsidiary TMN. Those include voice, data, and Internet-related multi-media services. 
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The Enterprise sector comprises the supply of integrated data and business solutions to 
corporates and medium to small size business customers. It also include the purveyance of 
IT/IS and BPO (business process outsourcing) services. 
Finally, the wholesale category involves whole sale telecommunications services, the 
production and distribution of telephone directories, public pay telephones, and other 
services.  
Operations in Brazil. PT operates in the Brazilian Telecommunications sector through one of its 
largest players, Oi. PT detains a 23,25% economic interest in this company as of after the 
corporate reorganization that it has been submitted to. In 2011, Portugal Telecom 
consolidated a 25,6% ownership interest in  Oi S.A.’s parent company, TmarPart. 
                     Figure 26: Oi’s Net Revenue Growth                                    Figure 27:  Oi’s EBITDA Growth 
 
Source: Bernstein Research 
Oi is responsible for providing telecommunications services to the same segments adopted in 
Portugal. Thus, those services can be of the Residential type, which include domestic long-
distance services (mainly in Regions 1 and 2), local fixed-line services, fixed-line 
interconnection (connect different operator’s calls with Oi’s network) and data transmission 
services. The Personal ones are mainly related to the provision of mobile telecommunication 
services. Those include interconnection services, as well as , data and voice services made 
available under 2G and 3G technologies. Designed for corporate and medium to small size 
businesses, the Enterprise services comprise mobile and fixed-line telecommunications 
services, advanced data centers, storage capacity and advanced voice services. Other services 
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are also offered counting among these, subscription television (cable and DTH), ISP services, a 
call center and a payment system for mobile devices. 
PT also holds a 16,2% economic interest in the parent company of Contax (S.A. and 
Participações), CTX Participações S.A., for usufruct of contact center services. For the purpose 
of accessing call center and telemarketing services, PT holds a 44,4% participation in Contax. 
Operations in Africa. PT is present in Africa through a strategic partnership held with a private 
equity company that has a great influence in the sub-Saharan part of Africa, Helios Investors 
LP. Helios detains 25% of Africatel, a holding company created to manage all the participations 
of PT in the African market, namely in Angola, Cape Verde, Namibia, and São Tomé & Príncipe. 
In what concerns Angola, PT has 25% of Unitel. Unitel is a GSM mobile operator counting with 
a total of 7,454 million subscribers, most of them opting for a prepaid solution (98,7% as of 
2011). The company has been betting on enhancing the quality of its network, and on the 
expansion of its voice and mobile broadband market.  
Data from 2011 points at a 1,784 million US dollar gross operating revenues, an increase when 
compared to the previous two years (see Appendix 3.1). 
 
5.2 Strategy 
Portugal Telecom has delineated a strategy for the coming years sustained on discipline and 
commitment. It is based on the improvement of financial, operational, and cost performance, 
and is directed to its core assets in business and geographical terms. 
The main driver of such strategy is innovation. PT has adopted a structured approach towards 
innovation and its execution, becoming really selective in which projects to take and which 
partnerships to get involved in. Projects are selected taking into account two main variables, 
risk and maturity, whereas partnerships are established in order to add value, and those can 
be of technological (to develop new services and solutions) or best practices-sharing-based 
nature. This is only viable when setting target goals, and PT has its own well defined. PT aims 
at enlarging its customer base to 100 million clients; enhancing its international exposure and 
in this way increasing the weight of international revenues over the total; becoming one of the 
top European companies in operating and financial results, and also in shareholders’ return; 
reinforcing leadership in the market sectors where it operates (mainly through offering 
integrated and convergent services); and allying all those efforts to a resilient sustainability. 
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Focusing on the Portuguese landscape, PT is betted on taking the best out of the recent 
functional merger of its mobile and wireline businesses which was designed to privilege a 
sustained operational efficiency, being focused on customers. For this to be possible PT 
incurred in several cost cuts reducing part of its layers and changed its organizational structure 
to one divided into four main segments (residential, personal, enterprise and wholesale), 
centered on its specific needs, promoting a trust-based relationship which allow for customer 
retention and respective increase in consumption of the brand’s products and services.           
 
It is also focused on taking forward the execution of projects linked to next generation 
networks and customer care. In this sense, PT intends to keep making the difference in a 
particular front where it is already the leader in Portugal and responsible for the highest levels 
of penetration in Europe, FTTH rollout. FTTH plays a central role on the company’s intentions 
to provide better quality and faster data and video services (especially to its residential and 
corporate customers), and also to include the mobile business in this fiber network in order for 
its customers to benefit from higher speed traffic. PT is also intended to monetize this 
investment to make the way to the LTE (Long Term Evolution) services, which are a 2012 
reality and the company is looking forward to increase its coverage level to more than 90% in 
no more than one year. Additionally, PT aims at improving performance in responding to more 
complex IT and television services. It also owns an expressive and global Wi-Fi network (see 
Appendix 3.2 for information by segment). 
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6. Risks and Uncertainties 
PT competes on a highly competitive industry subject to several risks and uncertainties of 
several origins. Those risks can be grouped into three main classes given its specificities: the 
Environmental; Financial, and Operational risks. 
Regarding the Environment risks, the first that has direct impact on PT’s performance has to 
deal with the industry’s regulation. On this subject, Portugal Telecom is under a tight set of 
regulatory measures which can have a great impact on the company. Changes promoted at 
national or international level by the competent entities may enhance the competitive pattern, 
increasing pressure and modifying the game terms with direct influence on the business 
results. Regulation might affect some key areas with particular incidence in the mobile 
business, digital television, next generation networks, broadband markets, and in more detail, 
on the type of offer and pricing. 
Another risk factor is related to competition. An increase in competition driven by other 
players or new operators in the market can compromise the PT’s estimated revenues. The 
intensification of competition can make itself felt through the introduction of new products 
and services, the use of economies of scale allowing for an increase in efficiency and cost 
reduction, aggressive marketing efforts, or through the bet on quality and differentiation. 
Aware of such threats, PT is focused on innovation and execution as a way of seizing best 
opportunities and addressing each segment individual needs. 
It should be noted that innovation, of the technological type, can also constitute a risk which 
has to be considered by the operators within the telecommunications industry. This is a fast-
pace business which demands for the additional effort of keeping trace of the technological 
advances and continuously adapting to changing environments. It is a challenging industry that 
calls for a constant follow up of the most recent developments if the company wants to 
maintain its competitive advantages. This becomes even harder when managed under an 
unfavorable economic scenario. PT has kept itself on the top of the wave thanks to its regular 
policy of R&D investment to support the process. 
As referred to in the last paragraph, the economic recession context may impact the 
company’s financial and operational performance. The constant delay of economic recovery 
may cause the level of demand to decline and in this way having a direct impact on PT’s 
margins. PT has been seizing the best opportunities and diversifying its asset portfolio in order 
to foster growth and profitability. 
51 
 
In what takes to the Financial risks, those can be related to exchange and interest rates, and 
credit and liquidity risks. 
Since PT detains several international investments, which are hold in different currencies that 
not the Euro, it is exposed to an exchange rate risk. The fluctuations of foreign currencies 
against the Euro can impact the results consolidated on the Group’s results. PT is also subject 
to risk arising from debt issued in other currencies. 
Interest rate risk is also a constant namely in what concerns financial expenses involving 
floating rate debt. This situation is further relevant in a scenario of uncertainty and recurrent 
volatility which characterizes the actual financial markets. This risk is amplified by the difficult 
situation experienced by the country which translates into an increase in the Portuguese 
sovereign debt’s interest rates. As a way to circumvent the overall picture, PT has been 
investing in derivative financial instruments. However, the financial crisis may difficult the 
company’s access to the needed capital to boost growth. 
PT is always subject to financial losses coming from third party infringement of its contractual 
obligations towards the Group. This is commonly called credit risk and can be felt in PT’s 
treasury and operating activities. As for the first, these risks can be linked to cash investments, 
and in order to mitigate them PT opts for diversifying and investing its cash for short periods of 
time. Operational credit risk is mainly related to outstanding receivables, and the management 
tries to dilute the risk by proceeding to a careful risk analysis comprising a detailed credit 
profile, constant monitoring and performance tracking, limiting the credit granted to 
customers. 
Regarding the last of the financial risks, the liquidity risk, it contemplates the mismatch 
between the company’s sources of funding and its financing needs, which can be of different 
types, like investments, debt repayments or dividend payments, among others. As a way to 
control this risk, PT intends to manage its capital structure accordingly, controlling its debt 
structure (seeking a maturity that allow for matching its obligations) and looking forward to 
attain more financial flexibility. It is the company’s intention to reduce debt and extend its 
maturity in order to reach the proposed goals. 
The last risk’s class includes three kinds of Operational risks. The risk associated with the 
obtainment of valuable strategic partnerships is amplified when considering an industry with 
the specificities of the telecommunications’ one. In this industry one of the key drivers for 
future growth is directly linked to establishing the best partnerships possible in order to seize 
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and take advantage of the existing opportunities. Partnerships can cover different fields such 
as, content developers, R&D efforts, and technology and equipment suppliers, within many 
other types. 
There are also risks associated with the Group’s infrastructure capacity. This is a crucial point 
to meet high quality standards and provide customers with the required treatment, always 
matching the regulatory settings. Owning a network of infrastructures (which makes part of 
the core business and can not be avoided) is even more prone to be penalized by risks under 
the form of incidents and/or breakdowns when those are located into public areas. Given 
those facts, planning and contingency action plans assume a great deal of importance in PT’s 
management. 
In order to mitigate the possibilities of being affected by environmental damages, PT has been 
looking for the best course of action in what takes to obtaining the appropriate environmental 
policy. This comprises action to be taken in areas such as resource consumptions, controlling 
waste and emissions, noise constraints, and the development of awareness initiatives. 
 
7. Regulatory Background 
In an industry like the Portuguese telecommunication one, regulation plays a central role being 
very much felt in many aspects of the business. The landscape under analysis comprises a 
challenging and highly competitive environment, turning regulation into a crucial matter.  
The regulatory background set in Portugal affects PT’s financial and operational performance 
in many ways, with emphasis on the following ones: restrictions applicable to PT’s product and 
services offer and consequent pricing, mostly noted on fixed line voice services and broadband 
products; control on the MTR's with direct implications on the mobile business revenues; 
several procedures which are simplified in order to make it easier for competitors to gain share 
through the acquisition of other operators clients, namely through number portability, carrier 
pre-selection, or unbundling of the local loop; the universal service obligation, under which PT 
is obliged to provide certain services to the general public; the terms under which are 
negotiated the company’s concession and licenses; and the obligation to permit the use of PT’s 
fixed line networks by other operators. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, it should be highlighted the exerted influence by the 
changes on MTR policy. Following repeated recommendations from European Commission, 
ANACOM went even further and pressured the operators on the Portuguese market to reduce 
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the MTRs in force. This gesture has direct impact on the ARPU, which will tend to adopt a 
pattern of continuous decrease, affecting PT’s revenues. It is also likely to intensify 
competition through a pronounced bet on differentiation, harming once more the company’s 
revenues. 
For complete and detailed information on the regulatory background please refer to the 
Appendix 4. 
 
 
8. Portugal Telecom Valuation 
In face of what has been presented on the literature review the valuation technique adopted 
to value Portugal Telecom was a Sum-of-the-parts (SOTP) valuation resulting from a WACC 
based DCF methodology. The DCF methodology used was applied to the two main geographies 
where PT operates- Portugal and Brazil. The valuation in Portugal was divided into the central 
business units – wireline and mobile businesses- allowing for a better perception of each 
area’s contribution to the holding company. 
At this stage an important remark should be make, since from 3Q11 PT started reporting its 
Portuguese telecommunications businesses, where it is included the Mobile and Wireline , as 
newly organized operating segment. As part of this new operating report format, PT also 
reports revenues of the Portuguese telecommunication businesses on a per customer segment 
basis, as addressed during the review chapters, including the Residential, Personal, Enterprise, 
and Wholesale classes. Those new segments mirror the exact same information as the 
previous model but allocating the Mobile and Wireline units’ figures through these segments.  
As a way of using a representative framework it was decided to perform the present valuation 
resorting to the old notation. In this way it is possible to take into account as part of the basis 
for the forecasts, data from 2007 until the end of 2011, whereas opting for the current 
notation the valuation would be biased given that there was only complete data for the years 
2010 and 2011 (and for the first two quarters of 2012). Furthermore, below revenues figures 
are less detailed: costs, depreciations, EBITDA and Capex are only provided for the whole 
Portuguese segment and not for each customer segment; and reading the information on the 
new reporting format and then translating into the old one is a much reliable and accurate 
exercise than trying to perform the opposite one. Information for 2012 was taken into account 
on the projections for that year. 
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 In what concerns the Brazilian operations, the valuation was performed as one and the 
inherent stake was consolidated into the Group financial statements.  As a way to achieve that, 
the FCFF calculation was performed separately for the two geographical markets, being 
discounted at the appropriate Weighted Average Cost of Capital, adjusted for each reality. 
It is also relevant to mention that in what regards Brazilian operations, its Enterprise Value was 
computed in the local currency (Reais) and afterwards converted into Euros, using the 
appropriate BRL/EUR exchange rate for the present year, provided by the Central Bank of 
Portugal (BdP). 
Regarding the remaining international investments hold by PT, those were valued resorting to 
the use of relative valuation techniques (using the average sector multiple for Africa and Asia), 
and each participation taken into account for the EV of the Company. It should be enhanced 
that Contax was valued based on its market value at the time of the valuation. 
The final steps involved accounting for net debt and pension liabilities in order to obtain the 
Group’s equity value and the implicit share price for the year 2012.  
It should be noted that the valuation in question only incorporated the information obtained 
and not consider possible changes only visible for the management. Not having full access to 
information is one of the limitations evidenced by the model. 
 
8.1 Model: Opacity and Uncertainty 
As mentioned before, the adopted model assumes some drawbacks which should be taken 
into account when looking at the analysis in question. 
In this sense, the used method does not entirely capture the effects of opacity and uncertainty 
since the valuation assumes a fiscal year perspective and not one of value-to-day. Additionally, 
not having full access to the company’s experience, aspect that becomes so more important as 
one move from an individual membership to the other extreme, an international business 
group. 
Other aspects, more of the technical kinds, impacting the final output of this process comprise 
the existence of several different accounting and fiscal models for the investments hold by 
Portugal Telecom throughout the world. 
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Moreover, the minor or no knowledge over the new projects to be incurred by the company, 
given that the Management defends itself from competition only presenting them at a later 
stage than its take-off phase. The weight of the perpetuity into a valuation within a sector 
facing constant innovation should also be considered. 
 
8.2 Methodology Approach 
The purpose of this section is to address the adopted approach to value Portugal Telecom. 
Given the complexity and degree of detail employed into the process, the following descriptive 
analysis will focus on the general framing and not in treating each business unit and its 
individual contribution to the final results. Notwithstanding, as mentioned in the previous 
sections, each business was treated separately and incorporating its specific drivers. 
As in any other case, a valuation within the telecommunications industry should start by a 
careful analysis of the company´s financial statements and operating data. Understood the 
business characteristics and past trends it was possible to perform a detailed revenue forecast, 
which started by the identification of the most relevant factors that would impact directly or 
indirectly the projected values.  
In this sense, the valuation process starts by analyzing each specific business unit and 
forecasting the relevant drivers for the explicit period (until 2018), which may include number 
of customers, MTRs, or number of lines, within others. 
After a thorough evaluation based on a detailed research on the industry and PT’s 
performance it was possible to identify the future trends that will drive revenues along the 
explicit period which combined with the ARPU estimates allowed for the obtainment of the 
final figures. Great relevance has been attributed to future expectations adjusted to my 
perceptions. 
The following step regards calculating the operating costs while never forgetting about the 
EBITDA margins. The margins are a crucial profitability indicator and have been analyzed taking 
into account its behavior and the performance of the market where PT operates. Accordingly, 
the operating costs were forecasted in relation to the operating costs, assimilating future 
expectations and gazing the margins’ evolution. 
The operating costs projections incorporate the restructuring plan implemented at the end of 
2010 which was targeted at diminishing the overall cost structure mainly through promoting 
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efficiency in certain internal processes, taking advantage of the established economies of scale 
and scope, and cutting costs related to personnel and other items with indirect impact on the 
company’s base operations. 
The following step involves determining the amount of depreciation to be recognized, using 
for this end a relation to the reported balance of tangible assets. At the same stage, capital 
expenditures were analyzed. For this purpose it has been brought to the equation the 
company’s investment plan, which was put together with its assets, both tangible and 
intangible, allowing to estimate the outflows regarding the direct investing activity. 
Ending the income statements’ projections, other expenses were estimated given its 
proportion to the relevant IS item, and financial costs using as main determinant the debt 
level. For that, cash inflows and outflows had to be determined.  
In line with the last step, the working capital needs were computed reckoning for the 
difference between current assets (accounts receivable, cash and equivalents, and inventories) 
and current liabilities (accounts payable), which in its turn needed to be previously projected 
(in this case assuming the evolution registered on the operating revenues and the cash ratio in 
what takes to the cash and equivalents item) as part of the balance sheet forecasts.  Those 
items have been estimated taking into account the evolution registered on the operating 
revenues which is reflected on the reference percentage used on the key liquidity ratios 
employed. 
Considering the target leverage ratio for the company, what remained was the FCF map 
development as a way to get to the final value. For that purposed the company was regarded 
as if it was unlevered the path was followed all over from the EBITDA to the cash flow from 
operations, going through EBIT and the operating profit calculations in the middle. The 
resulting free cash flows were then discounted at the appropriate WACC. 
Once the EV was estimated, the net debt and pension liabilities were deducted as a way to 
obtain the company’s equity value, which divided by the number of outstanding shares 
provides PT’s share price. 
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8.3 Valuation Process 
8.3.1 Operating Revenues 
Portugal Telecom encloses different business units which represent distinct realities, deserving 
in this sense to be treated separately.  
In what concerns the operating revenues, and given the structure followed to value the 
company, its projections were submitted to a common principle of disaggregation between its 
main sources but analyzed under different perspectives comprising distinct key drivers, in what 
constitutes an attempt to reach credible and realistic forecasts. Furthermore, it was taken into 
account that the company is subject to different growth paces regarding the type of business 
and the geographical location at stake.  
As a way to build a scenario based on realistic and consistent forecasts it has been analyzed 
the past trends of each business unit as well as its current stage in terms of growth. The 
Portuguese telecommunications market exhibits a higher maturity level when compared to the 
Brazilian one, resulting in less space for organic growth for the operations developed in the 
first location. In Brazil the reality is quite different with the existence of several opportunities 
to grow, and Oi is taking advantage of it, keeping its expansion parallel to the overall country’s 
development.  It was taken into account the continuous improvement pattern evidenced in 
Brazil in the past, and its potential to maintain such trend even in a worldwide troubled 
economic environment. The economy pace plays a central role in the company performance. 
For the purpose of simplicity, each business’ revenues forecast will be presented separately 
accompanied by the respective reasoning. 
Figure 29: Consolidated Operating Revenues by Business Area 
 
Looking at the Portuguese operations, those can be split into two main areas: Mobile business, 
and the Wireline business. 
As for the first, its operating revenues were computed as the sum of three different sources: 
services rendered, sales, and other operating revenues.   
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 6.147 6.278 6.119 6.071 6.086 6.095 6.157 6.382
Wireline 1.843 1.826 1.815 1.824 1.847 1.882 1.916 1.954
Mobile TMN 1.245 1.160 1.128 1.161 1.187 1.214 1.234 1.251
Brazil - Oi 2.412 2.604 2.444 2.307 2.224 2.118 2.069 2.180
Other and eliminations 646 688 732 778 828 881 937 997
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The revenues coming from the services rendered arise from different sources. Focusing on the 
customer branch its revenues come from both the data and voice market, which show 
different patterns in terms of future prospects. Utilizing operating data from ANACOM it was 
possible to estimate the revenue figures combining the total number of customers with the 
ARPU for the business.  
Figure 30: Domestic Mobile Business (TMN) Services Rendered Revenues from Customer segment 
 
The operating data was worked up in order to obtain the total number of TMN customers. 
According to ANACOM the group of operators in the Portuguese mobile market comprise: 
TMN (44,1% MS), Vodafone (38,9%), Optimus (15,7%), Zon (0,8%), and CTT (0,4%). For that to 
be possible it was created a proxy based on the company’s penetration rate, which was 
assumed to grow thanks to the high accession to tribal plans, and the projected Portuguese 
population, by INE. Having the proxy developed and its growth measured, the annual growth 
of total subscriptions is assumed to equal these of the proxy. Additionally, the percentage of 
TMN subscribers was assumed to be constant, given the market characteristics which 
encompass a highly competitive environment where the innovative offers are easily matched, 
at 2011 levels, allowing in this way to obtain the number of customers belonging to TMN. 
Figure 31: TMN Customers forecasted 
 
Following the number of customers forecast, it was needed to compute another driver of the 
revenues’ figures, the ARPU. The average revenues per unit were projected taking into account 
its historical behavior and most important, the future expectations regarding each type of 
market. The ARPU for the data market was assumed to have positive growth, contributing for 
the data revenues to increase as this is the part of the mobile market in higher expansion (data 
consumption is the main income source). On the other hand, voice market revenues are 
expected to continue declining given the increasing offer of tribal plan solutions, which 
represent competition in pricing, leading to lower prices and lower revenues. In 2011 pre-paid 
plans were about 70% of total plans. The percentage of tribal plans as of the total pre-paid 
plans is increasing, being around 50% in 2010 and 58% in 2011 and predicted to keep 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Customer: Data market 319,5 336,5 356,6 377,9 397,6 416,9 430,3 441,5
∆ 2,9% 5,3% 6,0% 6,0% 5,2% 4,9% 3,2% 2,6%
Customer: Voice market 687,1 654,6 641,0 640,0 644,0 649,1 653,5 657,3
∆ -12,8% -4,7% -2,1% -0,2% 0,6% 0,8% 0,7% 0,6%
ARPU (customer: data) 14,4 15,1 15,9 16,5 17,0 17,5 17,9 18,3
ARPU (customer: voice) 31,0 29,5 28,6 28,0 27,6 27,3 27,2 27,2
Operating Data (from ANACOM) 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
TMN Customers (k) 7.444 7.407 7.477 7.618 7.782 7.923 8.016 8.063
% of TMN subscribers 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0%
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increasing in the following years. The minutes of use also tend to have a negative impact on 
the mobile revenues since a slowdown is expected. As a way to incorporate all the mentioned 
information, ARPU from the voice business is estimated to decline and to follow the 
Portuguese GDP and private consumption trends. 
The second largest item of the revenues arising from the services rendered is the 
interconnection. The main driver regarding interconnection revenues is the Mobile 
Termination Rate (MTR), which have a clear impact on the mobile business revenues. In PT’s 
case it is amplified by the fact of being the operator with the highest share in the market, 
becoming more penalized by a decrease in this rate when compared to competition. Following 
the regulator’s indications, MTR has been adopting a constant decrease pattern. It was 
assumed to stay stable from 2014 (last period covered by data from OECD) onwards, and it 
was computed through a monthly series from OECD. As it was thought as the main 
determinant, the interconnection revenues were forecasted to follow the MTR growth 
patterns. 
Figure 32: Domestic Mobile Business (TMN) Interconnection revenues, Estimated MTRs 
 
After analyzing the roaming market, it was noted that its prices have been declining 
contributing to a revenue decrease. In this sense, revenues were projected as a decreasing 
percentage of the customer revenues. 
The total revenues from the services rendered were forecasted as the sum of the customer, 
interconnection, and roamers’ revenues. 
In what takes to the sales revenues, those were projected as a percentage of the services 
rendered (the most important item from revenues, representing over 90% of its total), given 
its reduced contribution to the total revenues. It was assumed to decrease on the first two 
years following analysts’ predictions, and then returning to values of 2010. The same process 
was adopted to estimate other operating revenues, but using as growth numbers the average 
of the weight in 2010 and 2011 on services rendered revenues. 
 
 
 
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Interconnection 100 70 44 30 30 30 30 30
MTR (per Q) 4,10 2,90 1,82 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25 1,25
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Figure 33: Domestic Mobile Business (TMN) Operating Revenues by source 
 
As in the wireline business, the economic cycle is a central factor, affecting the company’s 
performance, which is made visible on the expressive unemployment rates and inherently on 
customer’s available income. 
The wireline operating revenues were forecasted as the sum of the projections for its four 
main segments: retail, wholesale, data and corporate, and other revenues.  
The retail business was divided into two main categories: voice and non-voice. In order to 
estimate each segment revenues it was assumed a weight over the total retail revenues, 
capturing past tendencies and future expectations regarding the telecommunications industry. 
Over the years the main source of revenues from the wireline business has been related to the 
voice offers, but this trend is changing due to the increasing offer of triple-play solutions. This 
is a more competitive and resilient offer in periods of economic downturn as the one faced in 
present times. 
Revenues until the end of 2011 were estimated as a percentage of total retail revenues. The 
percentage was assumed as a way of incorporating market trends and prospects of triple-play 
considerable growth against voice (alone). 
In the particular case regarding voice revenues, those were computed combining the ARPU for 
the business with the number of accesses through Public-Switched Telephone Networks and 
the Integrated Services Digital Networks (PSTN/ISDN), which according to ANACOM’s data for 
2011, had an higher exposure to the residential segment (67%) than to the enterprise one 
(33%).  The ARPU was calculated using a proxy for its growth, established on the basis of the 
retail traffic, its main driver. 
Figure 34: Domestic Wireline Business: Retial voice Revenues 
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 1.245 1.160 1.128 1.161 1.187 1.214 1.234 1.251
Services rendered 1.132 1.081 1.052 1.058 1.082 1.107 1.125 1.140
Customer 1.007 991 998 1.018 1.042 1.066 1.084 1.099
Interconnection 100 70 44 30 30 30 30 30
Roamers 26 20 10 10 10 11 11 11
Sales 90 70 68 94 96 98 100 101
Other operating revenues 11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Retail: Voice market Rev. 535 508 490 477 468 463 455 447
as % of Retail Rev. 55% 51% 48% 46% 44% 42% 39% 37%
PSTN/ISDN  (k) 2.653 2.593 2.567 2.547 2.536 2.530 2.511 2.493
ARPU 202 196 191 187 185 183 181 179
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The PSTN/ISDN accesses comprise the traffic-generating lines as one of the voice market 
revenue drivers, which were estimated through the computation of an annual growth based 
on the last four years average as a way to maintain the last tendency. It includes as well the 
carrier pre-selection which registered a decline at levels of 2011 weighted at a 20% decrease 
factor, reflecting severe competition. 
Turning our attention the non-voice retail market, its revenues were forecasted as the sum of 
revenues coming from pay-TV and fixed broadband retail market. The figures used were 
obtained through ICP-ANACOM. 
The pay-TV market in terms of total subscriptions encloses the Cable TV, DTH, and other 
technologies (xDSL/IP TV; TV by FWA, and TV by FTTH) subscriptions. On this particular market, 
where PT makes himself visible through the Meo brand, the success has been achieved on the 
back of a very differentiated value proposition, which leverages on an innovative non-linear 
pay-TV service offering a seamless multiscreen experience (with a set of differentiated offers, 
live TV channels, VoD, games, music, and others). 
Assuming that the number of total households in Portugal will remain stable on the following 
years, what will drive the pay-TV market increase is its penetration rate. On the back of a deep 
market research, it is expected that the market will keep the last year tendency and continue 
to increase. Additionally, pay-TV penetration rate was assumed to increase at a constant level 
from 2013 onwards, reflecting a considerable investment made by the operators on this 
domain (Meo targeting an expansion in terms of market share, and ZON trying to protect its 
position). 
PT’s share of subscriptions was assumed to grow at the same pace as the pay-TV penetration 
rate, since PT is making a great effort to acquire new subscribers and in this way capture a 
higher fraction of the market. PT gains the new subscriptions, gaining more from the new and 
the existing ones, increasing market share. In order to catenate the entire process the pay-TV 
market grows in line with the penetration rate growth. 
Conciliating all the forecasted item into one formula, the TV customers were calculated 
combining the total number of subscribers on the pay-TV market with the company’s share.  
The other type of customers included on the non-voice retail market, the fixed broadband 
retail customers, were assumed to reach the same numbers as TV customers due to an 
increasing trend in the industry, the convergence of TV/Fixed broadband. This is an increasing 
reality which comprises sharing resources and interacting with each other synergistically, and 
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at the same time contributing to an increased coverage and higher bandwidth, expressed on 
Meo’s double and triple-play offers. 
The other determinant of this section of retail revenues, the average revenues per access, was 
computed as non-voice revenues per total accesses (until 2011), and then assumed to grow at 
2% a year, in a conservative approach.  
Having completed the forecast of the key drivers as well as the historical analysis, non-voice 
revenues were the result of combining the ARP access and total accesses (TV and Fixed 
broadband). 
Figure 35: Domestic Wireline Business: Retial non-voice Revenues 
 
The revenues coming from the wholesale market for the fixed line business are also dependent 
on the total number of accesses registered. The wholesale accesses can be measured on three 
different categories, the unbundled local loops which have been abruptly declining year after 
year; the whole sale line rental, evidencing a slight decreasing pattern; and the fixed 
broadband wholesale behaving in a similar way to the line rental. The wholesale business is 
also marked by a decline in the directories business. As a way to incorporate all the associated 
market trends, this revenue item was projected assuming a declining pattern smoothed along 
time by a reconciling factor. 
As for the data and corporate segment, it has been penalized by the economic environment 
and consequent cost cutting efforts mainly from companies. It was, however, predicted to 
slow its decline as the economy tends to recover.  
Given its small contribution to the total operating and in an attempt to incorporate market 
information, the other wireline revenues were assumed to represent a constant level at 
numbers of 2011. 
Figure 36: Domestic Wireline Business Operating Revenues by source 
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Retail: Other (non-voice) market Rev. 438 488 521 563 606 652 700 751
as % of Retail Rev. 45% 49% 52% 54% 56% 58% 61% 63%
Fixed Broadband Retail 1.105 1.186 1.229 1.300 1.374 1.449 1.526 1.605
TV customers 1.042 1.160 1.229 1.300 1.374 1.449 1.526 1.605
ARP access 204 208 212 216 221 225 230 234
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 1.843 1.826 1.815 1.824 1.847 1.882 1.916 1.954
Retail 973 995 1.012 1.040 1.074 1.115 1.155 1.199
Wholesale 468 450 437 430 426 426 426 426
Data & corporate 265 244 230 219 210 204 198 193
Other w ireline revenues 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
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In resemblance to the procedure adopted for the operations conducted in Portugal, Oi’s 
operating revenues have been projected considering two main sources, the wireline business 
and the mobile business. Other services contribution has also been incorporated. 
The wireline revenues were divided in Fixed Line, Fixed Broadband, and Others which include 
revenues coming from public phones and additional services. 
In what takes to the fixed line business, Oi has been trying to improve its performance in what 
regards line losses. It was assumed that line loss in fixed line revenues will be mitigated on the 
back of the restructuring of fixed tariff plan adopted in the middle of 2011. The loss is softened 
since these plans stimulate the use of fixed line by expanding its benefits like free minutes for 
most solutions, and digital calling services. However, due to increasing innovative technologies 
penetration, fixed line revenues will keep its downside trend. 
On the fixed broadband, Oi bets on customer loyalty and retention and in adding new 
customers to its share. It has been investing in the quality and speed (great progresses on this 
area) of its fixed broadband services, with visible results to the users. Additionally, Oi practices 
really competitive prices. 
Oi has also established a partnership with the government aimed at increasing the penetration 
of broadband in Brazil, which has allowed for the company to increase its coverage 
considerably in the last year. 
As a way to formulate the final revenue figures for the wireline business, those have been 
forecasted based on previous periods’ growth and incorporating the provided future trends. 
Revenues were estimated to show a sustained increase. Growth was based on the growing 
patterns followed by the broadband customers, accommodated for this item. 
Public phones follow the past trend of decline. Its revenues were assumed to decrease at half 
of the previous period decrease. Higher adhesion to new technologies will contribute to a 
decline in the usage of public phones which, however, will not be further reduced since Brazil 
is still a country where the weight of low income population is considerable. Finally, the 
additional services were assumed to stay constant throughout the explicit period. 
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Figure 37: Oi Wireline Business Operating Revenues by source 
 
The mobile revenues were estimated as the sum of different components, services, sales and 
others. They were estimated in gross terms. 
Oi’s mobile business has been registering a solid growth. In the post-paid segment, Oi has 
launched several initiatives aimed at increasing customer growth, with emphasis on the 
distribution channels restructuring and price repositioning. On the pre-paid segment, Oi 
continues to market the new offers launched in the end of 2010, beginning of 2011, allowing 
for daily bonuses which are dependent on the amount of the recharges. Additionally, Oi offers 
SMS packages (with up to 88% discount), and data packages (contributing to an increase in 
internet accesses), improving profitability in this way. As a result of the referred initiatives and 
stronger commercial competitiveness the customer base is growing, so are the revenues in this 
business area. 
Mobile services revenues growth is amplified by the higher pace increase materialized by the 
data services revenues, which are growing more than the remaining components of the mobile 
services, thanks to an investment in access speed and the offer of data packages. 
On the other hand, competition explains a large portion of the slowdown in some of the 
components of mobile services revenues. Price pressure suggests a deterioration in the 
competitive environment, and a decline in MTRs contributed to higher competition in the 
market as a second derivative effect. 
Looking at sales revenues, those were assumed to grow as mobile penetration rate increases 
in Brazil. The commercial effort together with increasing marketing and publicity, as well as 
innovation, drives sales up.  
Figure 38: Oi Mobile Business Operating Revenues by source 
 
Other services revenues were projected as its percentage to the sum of mobile and wireline 
total revenues. Assumed to be the average of the last two years weight of the described 
Real million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Wireline 31.213 29.387 28.225 27.557 27.490 27.975 29.002 30.448
Total Fixed Line 20.471 18.284 16.513 15.079 14.071 13.412 13.052 12.963
Fixed Broadband: Data 9.101 9.524 10.158 10.935 11.882 13.029 14.417 15.953
Public Phones 311 249 224 212 207 204 203 202
Additional Services / Advanced Voice 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330 1.330
Real million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Mobile 11.925 12.635 13.386 14.183 15.027 15.922 16.870 17.875
Services 11.775 12.480 13.227 14.019 14.858 15.748 16.691 17.690
Sales of handsets, sim cards and others 150 155 159 164 169 174 179 185
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revenues, as part of these services depends on the usage of equipment.  Assuming values of 
2011, consolidated revenues represent 64,2% of the gross revenues. 
Figure 39: Oi Business Operating Revenues by source 
 
 
8.3.2 Operating Costs 
Following the operating revenues forecast, the operating costs are considered as another 
crucial component for valuation purposes. 
The same principle of individual forecasting used for developing revenue estimates was 
applied to the operating costs’ side. In this case, the projection incorporate the direct and 
indirect impact produced by the restructuring plan implemented in the end of 2010. This is a 
relevant factor with repercussions at the EBITDA margins level. The appropriation of 
economies of scale as of economies of scope, made possible given the company’s scale and 
size, are key drivers of the registered improvements. 
The operating revenues are responsible for driving a considerable part of items from the 
Income Statement and Balance Sheet. In particular, Operating Costs assume a stable relation 
with operating revenues. 
Looking at the mobile business, the operating costs are composed by four different types, and 
were computed taking into consideration its relation to the operating revenues in most cases. 
The costs linked to wages and salaries reflect higher efficiency levels in certain internal 
processes and lower personnel costs as a direct result of the mentioned restructuring plan, 
being computed as the average of the last two years, first to incorporate the structural 
changes, weight on the operating revenues. Being part of the company’s policy, the number of 
employees was estimated to remain constant throughout the observed period, and the 
adjustment is made on the annual cost per employee (accommodated with inflation 
estimates). 
The direct costs suffered a reduction explained by a decline in interconnection costs, mainly 
due to the decrease in regulated MTRs, and the decline in the directories business which tend 
to more than offset the higher programming costs associated with the continued growth of 
Real million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Consolidated net revenues 28.252 27.485 27.217 27.301 27.810 28.712 30.004 31.607
Wireline 20.034 18.862 18.116 17.688 17.645 17.956 18.615 19.544
Mobile 7.654 8.110 8.592 9.104 9.646 10.220 10.828 11.473
Other Services 563 513 508 510 519 536 560 590
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pay-TV customers, notwithstanding a decline in programming costs per customer as pay-TV is 
reaching critical mass. Later growth is explained by the increasing importance of pay-TV and 
other mobile contents. 
 As for the commercial costs’ trend, it is explained by a decrease in costs of products sold, due 
to the rationalization of TMN’s handset portfolio and lower equipment sales, tending to 
increase as the business performance recovers, as made explicit on the revenue forecast. The 
other operating costs, including supplies, external services and other expenses, decreased as a 
result of the strict operational and cost discipline on external supplies embraced by PT. It was 
estimated to stay at 2011 levels as it has been quite stable for the past years. 
Figure 40: Domestic Mobile (TMN) Business Operating Costs by source 
 
Addressing the wireline cost structure there are some patterns which match the ones 
evidenced by the mobile business given the influence of similar factors such as the 
restructuration embodied by the Portuguese operations. 
As in the mobile business, costs related to wages and salaries were assumed to face a 
reduction given increasing processes efficiency and lower costs with personnel as a direct 
consequence of the adopted plan. Once more, the number of employees was estimated to 
remain constant and thus, the cost evolution on the remuneration side is directly related to 
some benefit cuts and other payroll adjustments.  
Direct costs were assumed to be a percentage of total revenues, capturing TV customers 
increase which were reflected on this cost item through the programming costs. The 
established percentage decrease along the explicit period as the increase in TV customers is 
becoming smaller. 
Commercial costs were assumed to register a slight increase due to the increasing number of 
TV customers partially coming from the announced effort expended on publicity and 
marketing (as the competitive environment get fiercer with other players practicing an 
aggressive marketing, it was assumed as crucial to avoid churn), a path that has proven to be 
successful in enhancing customers’ loyalty, since those include costs of products sold, 
commissions, and marketing and publicity expenses. The other operating costs, where it is 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating costs, excluding D&A 682 643 625 659 676 691 703 712
Wages and salaries 45 41 40 41 42 43 44 44
Direct costs 220 206 201 206 213 218 222 225
Commercial costs 215 205 200 221 226 231 234 238
Other operating costs 203 191 185 191 195 200 203 205
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included the maintenance costs associated to customers’ set boxes, were projected as a fixed 
percentage of operating revenues for the entire period, capturing the customer base increase 
and the increasing complexity in setting top technology items such as the boxes. 
Figure 41: Domestic Wireline Business Operating Costs by source 
 
Turning our attention to the Brazilian operations, it is worth noting that the operating costs are 
starting to impact margins in Oi as a result of investments made by the company which are not 
having proportional effects on revenues due to a market characterized by intense competition. 
The overall operating costs have increased due to an increase in sales and the improvement in 
service quality incurred by the company. 
The costs of goods sold show an increasing pattern as a result of the decision to implement 
subsidization on the modem of “Oi Velox” (the mobile business brand of Oi) and smartphones 
for post-paid customers, coupled with higher number of SIM cards sold. The same happens 
with the interconnection costs, growing thanks to higher proportion of on-net traffic, and 
increase in SMS in the total off-net usage. In selling expenses, as the cost of services, it was 
assumed a relation with the operating revenues, following in the first case the same pattern of 
costs of goods sold. 
Regarding the general and administrative expenses, those were assumed to increase as the 
business expands. It pertains to operation expenses which tend to grow as results do so. Other 
operating expenses were assumed to represent a constant percentage of the revenues. 
It was also considered an increase in personnel costs thanks to an increase in staff, and the 
organizational reorganization incurred in to improve operational performance.  
Additionally, an increase in third-party services was accounted, mostly due to higher 
maintenance costs aimed at improving service quality, higher commissions, focused on post-
paid mobile business as well as on the fixed broadband. 
 
 
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating costs, excl. D&A & PRBs 1.091 1.079 1.064 1.060 1.064 1.075 1.085 1.096
Wages and salaries 209 207 206 207 209 213 217 222
Direct costs 400 387 376 368 364 361 358 355
Commercial costs 113 119 118 119 120 123 125 127
Other operating costs 369 366 364 366 370 377 384 392
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Figure 42: Oi Business Operating Costs by source 
 
 
8.3.3 EBITDA margin 
Having the operating revenues and the operating costs forecasts, the EBITDA margin is the 
relevant factor to address.  
EBITDA margins are a really important performance metric and thus, have been incorporated 
into the previous operating items estimations, after a historical analysis together with the 
company and industry’s margins’ evolution projections. 
This is a crucial point for the deleveraging effort lead by PT to be made effective. It should be 
noted that a poor EBITDA scenario can represent a real risk involving EFCF taking a major hit 
coming from a loss in what takes to Oi’s dividends, given that those account for more than 25% 
of the group’s cash flows.  Furthermore, a company affected by a declining EBITDA trend, 
which is a common frame in the telecommunications industry, is subject to major cuts in the 
dividend pay-out in order to reduce debt and thus keeping a stable leverage ratio. 
Figure 43: EBITDA and respective margins by Business unit 
 
Incorporating a detailed analysis and the company’s intention to pursue a deleveraging policy, 
the Group’s EBITDA was forecasted to remain quite stable throughout the explicit period. The 
decrease on the dividends to be paid by the company was also taken into account, which allied 
with a stable growth pattern on the EBITDA figures contribute to an ease on achieving the 
Real million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating costs 18.744 17.880 17.754 17.806 18.341 18.922 19.732 20.657
Cost of Services 5.783 5.434 5.475 5.466 5.782 5.950 6.179 6.379
Cost of Goods Sold 198 193 191 192 195 201 210 222
Interconnection Costs 4.672 4.636 4.546 4.582 4.656 4.813 5.027 5.297
Selling Expenses 4.941 4.669 4.623 4.637 4.724 4.877 5.097 5.369
General and Administrative Expenses 2.618 2.399 2.375 2.383 2.427 2.506 2.619 2.759
Other Operating (Revenue) Expenses, net 532 550 544 546 556 574 600 632
EBITDA margins 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
TMN 638 563 517 503 502 511 523 532 539
Margin (%) 46,0% 45,2% 44,6% 44,6% 43,3% 43,1% 43,1% 43,1% 43,1%
Wireline 745 753 747 751 764 783 807 832 858
Margin (%) 38,6% 40,8% 40,9% 41,4% 41,9% 42,4% 42,9% 43,4% 43,9%
Oi 924 910 850 802 757 722 708 755
Margin (%) 34,9% 33,7% 34,9% 34,8% 34,8% 34,0% 34,1% 34,2% 34,6%
Others 108 170 181 192 204 217 231 246 262
Margin (%) 25,4% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3%
PT 1.492 2.188 2.354 2.296 2.273 2.269 2.283 2.318 2.413
Margin (%) 39,9% 35,6% 37,5% 37,5% 37,4% 37,3% 37,5% 37,6% 37,8%
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necessary leverage adjustment, avoiding more aggressive scenarios characterized by constant 
downside reviews in shareholders remuneration, or even asset sales. 
 
8.3.4 Capital Expenditures  
The action taken in what takes to the capital expenditures mirrors the several business units 
investing activities targeted at improving its operational performance.  Portugal Telecom’s 
investment policy is directly linked to the capital structure in force, and influenced by the 
average levels of depreciation. 
Figure 44: Estimated Capex by Business unit 
 
The capex on the Portuguese operations was estimated to follow a decreasing trend. Capex 
relating to clients and infrastructures decreased given the strong investment made over the 
last years, namely on the period between 2008 and 2011, regarding the fiber network 
implementation, the modernization of the 2G network already adapted to the 4G LTE, and in 
the leverage of the 3G and 3,5G networks’ coverage and capacity, leading to a decline on the 
capex related to technology, notwithstanding the investment related to the 4G LTE network 
implementation.  
Aligning my expectations with those of the company, it was assumed that the future capex 
tend to decrease at a visible pace as the fiber network implementation is concluded, not 
forgetting the implementation of PT’s  4G LTE network in 2012 and the considerable 
investment on the new data center. 
In Oi’s case the trend is similar, assuming the decreasing pattern as its main driver. The 
investments linked to the Brazilian operations were mainly directed to projects targeted at 
improving the fixed network quality, expand coverage of both fixed and mobile networks, 
increase the speed of fixed broadband services, to increase the capacity of 3G data traffic in 
strategic locations, and so as to provide the previously mentioned data packages to corporate 
customers. 
 
Capex 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Capex Portugal 657 647 678 652 636 621 609 594 579
Capex Mobile 133 131 186 180 180 178 176 173 169
Capex Wireline 524 516 493 472 456 443 433 422 410
Capex Oi 0 444 532 499 448 421 379 350 347
Capex Other 141 133 141 150 160 170 181 192 204
Total 798 1.224 1.351 1.301 1.243 1.212 1.169 1.136 1.130
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8.3.5 Net Working Capital  
The working capital was defined as the difference between the non-financial items of the 
current assets and current liabilities, comprising accounts receivable, cash and equivalents, 
and inventories on one side, and accounts payable on the other. In this sense, this item will 
evolve according to the Operating Revenues, and thus are based on historical performance 
throughout the explicit period. 
Figure 45: Working Capital Needs 
 
Portugal Telecom has been paying attention to its working capital and trying to increase its 
cash flows as a way to cover the debt entrance, showing a solid working capital management. 
Since it is being analyzed a healthy company with a high liquidity pattern, it was expected an 
expressively positive figure for this item, meaning the company is financed and able to pay its 
short-term liabilities.   
The financial condition evidenced by the company is verified through some key liquidity ratios, 
such as the current ratio (5,7), the quick ratio (5,6), and the cash ratio (3,9). The higher values 
registered show a capable company in what takes to respecting its obligations, giving an idea 
of PT’s operating cycle efficiency and its ability to transform its products in cash. 
After computing DSO (days sales outstanding) and DPO (days payable outstanding), it was 
possible to verify that the later is always higher than the first, once more indicating a strong 
liquidity profile and pointing at a negative cash conversion cycle. 
 
8.3.6 Financial Analysis 
Presently, PT is a highly leveraged company which is reflected on it market D/E of 2,31 and the 
current financing structure is the result of the past and current intense investing activity. 
It was a management strategy to take advantage of leverage to enhance growth and 
profitability, and at the same time keeping its high values in what concerns shareholders’ 
remuneration. In this way, PT assures the debt payment as well as the distribution of dividends 
(known for paying a high dividend when compared to other industry players), however it had 
to make some cuts on the last topic. 
Euro million 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Current Assets* 8.611 7.738 7.903 7.703 7.642 7.662 7.672 7.751 8.034
Current Liabilities 723 1.446 1.477 1.440 1.428 1.432 1.434 1.449 1.501
Net Working Capital 7889 6292 6426 6263 6214 6230 6238 6302 6532
∆ 5931 -1597 134 -162 -49 16 9 64 230
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Portugal Telecom key credit strength over the last years relates to its ability to generate strong 
operating free cash flow, which is made possible thanks to its leading market positions in both 
mobile and fixed businesses in Portugal, as well as to its international operations. Another 
topic that has proven useful in this context regards the implementation of continued cost 
cutting programmers.  
Looking at 2011, PT maintained a solid liquidity position given its significant level of cash, its 
debt profile (with and average maturity of approximately six years) and the additional 
flexibility provided by its committed stand-by lines and underwritten commercial paper lines. 
 
Figure 46: Financing Structure and Debt evolution 
 
 
PT’s debt portfolio comprises exchangeable bonds, bonds, bank loans, liabilities related to 
equity swaps on treasury shares, commercial paper, leasings, derivative financial instruments, 
and other financings. Once more exploring its most relevant funding source, PT has recently 
issued Eurobonds with a maturity of around five years and a coupon of 5,875%, through its 
wholly-owned subsidiary PT International Finance BV. This reflects a trend experienced in the 
previous year where the performance of PT’s bonds was significantly influenced by market 
concerns on sovereigns’ creditworthiness, namely with respect to Portugal, which affected the 
perceived credit risk of corporates. For that reason, PT’s credit spreads and yields increased 
significantly during the year, although substantially less than Portuguese sovereign yields, due 
to PT’s own financial strength and relevant exposure to different geographic markets, which 
has been growing considerably. 
The describe transaction fits the profile of those that contribute to enhance PT’s financial 
flexibility through the extension of the debt maturities, which considerably reduce financial 
risks, even more considering the current environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Structure 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Financial Debt 7.046 7.206 12.281 11.903 11.292 10.710 10.173 9.598 9.043 8.605
Cash and equivalents 1.518 5.107 5.668 5.789 5.643 5.598 5.612 5.620 5.677 5.885
Net Debt 5.528 2.100 6.613 6.114 5.649 5.112 4.561 3.978 3.365 2.720
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Figure 47: PT’s Debt Profile 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom Trading Update, September 2012 
Reconciling the guideline followed by the company, PT has been betting on a strategy based on 
extending debt maturities together with possessing diversified sources of funding as way to 
reduce risks from financial nature. In this sense, PT enjoys a very solid financial position, being 
fully financed until mid-2016. 
Another remark to be made has to deal with the weight of net interest expenses on EBITDA, 
which has kept its regularly low pattern safeguarding the company from a sound impact on net 
income from minimal unfavorable variations on the revenues and EBITDA margins. 
Figure 48: Interest Burden 
 
The financial structure of the firm was assumed to improve overtime through the repayment 
of debt as part of a sustained deleveraging effort assumed by PT. This can be seen by looking 
at the Net Debt/EBITDA ratio, evolving really well and thus reaching sounder figures. 
Figure 49: Net Debt over EBITDA ratio evolution 
 
 
 
Interest 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E
EBITDA 2.292 2.480 1.557 1.492 2.188 2.354
Net Interest Expense 197 272 227 185 297 346
NIE/EBITDA 8,6% 11,0% 14,6% 12,4% 13,6% 14,7%
Financial Balance Sheet 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Net Debt/EBITDA 3,0 2,6 2,5 2,2 2,0 1,7 1,5 1,1
ROE 9,1% 7,7% 7,2% 6,8% 6,6% 6,5% 6,4% 6,6%
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8.3.7 Income Taxes 
As Portugal Telecom is present in many geographies it becomes more complex to treat taxes 
since each location has its own regulatory policy.   
For valuation purposes, taxes on EBIT assume its preponderance as a driver of FCFF. This item 
was assumed to be dependent on the fiscal regimes prevailing on the main geographies where 
PT operates, Portugal with a tax rate of around 30%, and Brazil which adopts a 34% tax rate. It 
should be noted that the mentioned tax rates, which are the ones actually used on the 
performed valuation, in most cases do not match the tax payments of the company as 
illustrated on its books. This mismatch is widely justified by taxation on interest income, and 
by a factor that contributes to a decrease on the effective tax bill, the effect of tax shields on 
interest payments, which are captured on the WACC formula in use. 
Another remark should be made on the differences in terms of performance registered along 
the different countries where the company operates, which gives born to the existence of 
differed taxes. 
 
8.3.8 Depreciations and Amortizations 
Depreciations were calculated as a relation to Tangible assets. It was assumed a proportion of 
depreciations over tangible assets applied to the previous year balance of TA. 
After a first year increase due to the recent investments made in the roll-out of the pay-TV 
service, depreciation evidence a downward tendency in such a way that this item’s figures 
tend to equal Capex values in the long term, and for valuation purposes for the terminal 
values. The implicit assumption behind a decreasing ratio is that as the firm enters in a mature 
stage and investments reach the end of their useful life, the increment in Capex is not enough 
to counteract the decreasing depreciation. In this sense, in an extreme scenario, the purpose 
of investments is mainly to replace the assets into consideration, which tend to be fully 
depreciated. 
 
8.4 DCF Assumptions 
8.4.1 (WACC) Cost of Capital 
The cost of capital was estimated to capture the turbulent economic environment and its 
implications on the conditions for Portugal Telecom to access the financial markets. 
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On a standard situation it is expected that the cost of the best alternative opportunity for 
placing capital to be the sovereign bonds assuming null or marginal risk, as a corollary, the 
cooperative enterprise debt should be superior. All this into a logic of perpetuity in terms of 
time horizon. In other words, the cost of accessing the market for Portugal Telecom is lower 
than the one for Portugal, when in a normal situation should be equal to the treasury bonds 
plus an added premium.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, as a way to compute the Enterprise Value of each 
business unit, both the FCFF and the Terminal Value need to be discounted at the appropriate 
discount rate, in this case at the WACC. In order to capture the individual operating and 
financial risk that can be inputted to each specific country it was estimated a different rate 
modeled to each reality. Those rates are the result of combining all the components presented 
below. The current situation is an exotic one, where the treasury bonds’ pricing is greater than 
the PSI’s debt due to several reasons, counting among others the ones that follow. 
PT operates in a global context holding investments in other markets, and in this way out of 
the Portuguese macroeconomic risk, meaning that its business-related risk is partially away 
from the Portuguese sovereign risk. Furthermore, the market for sovereign debt is assaulted 
by the speculative effects of the market of derivative debt (short-selling, futures…). The 
Portuguese debt market is compartmented since a considerable slice belongs to the 
Portuguese banking system after an acquisition in cartel. 
Strictly speaking, it is possible for a company even at risk of State’s financial collapse to behave 
better to the eyes of the capital owners if selling a product which contains first need good’s 
characteristics, as it is the case of telecommunications, or even luxury/ attribution of social 
status features as it is the case of the Contents’ good, since in both these cases the elasticity of 
demand-income is very low. PT’s offer does own these two characteristics. 
Yet, it is worth noting that it may still be a convergence of the two risk premiums (sovereign 
and corporate) in the future, discounting the short-term volatility of sovereign debt speculated 
in the secondary market and then the high sovereign yields on the secondary market traduce a 
certain incapacity from the investors’ side to judge the long-term, given the political-based 
instability.  
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Figure 50: WACC Components 
 
8.4.2 Cost of Equity 
The adopted risk-free rate was the yield on the German 10-year Treasury Bonds in what 
concerns the computation of the cost of capital for Portuguese operations, since those are the 
only Government Bonds in Europe considered to be default free. Furthermore, this choice is 
based upon the fact that PT’s revenues ‘currency is the Euro. 
In regard of the operations developed on Brazilian soil, the risk-free rate considered was the 
yield on the country’s 10-year Treasury Bond, in accordance to Damodaran (2008), and in what 
consist of an attempt to make a more consistent valuation trying to capture the country’s own 
reality. 
In what takes to the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) chosen for Portugal, it was calculated according 
to Damodaran’s suggested methodology in order to incorporate the additional risk of equity 
markets resulting from the experiencing turbulent period. 
In this sense, the long term country risk-premium was estimated based on the default spread 
associated with Moody’s country ratings (based upon traded country bonds), over a default 
free government bond rate, in what was considered to be a measure of the added country risk 
premium for Portugal. Moreover, as a way to reach the total risk premium the default spread 
was added to the historical risk premium for a mature equity market. It is important to notice 
Portugal Brazil
Cost of Equity 11,28% Cost of Equity 14,35%
Rf 1,491% Rf 9,33%
Market Premium 10,13% Market Premium 6%
Beta 0,97 Beta 0,84
Cost of Debt 7% Cost of Debt 10%
Interest coverage ratio 1,788 Tax rate 34%
Attributed Rating B+
Spread 5,50% D(%) 30%
E(%) 70%
Tax rate 30%
WACC 12,02%
D(%) 35%
E(%) 65%
WACC 9,04%
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that especially in the short-term, the equity country risk premium can be greater than the 
actual country’s spread, and thus calling for an adjustment. Accordingly, combining the default 
spread with the relative equity market volatility (estimated as the standard deviation in the 
country equity market over the standard deviation on the country’s bond) it was possible to 
get to an adjusted country risk premium. For this purpose, it was assumed the emerging 
market average of 1,5, considering that the equity markets are roughly 1,5 times more volatile 
than bond markets, obtaining the country specific risk premium which was further added the 
assumed 6% risk premium for mature markets (in this case the German one) resulting on the 
total risk premium to be considered for valuation matters.  
Regarding the ERP assumed for the Brazilian operations, it was obtained considering a 
historical approach, given the value attributed the risk free rate in this particular case. As 
presented on the literature review chapter, the percentages attributed to the ERP have been 
between 5% to 6%. If the historical excess returns have pointed more towards values around 
the lower end of the presented range, inserting on the equation the current market conditions 
it becomes reasonable to assume a higher value, pointing at the 6% figure.  
The missing necessary component to get to the cost of equity is the levered Beta which was 
estimated taking into account several processes in order to opt for the solution that would 
better adhere to reality and in this way express the company’s undiversified risk. In this sense, 
three different betas were considered, including the industry beta based on Damodaran’s 
predictions, a regression beta computed against the PSI20, and a peer group beta. 
After performing all the mentioned calculations, it was assumed a final beta for the Portuguese 
operations of 0,97, which is the result of an average of the industry beta and the one 
computed to the group of comparable firms, since those were found to be the most reliable 
figures given the industry and the company’s characteristics.  
Figure 51:Beta levered (Portugal) 
 
Beta calculation: Beta lev. Market Cap.(EUR) Net Debt (EUR) D/E Beta Unl. Taxe rate Final Beta
PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA-REG 0,99 3.374 7.792 2,31 0,38 30% 0,97
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG-REG 0,75 41.399 37.459 0,90 0,61 30%
FRANCE TELECOM SA 0,85 25.006 28.050 1,12 0,57 33%
SWISSCOM AG-REG 0,74 16.619 6.756 0,41 0,76 21%
TELEFONICA SA 0,94 48.001 51.503 1,07 0,59 35%
TELENOR ASA 0,82 25.411 2.648 0,10 0,93 28% 0,98*
Average 0,82 0,72 0,69 0,95
*Industry Beta Damodaran
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The average telecommunications industry beta (0,98), according to Damodaran, was achieved 
based on a sample of US companies that even though exhibiting similar characteristics and 
acting in the same core business sector as PT, was calling for an adjustment to accurately 
reflect the company’s risk profile. The referred adjustment was performed combining the 
obtained figure with a peer group-based beta calculation. To do so, a group of companies 
operating in the same industry and following similar business structures in what has to deal 
with its business areas as PT, was considered. The beta estimation process was based on the 
comparable levered betas and its funding structure. The betas of each of the companies were 
then unlevered according to its prospects on their financial structure and tax rate. Afterwards, 
an average of the unlevered betas was computed and was combined with PT’s target financial 
structure (obtained according to the company guidelines) and corporate tax rate to obtain the 
final levered beta. Since this method also comprises its drawbacks, among which are included 
the distortion caused by the companies different capital structures, and in a way to take into 
account the closest PT’s peers, an average between the two levered betas was done. 
Regarding the levered Beta assumed on the Brazilian operations, it was estimated as an 
average between the regression beta calculated with the returns against the IBOV Index (0,69) 
considering data taken from Bloomberg and daily returns from 29-09-2006 until 28-09-2012, 
and the industry beta, as a way to avoid the divergences evidenced on a possible group of 
comparable to be used on Oi’s case. 
 
8.4.3 Cost of Debt 
Finally, the cost of debt was estimated allowing for the cost of capital (WACC) used for 
valuation purposes to be obtained. 
The cost of debt for Portugal was calculated resorting to the company spread, which came 
from the Damodaran’s table that relates the interest coverage ratio of a firm to a synthetic 
rating and the respective default spread (obtained from traded bonds). By adding the spread 
that suits PT’s reality to the adopted risk free rate, it has been obtained the pre-tax cot of 
borrowing for a firm. For the associated after-tax value, a country-specific tax rate of 30% was 
considered. 
In what takes to Brazil the value of the component into analysis was achieved through the 
assuming the average Yield to maturity on long-term bonds from comparables. 
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8.4.4 Remark on Perpetuity Inputs 
Making the assumption that from 2018 onwards Portugal Telecom’s value grows in perpetuity, 
implies agreeing on the fact that it has reached its mature state, and therefore, it will grow at a 
pace equal or, in most cases, lower than the overall economy. 
As a way to capture the different realities embraced by each PT’s business unit, it was 
estimated that the Wireline business would grow at 0,7% in nominal terms, and the Mobile 
business would face a 1,2% growth rate. In what regards the Brazilian operations, those were 
assumed to grow at 5,3%. The mentioned figures take into account the nominal GDP growth 
levels, as well as the projected inflation rates, and the implicit growth forecasted for the last 
years of the explicit period.  
The equated scenario also takes into account that PT operates different business units located 
in different geographies, which needed to be weighted into the company’s profile, especially in 
what concerns growth prospects and demanded returns. 
 
8.5 (SOTP) Valuation Results 
In the words of Luehrman (1997) the best alternative to perform a business valuation relies on 
applying the basic DCF relationship to the business specific types of cash flows and afterwards 
add all the present values up. This represents the methodology used to value Portugal Telecom 
in generic terms. It has been used a Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation as a way to achieve the 
appropriate fair value for the company, considering the cash flows for the three main business 
units (Mobile, Wireline, and Oi), as well as the international participations.  
The process began with the estimation of the Enterprise Value of Portugal Telecom through 
the sum of each business unit contribution and the remaining international participations both 
in Africa and Asia. Afterwards, in order to go from the EV to the Equity Value some 
adjustments were performed, namely the subtraction of PT’s net debt and its pension 
liabilities. 
Looking at each business weight on the total EV, Oi is the most significant segment, 
contributing to almost 31%, followed by the Portuguese operations’ segments which represent 
around 30% in what takes to the Wireline business and 29% to the Mobile one. The 
participations in Africa enclosed on Africatel are responsible for roughly 7%, whereas the Asian 
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investments account for 2%. The remaining 1% is linked to the indirect participation on Contax 
which was determined through its market value. 
After all these considerations it was possible to reach an approximate 4,5 bn Euro figure for 
the company’s Equity value which resulted in a YE12 5,01 Euro price target, considering the 
896,5 million outstanding shares. When comparing to the price registered on September the 
5th of 2012 of 3,9Euro, this represents a 28,5% of implied upside potential and thus, the final 
recommendation is Buy. 
Figure 52: Sum-Of-The-Parts Valuation table 
 
 
8.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
The aim of this section is to analyze the impact on the forecasted share price through the 
change of some key drivers’ behavior.  For this purpose, it has been performed a sensitivity 
analysis based on the manipulation of the WACC values, as well as of some of its components , 
and the growth rates used on the Terminal Value estimation. The analysis was performed 
taking into account values for the Portuguese business units (Mobile and Wireline) separately 
when possible, and for the Brazilian ones as well.  
Business Stake Stake Value weigh (% EV) Method
Portugal 100% 6.910 59,4%
Mobile business 100% 3.421 29,4% DCF
Wireline business 100% 3.489 30,0% DCF
Oi 25,6% 3.568 30,7% DCF
Contax 92 0,8% Market Value
Africatel 75% 842 7,2%
Unitel 18,8% 676 5,8% EV/EBITDA
MTC 25,5% 101 0,9% EV/EBITDA
CVT 30,0% 59 0,5% EV/EBITDA
CST 38,3% 5 0,05% EV/EBITDA
Timor Telecom 41,1% 54 0,5% EV/EBITDA
CTM 28,0% 165 1,4% EV/EBITDA
PT's EV 11.632
PT's Net Debt 6.114
Pension liabilities 1.025
Equity Value 4.492
Shares Outstanding (Millions) 896,5
Share Price (EUR) 5,01
Price (05 September 2012) 3,9
Implied Upside Potential 28,5%
80 
 
The discount factor is one of the major drivers of a valuation, even more if recalling that EV of 
a business is reflected upon the sum of its discounted FCFF. In line with this thought, 
performing a WACC sensitivity analysis was regarded as crucial to measure the amplitude of a 
change on this particular factor on the final value. 
Figure 53: WACC sensitivity analysis 
 
As expected, the results obtained, with figures ranging from 3,83 to 6,56Euro, clearly shows 
the relevance of this detail on the valuation as a whole.  
Still regarding the discount rate, variations on the risk premium (positive and negative of 1%) 
and on the levered beta were tested for both rates used in Portugal and Brazil. 
Figure 54: WACC components sensitivity analysis: ERP and Beta 
 
Additionally, and given the relevance and expression of the Terminal Value on Portugal 
Telecom´s Enterprise Value, it was estimated the impact of variations on the adopted growth 
rate, with direct implications on the EV component in question. The analysis was performed 
for each business unit, highlighting the amplitude of the range obtained when looking at the 
Brazilian operations, given the larger scale adopted. 
Figure 55: Terminal Growth sensitivity analysis 
 
Finally, it should not be forgotten the impact on other factors that would influence the 
valuation’s final outcome. In this regard, the EBITDA margin constitutes a good example since 
the FCFF calculations begin from EBITDA figures and thus it has been tested to detail, even 
WACC
Brazil 8,04% 9,04% 10,04%
11,02% 6,56 5,55 4,77
12,02% 6,02 5,01 4,23
13,02% 5,61 4,61 3,83
Portugal
Discount rates (POR) Discount rates (BRA)
Beta 9,13% 10,13% 11,13% Beta 5,00% 6,00% 7,00%
1,17 4,53 4,00 3,54 1,04 4,95 4,66 4,41
0,97 5,59 5,01 4,48 0,84 5,31 5,01 4,76
0,77 7,03 6,36 5,78 0,64 5,73 5,44 5,19
ERP ERP
g  Mobile Business g  Wireline Business g  Oi Business
0,60% 0,10% 3,30% 4,49
0,90% 0,40% 4,30% 4,71
1,20% 0,70% 5,30% 5,01
1,50% 1,00% 6,30% 5,41
1,80% 1,30% 7,30% 5,98
Share PriceShare Price
4,84
4,92
5,01
Share Price
4,83
4,92
5,01
5,11
5,22
5,11
5,22
81 
 
though this component has presented regular patterns over time, a trend that is quite 
common on this particular industry.  
Figure 56: EBITDA margins sensitivity analysis 
 
 
8.7 Others factors to influence the valuation outcome 
Industry’s Microeconomic Characterization 
It is worth drawing the attention to some relevant effects that influenced the final outcome of 
the presented valuation. 
 Predominance of fixed costs over the variable ones; 
 The existence of economies of scale which translates into one fixed costs structure 
that accommodate several levels of production; 
 Economy of joint production between Communications and Contents; 
 The end of cycle for some products such as the Wireline ones; 
 The potential of the new channels, as it is the case of Internet connection where the 
ease to communicate is just a support; 
 The effect of communication of social status: alliance between the 
telecommunications and TV operators – strategic alliance to leverage new markets 
through Contents; 
EBITDA Consolidated EBITDA TMN
+3% +3%
+2% +2%
+1% +1%
- -
-1% -1%
-2% -2%
-3% -3%
EBITDA Wireline EBITDA Oi
+3% +3%
+2% +2%
+1% +1%
- -
-1% -1%
-2% -2%
-3% -3%
4,61 4,55
4,41 4,32
5,21 5,24
5,01 5,01
4,81 4,78
Share Price Share Price
5,61 5,70
5,41 5,47
3,33
5,41
5,28
5,14
5,01
4,88
4,75
4,61
6,13
5,57
5,01
4,45
3,89
Share Price Share Price
6,69
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 In the same line, the effect of communication of social status or intentional opacity on 
price through the alliance between support and communications- it is the case, for 
example, of the alliance between telecommunications operators and mobile phone 
manufacturers; 
 The role of uncertainty in what regards the future market share, and the profitability 
levels given the product or service innovation effect ; 
 The existence of important barriers to entrance, namely in what takes to high entrance 
costs- existence of public grant; high and critical demands regarding the experience 
curve; and the “privileged access” to the infrastructures induces an effect of oligopoly. 
 
8.8 Difference between Market Price and Valuation Price 
The market value versus a valuation can be explained, in regard of a listed company, through 
the following reasons: 
- Generally, the analysts, which are professional practitioners, have privileged access to 
information that is not fully disclosed and thus not accessed by the small players which 
form the majority of the market transactions. Thereby, it is justified the fact that the 
market follows the Investment Houses recommendations. 
- In a context of volatility over the sovereign risk, the perspective of continuous 
recession depresses the assessment of the fundamentals through the incorporation of 
the agents’ expectations.  
- Additionally, the difference is for a speculator a lack of the market and a clear 
indication to buy or sell in anticipation to the present tendency assumed by the 
quotation. 
- Finally, and on the opposite direction, the discounted cash flow method contains 
information which at great extent does not incorporate the effects of cooperation and 
rivalry between the main players – Rating agencies versus Investment Banks belonging 
to the same Group where there is not always a Chinese Wall effect. Another example 
can be the cartelization of the major players which are lenders and shareholders at the 
same time, and tend to protect the quotation, or even the pressure exercised by the 
concerted actions of short-selling, predicted on the Game Theory. 
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8.9 Multiples Valuation 
8.9.1 Peer Group Presentation 
In line with what was discussed on the Literature Review, the relative valuation method is one 
of the most used techniques to value a company. However, for this theory to hold and become 
an accurate procedure it has to have adherence to reality, which goes by selecting a solid peer 
group, composed by companies that can be regarded as true comparables. 
The search for the exact group of companies to form the peer group in cause encountered 
some difficulties mainly related to the geographic areas where the companies establish their 
operations, and its inherent particular self-defining details where it is included the growth 
pace, and other aspects which are unique for that market. As way to circumvent as much as 
possible the associated drawbacks and obtain the peer group, the limits to the selection 
criteria were broadened, as well as its requirements.  
The type of business that each company pursues was one of the aspects to take into 
consideration, and even though some companies tend to act more on the mobile rather than 
the wireline side (or the other way around), they all tend to be present in the same type of 
markets and businesses. The same can not be said about geographic diversification, since most 
are represented in more than one continent but not all at the same geographic areas. The peer 
group was built taking those aspects into consideration and trying to overcome the disparities 
through the inclusion of players which on average would constitute a representative sample. 
In this sense other factors, capturing operating and financial characteristics, were included 
onto the criteria, namely the company’s seize, future prospects in terms of growth and 
maturity stage, margins expression (EBITDA margin mainly), financial structure, and other key 
indicators such as ROE and ROIC, and the value for the most relevant multiples for the 
industry. Moreover, the choice relied upon companies which are quoted. 
Figure 57: Peer Group characteristics  
 
 
 
Peer Group Market Cap. EV EBITDA Marg. Total Debt/EV D/E ROE ROIC ROA Rev. Yr Gr
PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA-REG 3.374 11.981 35,6% 0,94 2,31 9,4 4,7 1,8 2,1
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG-REG 41.399 87.712 34,4% 0,57 0,90 1,5 1,9 0,4 -6,0
FRANCE TELECOM SA 25.006 58.503 33,2% 0,65 1,12 13,8 8,1 4,1 -0,5
SWISSCOM AG-REG 16.619 23.865 37,5% 0,32 0,41 14,2 4,4 3,4 -4,3
TELEFONICA SA 48.001 48.597 30,9% 0,60 1,07 23,5 9,5 4,2 3,5
TELENOR ASA 25.411 29.232 34,9% 0,24 0,10 8,3 6,7 4,2 -2,5
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8.9.2 Relative Valuation  
The choice of multiples when valuing and comparing companies depend on the specific nature 
of the business and the industry where the company operates. Taking that into consideration 
as well as the analysts preferences when dealing with a telecommunications operator, 
EV/EBITA was the chosen multiple to perform this valuation exercise. 
Making the bridge to what was discussed on the Literature Review, Enterprise Value multiples 
can be more efficient than Equity Value multiples since the first allow for a direct comparison 
of companies with different profiles, with no regard to its capital structure (value of a firm is 
independent of its capital structure in theory), whereas the others are impacted by the 
leverage effect. Furthermore, the EV multiples are commonly less vulnerable to differences on 
the accounting methods, given that the denominator is computed based on data prior to the 
Net Income item, which is particularly relevant when valuing companies detaining 
participations on foreign businesses, as it is the case of PT and Oi. 
Figure 58: Peer Group: ratios comparison 
 
Looking at the EV/EBITDA multiple and combining it with the analysts regular practices, it was 
possible to reach an EV of around 11,9bn Euro which compares to the forecasted 11,6bn Euro 
through the DCF method. The calculated value is based on a 5,1x multiple which result from 
the average figure for that specific multiple for YE12 of the companies composing the adopted 
peer group. This methodology relies on the projections, or forward estimates for the multiple 
obtained through Bloomberg. Empirical evidence suggests that forward-looking multiples are 
generally more accurate predictors of value than the historical ones. 
 
8.10 IB valuation comparison 
The developed valuation will be compared to one performed by Caixa Banco de Investimento 
(Caixa BI) equity analyst Guido Varatojo dos Santos, which is distributed by the members of the 
ESN. Caixa BI provides a regular coverage on Portugal Telecom, presenting valuation updates 
Peer Group EV/EBITDA P/E Price/Sales
PORTUGAL TELECOM SGPS SA-REG 4,9 12,0 0,50
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG-REG 4,3 13,2 0,71
FRANCE TELECOM SA 3,8 6,8 0,57
SWISSCOM AG-REG 6,3 10,8 1,77
TELEFONICA SA 4,8 9,6 0,77
TELENOR ASA 6,2 14,5 1,81
Average 5,1 11,0
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every quarter. The report used is the 26thMarch update, which presents a 5,30Euro price 
target. As it will be further explored throughout this section, several factors explain the 
pointed out discrepancy.    
After a careful analysis of the IB report some differences were noticed which contribute to 
explain the final outcome disparity. Some value drivers of different kinds, such as the EBITDA 
margins, the WACC and its components, terminal growth rates, KPIs for the Portuguese 
operations, Capex, and the Net Debt figures, reflect the basis for such price mismatch. 
In what concerns the operating data, in particular the KPIs related to the Portuguese 
operations, there is a slight difference on the wireline business where I was a little more 
optimistic on the fixed retail accesses forecasts, and on the number of mobile customers, 
where this time I adopted a more conservative approach given the intense competition and 
the difficulty in increasing market share. 
Figure 59: KPIs (Portugal) comparison 
 
Another divergence relates to the Capex forecasts which are less penalizing on Caixa’s 
valuation. On the opposite direction goes the estimated Net Debt figure which have an wider 
impact on the share price on Caixa BI analysis, deducting a bigger slice to the company’s EV 
bringing closer the Eq.V figures. 
When comparing the EBITDA margins it can be noted a more optimistic approach on my side, 
mainly in what takes to the margins on the Brazilian operations. Those are the main 
responsible for the gap (of almost 3%) when looking at the total EBITDA margins. 
Figure 60: Caixa BI’s EBITDA margin estimates 
 
           
KPIs Portugal 2012E 2013E 2012E 2013E
Fixed Retail Accesses 4.863 4.911 4.939 5.025
PSTN/ISDN 2.599 2.563 2.593 2.567
Broadband 1.137 1.162 1.186 1.229
Pay-TV customers 1.127 1.186 1.160 1.229
Mobile Customers 7.510 7.540 7.407 7.477
Caixa BI DCF Valuation
EBITDA margin (%) 2012E 2013E
Portugal 43,9% 43,6%
Oi 32,0% 32,2%
Total 34,8% 34,7%
Source: Caixa BI
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Additionally, differences noticed on the FCFF estimations can not be disassociated from the 
following step which involves the combination with a discount fact. In cases like the 
Portuguese operations, where the amount of the FCFF computed during the presented 
valuation are considerably higher than the ones estimated by Caixa BI, the final value reflects 
an extenuating effect coming from the higher WACC applied. 
As corollary of the data exposed on the Sensitivity analysis chapter it was settled that small 
changes on WACC can have great repercussions on the final outcome of the valuation. In this 
case the main components being responsible for such differences on the rates include, the 
target capital structure assumed and the cost of equity calculations. The last mirrors the 
different estimation method imposed on the ERP, which has been clearly explained on the DCF 
assumptions’ chapter. The choice of the Risk-free rate on my view does not reflect a bond with 
zero probability of default, being in this case too high for the purposed. Moreover, the levered 
betas used, which are higher than usual, also contribute to the denoted mismatch.   
Figure 61: Caixa BI’s WACC calculation 
 
 
Testing the WACC values proposed by Caixa’s equity analyst on my valuation the gap is 
diminished by more than 70%, accounting the difference for 8cents instead of the initial 
29cents.   
Accommodating the EV forecasts onto a single SOTP table, other aspects contributing to the 
price differential become clear. The most relevant has to deal with the Oi business segment 
where the value obtained on Caixa BI’s report is considerably higher, contributing to this gap a 
Rf 4,5% Rf 6,5%
Risk Premium 4,0% Risk Premium 6,0%
Beta 1,30 Beta 1,20
Re 9,7% Re 13,7%
Rd (gross) 7,0% Rd (gross) 9,0%
Rd (net of taxes) 4,9% Rd (net of taxes) 5,9%
Tax rate 29,5% Tax rate 34,0%
Capital structure target Capital structure target
Equity 80% Equity 80%
Debt 20% Debt 20%
WACC 8,75% WACC 12,15%
g 1,0% g 3,0%
Portugal Brazil
Source: Caixa BI
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conservative approach on my side. Given the volatility on the Brazilian market I decided to be 
cautious when addressing crucial parts on the process. 
 Figure 62: Caixa BI’s Sum-Of-The-Parts estimates 
 
 
Overall, most of the differences come from the distinct expectations about the sector on both 
sides, mine and Caixa BI’s research analyst, but in the end there is a balance commensurate by 
some trends offsetting others, leading to close estimates to the company’s equity value.  
 
8.11 Investment Case 
All in all, PT stock is, from my viewpoint, a solid investment case and hence a strong pick for 
those intended at reaching an attractive combination of steady cash-flow generation and 
growth opportunities.  
Portugal Telecom is the largest player on the Portuguese Telecommunications industry, 
holding investments in Portugal, Brazil, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. PT counts with an 
approximate 100 million customer base, consolidating its leadership in the Portuguese market. 
PT remains loyal to its international growth agenda aiming at developing its resources in its 
core businesses, without despising its commitment to an operational, cost, financial, and 
strategic discipline. This pronounced international footprint through the implied diversification 
on its asset base has played an active role on the company’s expansion, not only minimizing 
uncertainty and risks associated to the Portuguese market, devastated by a strong economic 
Business Stake Stake Value weigh (% EV) Method
Portugal 100% 6.732 54,6% DCF
Oi 25,6% 4.595 37,2% DCF
Others -223
Contax 19,4% 119 1,0% Market Value
Africatel 75% 894 7,2% EV/EBITDA
Timor Telecom 41,1% 51 0,4% EV/EBITDA
CTM 28,0% 164 1,3% EV/EBITDA
PT's EV 12.337
PT's Net Debt 7.014
Pension liabilities 682
Equity Value 4.641
Shares Outstanding (Millions) 875,9
Share Price (EUR) 5,30
Source: Caixa BI
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downturn, but also contributing to embrace flourishing sources of revenues regarded as  great 
future opportunities.  
Furthermore, PT is not only leader on the domestic fixed and mobile market, where it enjoys 
the return of a major investment on FTTH, but also in the Brazilian wireline and broadband 
market. The company is also able to evidence a strong and visible dividend policy, good under 
shareholders viewpoint. 
Additionally, all the mentioned strengths should not be dissociated from a set of effective 
opportunities to be explored by the company which further contribute to a positive 
recommendation scenario. The consistently high EBITDA margins which can be improved due 
to FTTH, constitutes a great example of what has just been discussed. Likewise, the 
development of its International assets (mainly in Brazil and Africa), and the avail of the 
increasing fixed-mobile convergence trend, can also contribute to leverage PT’s healthy 
condition. The considerable bet on financial flexibility through the necessary deleverage 
should also be noted. 
However, it should not be forgotten the threats and weaknesses side of the question which 
accounts for: possible drawbacks linked to frequent changes in the regulatory framework 
(namely in what concerns MTR downward revisions); uncertainty arising from Oi’s future 
performance, since it is the fourth player on the Brazilian mobile market and counts with low 
Pay-TV market share; the economic environment experienced in Portugal, and the consequent 
credit market trends (with emphasis on the credit constraints and the increasing financial 
costs) ; as well as the fact that the domestic market has reached a mature stage, namely the 
mobile one. Most of those factors are even more relevant when considering a highly 
competitive environment as the one characterizing the telecommunications industry.  
 
9. Conclusion 
In this dissertation I assayed a way to provide an insight into the best practices of Valuation, 
manifesting an intention to highlight the relevance for analysts (and any other type of 
practitioners) of grounding the process on a solid and consistent theoretical knowledge. 
Aspiring at that purpose, an extensive review of the literature I regarded as relevant was 
conducted. As part of the discussion driven on the referred chapter were distinct subjects 
considered to be relevant in light of PT’s strategy, but the incidence was on the fundamentals 
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of valuation as a science. In this respect, topics such as the DCF methodology and the 
inseparable WACC-APV comparison occupy a central place. Without contemning the APV 
methodology, which has proven to be more consistent in particular situations, the WACC-
based DCF was shown to be the most suitable method to correctly value Portugal Telecom. 
The chosen method is also preferred by most research analysts.  
I have resorted to a Sum-Of-The-Parts of all investments hold by Portugal Telecom, estimating 
the discounted cash flows for the domestic and the Brazilian operations and applying a relative 
valuation technique to value the other international investments that complete the company’s 
portfolio. In order for this to adhere to reality a deep market analysis combined to the 
company’s strategic plan was taken into consideration.   
Looking at the final outcome, a YE12 price target of 5,01Euro was obtained grounded on the 
appealing investment case introduced on the previous chapter. The outlined fundamentals are 
sound and growth coming from a sustained international exposure is a reality.  
It was also performed a comparison with an equity research report on PT, developed by Caixa 
BI, which yielded similar results despite the differences on the approach used. The 
methodology and the data used were close and so it was the final results, as stressed on the 
sensitivity analysis carried out on the last chapter. It also served to highlight the impact of 
some key variables, such as the WACC components and the terminal growth rate, on the final 
value. 
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10. Appendix 
1. Macroeconomic Environment (Cont.) 
1.1 The United States 
When looking at the numbers concerning the US GDP in 2010 (3% growth), we observe a 
deceleration in the growth, since it grew at 1,7% living up to expectations. This fact is mainly 
responsibility of the external shocks’ impact on the US economy, being the most penalizing 
one the sovereign debt crisis in Europe which resulted in a lower propensity to invest and in a 
lower public consumption.  
Figure: US GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
The unemployment rate reduced from 9,1% in the beginning of 2011, to 8,5% at the end. As of 
the annual inflation, it was set above the 2% target at 3% in the same period. 
Provided this overall framing, the Federal Reserve moved forward with its second quantitative 
easing program, acquiring  long-term treasuries and keeping the FED funds rate at historically 
low levels (between 0 and 0,25%). 
 
1.2 Namibia 
Leveraged on a credit extension, a solid improvement in the demand for products as specific as 
the mineral ones, and a fast recovery in mining activities, namely in what involves uranium and 
diamonds; the Namibian economy is making remarkable progresses having grown 3,6% in 
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2011 after a 2009 0,7% decrease in this same indicator. Furthermore, in the words of the 
International Monetary Fund this country’s economy is expected to incur in additional growth 
of around 4,2% in 2012. In line with that, the deficit is predicted to decrease to 4,7% (8,9% 
forecasted to 2011) while inflation rate should ease to 5,5% (estimated 5,7% in 2011). 
Figure: Namibia GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
The macroeconomic scenario also involves a situation of high income inequality and 
unemployment. Conscious of this environment the government has been taking action 
through the use of expansionary fiscal policies in order to sustain and if possible revert the 
precariousness of employment, and promote growth. 
Based on the adopted course of action the outlook seems promising on the eyes of external 
entities, and this view is in part sustained good future investment prospects in structural areas 
such as services and construction. However, it should not be disregarded the presence of 
relevant downside risks that may injure Namibia’s expectations in becoming increasingly 
competitive and diversified, enhancing in this way its external position.  
 
1.3 Cape Verde 
Being one the African countries with higher level of exposure to various European economies, 
and despite the complicated moment they are going through, plagued by a devastating 
economic and financial crisis, Cape Verde is still growing at an interesting pace, registering a 
GDP growth rate of around 5% (slight deceleration from 5,4% in the previous year). This 
economic activity figures have been held by tourism and some relevant public investments. 
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Figure: Cape Verde GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
In contrast, some indicators continue to deserve some caution, as it is the case of the overall 
fiscal deficit which is of 9,9% of GDP (yet meeting estimates), or the consumer price inflation 
that jumped to 4,5% in 2011 as result of the shocks on food and fuel prices.  
In the currency front, the exchange rate is tied against the Euro. 
 
1.4 São Tomé & Príncipe 
São Tomé & Príncipe is one the victims of the incapacity of most European countries in 
overcoming the international financial crisis, which translates into a decrement of foreign 
direct investments. This was particularly noted in what takes to the GDP growth that 
registered a significant decline, recovering to approximately 5% in 2011. These prospects are 
to be maintained based on the consolidation of externally financed projects in several crucial 
areas (such as tourism or trade), and especially on oil drilling activities. 
Figure: São Tomé & Príncipe GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
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Even though registering high values, inflation has decrease to figures around 12% in 2011. As 
for the exchange rate, it is following the Euro trends for the past two years. 
 
1.5 Other Geographies 
1.5.1 East Timor     
Supported on a continuous government spending through the implementation of a plan 
targeted at a strategic and sustainable development, East Timor has been registering 
considerable figures in what takes to GDP’s growth (around 10%). Public investments have 
allowed improving infrastructures and making this country’s intentions of becoming a higher 
income county within twenty years plausible. It is also relevant to mention the importance of 
the petroleum business for this economy’s development, which is facing strong demand and 
rising prices. 
 
Figure: East Timor GDP Growth (%) 
 
Source: IMF 
As a consequence of a weak US dollar, high food prices, and need for increasing government 
spending, inflation continued at high levels and rising to 13,4% in the end of 2011. 
 
2. Industry: Telecommunications Context in Portugal  
2.1 Portugal Telecom’s Positioning 
Portugal Telecom is a Portuguese operator with international expression. PT counts with more 
than 93 million customers scattered by the geographies where it operates: Portugal, Brazil, 
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Africa (in four locations), and Asia. The international component is crucial for PT as it is proven 
by the percentage of revenues realized outside Portugal (around 58%, from which 53% are 
from Brazil). 
PT bases its operations on its core values, being defined as an innovative, customer-oriented 
company operating in different segments. In what takes to the Residential segment, 
consolidation of the TV strategy inculcated is the path to follow (currently have approximately 
30% market share on the internal pay-TV market). On the Personal segment, the course of 
action is directed towards developing new data and internet products and services taking 
advantage of strategic partnerships, as well as, rethinking its tariff plans in order to positively 
influence the mobile business. Finally, on the Corporate segment the future goes through the 
use of the new Data Centre, and a solid bet on cloud-services. 
As sustained by the company’s financial statements, the international expression is key for 
value creation in this particular sector. In this sense, PT has developed a valuable portfolio of 
assets whose management should be its first concern. The strategy is assembled on sharing 
the know-how across its businesses allowing for a better operational performance in the end. 
 
3. Company Overview  
3.1 Business Profile (cont.) 
PT also holds investments in Namibia through its 25,5% share in MTC. Additionally in this 
particular case PT, under an agreement with other shareholders, assumes the role of setter 
and even has the power to control the operating and financial policy of the Namibian mobile 
operator. The company has been focused on innovation through the increased offer of 
smartphones and linked services, with emphasis on the broadband usage through the 
improvement on quality and speed. MTC’s customer base is mainly composed by prepaid 
users, counting with around 1,95 million customers. 
The company’s revenues have been following a growing trend, culminating in 2011 in 1,608 
million Namibian Dollars.  
In Cape Verde PT holds a 30% stake in the local mobile, fixed and data services provides, Cabo 
Verde Telecom (CVT). The mobile telecommunications industry at Cape Verde Islands is 
predominantly marked by the pre-paid solutions, with approximately 99% percent of the total 
subscribers. The fixed line services in its turn, evince a penetration rate of about 15,2%. As a 
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result of a visible effort conducted by the operator in what has to deal with stimulating data 
and IPTV usage, both broadband and TV showed clear results, representing together almost 
39% of the wireline customer base. Some advances have also been made in the corporate 
segment through the offer of tailor made services. 
CVT’s  gross operating revenues showed some growth from 2009 to 2010, keeping about the 
same figures (about 84 million) to 2011. 
Finally, in what takes to its investments in Africa, and in particular in São Tomé and Principe, PT 
has a 38,3% participation in CST, Companhia Santomense de Telecomunicações. This a fixed, 
mobile and data services provider, which registered a 11,9 million (in local currency) revenues 
in 2011. 
Operations in Asia. PT’s presence in Asia is made visible through its investments in Timor 
Telecom and CTM. 
Regarding the first company, it is a fixed and mobile telecommunications provider operating in 
East Timor. PT holds a 41,12% interest in such company which counts with an interesting 
penetration of data contents, accounting for about 18% of the mobile services revenues, as a 
result of the company’s effort on promoting these services together with the voice ones. 
Timor Telecom recent strategy allowed for it to grow from 48,6 million US dollars in 2009 to 
66,4 million in 2011. 
Companhia de Telecomunicações de Macau (CTM) laso makes part of PT investments portfolio 
in Asia, holding a 28% interest on it. CTM is both a mobile and fixed line telephone service 
provider in the region of Macau, registering a 31,2% coverage of fixed lines, and around 635 
thousands customers linked to its mobile services.  
As a result of a strategy based on the promotion of equipment and services to corporate 
customers, with particular focus on the mobile business area, CTM increased its operating 
revenues from 2,760 million Patacas in 2010 to 3,979 million Patacas in 2011. Mobile service 
revenues had an extremely important role in this denouement since it registered a growth of 
9,5%, mainly due to smartphones and wireless broadband increasing penetration. 
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3.2 Strategy by Segment 
Looking at each segment individually, PT believes that it can address each type of needs 
adapting its processes and thus its final offer. In what concerns the Residential services, PT is 
focused on making the difference through providing a sophisticated multi-screen Pay-TV 
experience, sustained on the belief that next generation access networks will allow for a 
growing connectivity, constituting in this way a great market opportunity. Multi-devices 
connection is regarded as a trend to be consistently leveraged in the future. Associated to this 
trends surge the cloud-computing concept, allowing for an easier access to software and 
technology linked with high levels of security and storage capacity. PT has been giving solid 
steps in differentiating through following those trends, having established important 
partnerships and developed new and innovative services and applications. 
In the Personal segment PT is focused on leveraging mobile data consumption through the 
convergence of services offered. In this sense, the company bets on taking the best out of the 
increasing penetration of mobile devices (such as laptops, smartphones, and other) and the 
significant growth in data services and applications. PT has a complete offer of TV, Internet, 
and is also enhancing the quality of its mobile offer by creating new pre and post-paid tariffs. 
Those are high quality (mainly targeted to high-value customers) and customizable and 
intended to change the type of competition in the market, shifting it away from competition 
on pricing. 
Based on its transport and access networks PT intends to supply the business segment with 
new and optimized services including IT/IS and BPO ones. PT has registered a significant 
investment in infrastructures, with emphasis on its new data center built in Portugal. 
Additionally, PT wants to provide its enterprise customers with innovative cloud-computing 
services, grounded by solid partnerships with multinational experts such as Microsoft. 
 
97 
 
As mentioned before, PT is turned into adding value to the group by increasing its international 
exposure since it believes that its international assets are the most likely to be the catalysts  of 
future growth, with highlight to Brazil. Thereby, Portugal Telecom wants to leverage the 
strategic value of its international investments, reinforcing its presence in some of the 
mentioned locations. PT as centered its strategy in promoting commercial and operational 
excellence. In a way to bring each business to the top PT finds it crucial to bet on sharing best 
practices across business units. 
In Brazil’s particular case, the idea is to build upon the partnership with Oi and take advantage 
of its great expression in the country to improve operational and financial performance. Using 
all its knowledge and experience acquired in other markets, PT wants to implement a 
multidisciplinary offer targeted at addressing all the segments individual needs. 
In Africa and Asia the rationale behind the adopted strategy is similar to the one followed in 
Brazil but with especial attention paid to management control and best practices sharing. 
 
4. Regulatory Background (Cont.) 
This regulatory background was set having in mind two main areas of concern: the social and 
the economic. 
The normative regulation, established after the dismantlement of the monopolies on the 
telecommunications, has been ever since marked by the politic perception that liberalization 
measures could not set apart or undervalue the basic and essential necessity felt on 
everyone’s daily routine, despite the place we are referring to. Furthermore, the price setting 
is essential on the telecommunications social regulation context, given that one of the 
universal service base principals is to ensure the access to the universal service provision at 
moderate prices by everyone.  
The liberalization of the telecommunications was promoted to abolish the exclusive rights, 
creating juridical conditions for the access more or less free of the private initiative to the 
sector. Yet, since the beginning, the public powers’ pretension was not only to make the 
competition on this industry juridically possible, it was more than that, and it assumed the 
responsibility to create juridical conditions to favor the implementation of an effective 
competition on the sector. 
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It should be considered that, by one side, on the telecommunications industry, as in other 
network industries, the new agents had to face an operator benefiting from a dominant 
position inherited from the monopoly’s time. On the other side, and constituting this another 
particularity of this type of industries, the new operators can not fail to take advantage of the 
essential resources which can only be provided by the incumbent operator, fact that should be 
carefully addressed and deserves particular attention by the public powers, since there are 
commercial relations that have to be established between the several agents on the market. In 
other words, also within this framework, now concerning the economic regulation, the public 
powers assumed the key role of establishing rules targeted at assuring the balanced 
functioning of the telecommunications market, correcting its natural distortions and creating 
juridical conditions for it to get closer to the perfect competition model. 
In this sense, it was imperious to establish rules in favor of competition. This is the explanation 
for the economic regulation to present itself as a favorable one to the emerging operators, 
since it is marked by the objective of protecting and contemplating them with a positive 
discrimination. The asymmetry shows up in this way as a characteristic aspect of all the 
telecommunications’ normative regulation rationale. 
 
4.1 Aspects with Practical Relevance   
Analyzing some of the most important aspects which have practical relevance for the present 
case, some highlights should be made. 
For the past years or even a decade the mobile market shares have remained constant in what 
concerns the three main operators in Portugal. This high level of concentration that 
characterizes the Portuguese mobile market can be largely explained by the existing barriers 
faced by consumers when trying to switch network. As a consequence of the evident mismatch 
between the defined on and off-net prices, being the offers associated to the first type of price 
in rule considerably cheaper, consumers tend to opt for belonging to the same network of 
their network contacts (including relatives, friends, colleagues) as a way to take advantage of 
the discounts practiced by the on-net solution. 
This issue has been in the center of the telecommunications regulators priorities since it is 
regarded as a hindrance to development and thus has sparked a set of measures targeted at 
boosting competition. Action has been taken at different levels. In the middle of 2009 the 
European Commission, having in mind benefiting costumers and at the same time galvanizing 
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competition, adopted a recommendation addressing the termination rates and promoting its 
decrease. With this specific curse of action the EC wanted to promote fairness through the 
charge of fair prices to consumers, it intended to see both fixed and mobile termination rates 
reduced until it matched the cost of an efficient operator in regard for terminating calls on its 
network. 
Ever since, the effects have been felt all over Europe, including Portugal and its mobile market 
which has been fatigued by those acts. The mentioned recommendation has had its 
repercussions on the Portuguese mobile market in gradual stages. On the first year following 
the EC announced action the MTRs had fallen approximately 6 cents, and in mid-2011 it was 
around 3,5 cents. Consequently, Portugal Telecom’s mobile operator, TMN, taking into 
account that it is the largest player on the Portuguese market, and that its interconnection 
revenues are higher than the referent costs, has been watching its interconnection revenues 
dramatically falling, with an annual decrease of more than 30% in the second half of 2011, 
being responsible for almost 40% of its total losses on service revenues during this period. 
Reinforcing the EC recommendation, ANACOM suggested an even greater reduction in MTRs, 
aiming at achieving a figure of 1,25 cents in the end of 2012. 
However, this is a sensible matter which involves a lot of discussion regarding its practical long-
term effects on competition. As mentioned before, the Portuguese reality is deeply marked by 
high levels of concentration on the mobile market and evidences a considerable dependence 
on the network effect, since that a consumer will benefit more from adopting the network 
which count on the widest consumer base. This phenomenon occur thanks to the previously 
mentioned difference between on and off-net prices. 
As a natural response to the competitive environment surrounding the telecommunications 
operators, the largest ones will tend to practice higher of-net prices as a way to retain and 
even add new customers to its vast subscriber base. The change on the MTR policy promoted 
at an international level and materialized by ANACOM is contributing to a change on this 
landscape, empowering the smaller operators which are pressuring the larger ones to reduce 
its off-net price policy. In the end, this was the effect pursued by ANACOM which will allow for 
a healthier competition benefiting the consumers above all. 
From a corporate view, and having practical relevance, this encouraged MTR reduction reflects 
on the ARPU, which will continue to feel a pronounced pressured. Additionally, competition 
may turn attention to differentiation and at the same time, become more intense. 
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4.2 PT’s Case 
Contrary to what occurred in other countries, in Portugal, the liberalization of the 
telecommunications market did not imply the abolishment of the public service figure. This is 
the result of before enacting the sector liberalization; the Government had attributed to 
Portugal Telecom the concession of the telecommunications public service, for a period of 30 
years: contract valid from March the 20th of 1995, celebrated under the bases adopted by the 
decree law nº 40/95, of February the 15th- meanwhile, the concessionaire was legally 
designated as universal service provider of telecommunications on the term of contract (article 
23rd, nº 1, of the law decree nº 458/99, of November the 5th).  
Although it had taken into account the imminent liberalization of the sector, predicting, for 
instance, the restriction or even loss of exclusive rights, the concession contract ended up by 
designing a specific regulation for the concessionaire which departs in some aspects of the 
regulation applicable to the majority of the operators competing with it: it has the right to 
manage the activities predicted on the contract for the stated 30 years (the licenses attributed 
to the same type of activities are thought to last 15 years); not acting under a license regime, 
the concessionaire does not have to pay fees for issuing or renewing such acts (however, it 
pays a rent to the State for the network concession); unlike competitors, is exempt from 
municipal licensing in urban matters, as well as from the payment of fees for the occupation of 
public domain; it is subject to the application of contractual penalties (adding to the fines that 
can also be applied); in his capacity as company concessioned by the State is not subject to the 
application of the Competition Defense Law in the scope and validity of the contract of 
concession (Law decree nº 371/93, of October the 29th, article 41st, nº 2).  
4.3 ANACOM: Administration and Supervision Activity 
At great extent, the administration and supervision functions of the telecommunications 
sector in Portugal, or strictly speaking the administrative regulation, are assigned to an 
independent administrative authority, the ANACOM – Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações. 
However, the law attributes the member of the Government in charge of the communications 
area some important competences regarding the sector’s administration. These competences 
add to those that the Government already possesses in the scope of the normative regulation 
(including editing law decrees and administrative regulations), where it is included, moreover, 
the definition of the strategic lines and the guiding principles of all the public policy for the 
telecommunications. 
101 
 
In short, ANACOM has regulatory power, power for awarding titles which enable the exercise 
of telecommunication activities, supervisory power, authoritative power, sanctioning power 
and, power to mediate disputes between operators. 
5. Portugal Telecom’s business structure 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom Annual Report, 2011 
6. Shareholder Structure 
 
Source: Portugal Telecom (Website) 
PT Comunicações 100% Oi 25,6%
TMN 100%
Unitel 25% (a)(b) Angola Mobile
CTM 28% (b) Macao Wireline, mobile
MTC 34% (a) Namibia Mobile
CVT 40% (a) Cape Verde Wireline, mobile
Timor Telecom 41% East Timor Wireline, mobile
CST 51% (a) São Tomé & Príncipe Wireline, mobile
(a) These stakes are held by Africatel, w hich is controlled 75% by PT. (b) These stakes are consolidated by the equity method of accounting.
Systems and IT: PT Sistemas de Informação 100%
Innovation, research and development: PT Inovação 100%
Backoffice and shared services: PT PRO 100%
Procurement: PT Compras 100%
Call centres and telemarketing services: Contax in Brazil 44,4% and PT Contact 100%
Telecommunications in Portugal Telecommunications in Brazil
Customer Segment
Residential
Personal
Other Telecommunications Businesses
Other Businesses
Other
Customer Segment
Residential
Personal
Enterprise
Other
Enterprise
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7. PT Share Price 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
8. PT Stock Performance for the last 5 years 
 
Source: Bloomberg; PT site 
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9. Total Shareholder Return: PT versus Major players in the industry 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
10. Main Indicators and Forecasts: Portugal 
 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat 
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11. Main Indicators and Forecasts: Brazil 
 
                                                                                             Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
 
 
12. Other Industry and Company Figures 
 
12.1 ARPM Trends in Major European Markets 
 
                                                                                              Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP 2010 2011 2012E 2013E
GDP grow th (%) 7,5 2,7 2,5 3,3
Household Consumption 6,9 4,1 3,5 4,2
Government Consumption 4,2 1,9 3,2 3,6
FCGF 21,3 4,7 1 1,4
Exports 11,5 4,5 4,1 1,5
Imports 35,8 9,7 5,6 2,7
Inflation 2012E 2013E 2014E
5,2 4,8 5,1
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     12.2 Mobile Service Revenues Trends in Europe                                  12.3 Voice Service Revenues Trends in Europe 
 
Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
 
 
12.4 Mobile Termination Rates Trends in Europe 
 
Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
               12.5 ARPM Trends versus Lowest MTR                   12.6 TMN: Termination as percentage of Service Revenues 
 
Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
 
12.7 Voice Traffic Volume Estimates for the Portuguese Market 
 
                                                             Source: Espirito Santo Investment Bank 
12.8 Total Service Revenue Estimates for the Portuguese Market by Operator 
Source: ESIB
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13. Domestic Mobile Business: Operating data – Number of Customers (Forecasted) 
 
 
14. Domestic Mobile Business: Customer Data and Voice Market Estimation 
 
  
Operating Data (from ANACOM) 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
TMN Customers (k) 7.419 7.414 7.334 7.354 7.444 7.444 7.407 7.477 7.618 7.782 7.923 8.016 8.063
% of TMN subscribers 44,1% 44,3% 44,0% 43,7% 43,9% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0% 44,0%
Proxy Ts (assuming TMN 11FY 44%) 16481 16459 16327 16644 16822 16822 16739 16898 17216 17587 17905 18117 18223
-0,1% -0,8% 1,0% 0,8% 0,6% -0,5% 0,9% 1,9% 2,2% 1,8% 1,2% 0,6%
Total subscriptions 16824 16736 16668 16829 16956 16927 16843 17003 17323 17696 18016 18229 18336
-0,5% -0,4% 1,0% 0,8% 0,6% -0,5% 0,9% 1,9% 2,2% 1,8% 1,2% 0,6%
Penetration rate 154,9% 154,7% 153,4% 156,3% 157,9% 157,9% 157,9% 159,4% 162,4% 165,9% 168,9% 170,9% 171,9%
3,0% 0,0% 1,5% 3,0% 3,5% 3,0% 2,0% 1,0%
Population Portugal (source: INE) 10.642 10.641 10.643 10.649 10.654 10.654 10.601 10.601 10.601 10.601 10.601 10.601 10.601
Customer**
Euro million 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Customer: Data market 310,6 75,6 78,9 85,1 79,9 319,5 336,5 356,6 377,9 397,6 416,9 430,3 441,5
∆ -1,1% 1,4% -0,9% 4,8% 6,3% 2,9% 5,3% 6,0% 6,0% 5,2% 4,9% 3,2% 2,6%
Customer: Voice market 788,4 176,3 174,4 171,4 165,1 687,1 654,6 641,0 640,0 644,0 649,1 653,5 657,3
∆ -8,3% -13,8% -11,1% -13,0% -11% -12,8% -4,7% -2,1% -0,2% 0,6% 0,8% 0,7% 0,6%
ARPU (customer: data) 13,954 3,400 3,586 3,859 3,577 14,421 15,142 15,899 16,535 17,031 17,542 17,893 18,251
∆ -3,4% -0,7% -1,8% 4,2% 6,0% 3,3% 5,0% 5,0% 4,0% 3,0% 3,0% 2,0% 2,0%
ARPU (customer: voice) 35,422 7,926 7,927 7,767 7,392 31,012 29,461 28,577 28,006 27,586 27,310 27,173 27,173
-10,3% -15,5% -11,9% -13,5% -13,6% -12,4% -5,0% -3,0% -2,0% -1,5% -1,0% -0,5% 0,0%
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15. Domestic Wireline Business: Retail Voice and Non-Voice Market Estimation 
 
Retail**
Euro million 2009 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Retail: Voice market Rev. 680 581 143 136 130 126 535 508 490 477 468 463 455 447
as % of Retail Rev. 70% 60% 58% 56% 54% 52% 55% 51% 48% 46% 44% 42% 39% 37%
PSTN/ISDN  (k) 2.746 2.695 2.683 2.672 2.662 2.653 2.653 2.593 2.567 2.547 2.536 2.530 2.511 2.493
Traff ic-generating lines 2.612 2.600 2.597 2.593 2.589 2.585 2.585 2.541 2.524 2.511 2.504 2.501 2.484 2.468
∆ -1,6% -0,5% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,6% -1,7% -0,6% -0,5% -0,3% -0,1% -0,7% -0,7%
Carrier pre-selection 134 95 87 79 73 68 68 53 43 37 32 29 27 26
-23,2% -28,9% -9,0% -8,3% -8,1% -6,8% -28,5% -22,8% -18,2% -14,6% -11,7% -9,3% -7,5% -6,0%
Weigh on total PSTN/ISDN 4,9% 3,5% 3,2% 3,0% 2,7% 2,6% 2,6% 2,0% 1,7% 1,4% 1,3% 1,2% 1,1% 1,0%
Retail traff ic (proxy) 4.713 4.581 1.138 1.098 1.080 1.130 4.446 4.315 4.210 4.129 4.069 4.031 3.993 3.956
∆ -5,5% -2,8% -2,4% -3,9% -2,5% -2,9% -2,9% -2,9% -2,4% -1,9% -1,4% -0,9% -0,9% -0,9%
ARPU 247 216 53 51 49 48 202 196 191 187 185 183 181 179
Retail: Other (non-voice) market Rev. 291 388 103 107 111 117 438 488 521 563 606 652 700 751
as % of Retail Rev. 30% 40% 42% 44% 46% 48% 45% 49% 52% 54% 56% 58% 61% 63%
Fixed Broadband Retail 862 1.001 1.019 1.040 1.072 1.105 1.105 1.186 1.229 1.300 1.374 1.449 1.526 1.605
∆ 21,5% 16,1% 13,2% 2,1% 3,1% 3,1% 10,3% 7,3% 3,7% 5,8% 5,6% 5,5% 5,3% 5,2%
TV customers 581 830 876 919 974 1.042 1.042 1.160 1.229 1.300 1.374 1.449 1.526 1.605
Proportion of TV to Fixed broadband customers 67% 83% 86% 88% 91% 94% 94% 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ARP access 202 212 54 54 54 54 204 208 212 216 221 225 230 234
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Pay-TV Market (Total TV subs) 2.528 2.775 2.977 3.109 3.184 3.258 3.333 3.408 3.483 3.557
10,6% 9,7% 7,3% 4,4% 2,4% 2,3% 2,3% 2,2% 2,2% 2,1%
Cable TV (subs) 1.452 1.438 1.428 1.428 1.448 1.448 1.448
DTH (subs) 645 670 671 676 699 699 699
Other technologies (subs) 432 666 3.537 830
PT Subs Share 23,0% 29,9% 31,2% 32,3% 33,5% 35,0% 35,0% 37,3% 38,6% 39,9% 41,2% 42,5% 43,8% 45,1%
Pay-TV Penetration rate 44,2% 48,5% 51,8% 54,1% 55,4% 56,7% 58,0% 59,3% 60,6% 61,9%
∆ 3,8% 4,3% 3,3% 2,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3%
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16. PT’s EBITDA Margins 
 
 
17. PT’s Net Working Capital 
 
 
18. PT’s CAPEX 
 
EBITDA margins 2007 2008 2009 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
TMN 44,0% 42,8% 44,4% 46,0% 47,5% 46,9% 45,5% 40,9% 45,2% 44,6% 44,6% 43,3% 43,1% 43,1% 43,1% 43,1%
Wireline 48,1% 45,9% 41,1% 38,6% 41,2% 41,1% 40,5% 40,3% 40,8% 40,9% 41,4% 41,9% 42,4% 42,9% 43,4% 43,9%
Oi 34,9% 28,6% 35,0% 35,6% 33,1% 33,7% 34,9% 34,8% 34,8% 34,0% 34,1% 34,2% 34,6%
Others 25,3% 28,5% 31,0% 25,4% 22,6% 14,3% 42,5% 26,5% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3% 26,3%
PT 37,3% 36,9% 41,7% 39,9% 41,0% 35,7% 37,4% 30,8% 35,6% 37,5% 37,5% 37,4% 37,3% 37,5% 37,6% 37,8%
Euro million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Net Working Capital 2.328 1.442 1.958 7.889 6.292 6.426 6.263 6.214 6.230 6.238 6.302 6.532
∆ -886 516 5.931 -1.597 134 -162 -49 16 9 64 230
Current ratio 3,6 2,5 2,9 12,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7
Quick ratio 3,5 2,3 2,7 12,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6
Cash ratio 1,7 0,8 1,1 7,1 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,9
Capex 2008 2009 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Capex Portugal 647 745 657 101 149 150 247 647 678 652 636 621 609 594 579
Capex Mobile 245 180 133 19 38 35 39 131 186 180 180 178 176 173 169
 % 15,3% 11,9% 9,6% 6,2% 12,3% 11,0% 12,4% 10,5% 16,0% 16,0% 15,5% 15,0% 14,5% 14,0% 13,5%
Capex Wireline 403 565 524 82 112 114 208 516 493 472 456 443 433 422 410
20,9% 29,0% 27,2% 18,1% 24,2% 24,9% 44,4% 28,0% 27,0% 26,0% 25,0% 24,0% 23,0% 22,0% 21,0%
Capex Oi 0 0 117 107 221 444 532 499 448 421 379 350 347
14,0% 13,3% 28,4% 18,4% 20,4% 20,4% 19,4% 18,9% 17,9% 16,9% 15,9%
Capex Other 141 21 30 30 52 133 141 150 160 170 181 192 204
33,2% 18,6% 15,0% 17,7% 30,8% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5% 20,5%
Total 798 122 296 286 520 1.224 1.351 1.301 1.243 1.212 1.169 1.136 1.130
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19. PT’s TMN FCF 
 
 
20. PT’s Wireline FCF 
 
 
 
 
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
EBITDA 563 517 503 502 511 523 532 539
Depreciation and Amortization 232 244 237 230 222 215 207 201
Other expenses 10,5 6,9 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,4 7,5
Financial expenses (gains) except interest 1,0 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
EBIT 319 265 258 265 282 300 316 330
Taxes 95,7 79,5 77,5 79,5 84,5 90,1 94,7 98,9
Operating Profit 223 186 181 185 197 210 221 231
Depreciation and Amortization 232 244 237 230 222 215 207 201
Net Working Capital 1.275 1.187 1.154 1.188 1.215 1.243 1.263 1.280
Change in NWC -88 -33 34 27 28 20 17
Cash Flow from Operations 456 517 450 381 392 397 408 414
Net Capex 131 186 180 180 178 176 173 169
FCFF 325 331 270 201 214 221 235 245
Discounted FCF 331,4 247,3 169,1 164,9 156,3 152,7 146,0
Nominal Grow th rate 1,2%
Terminal value 2053,6
Enterprise Value 3421,2
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
EBITDA 753 747 751 764 783 807 832 858
Depreciation and Amortization 476 500 485 470 454 440 425 411
Post retirement benefits 56 60 58 58 58 58 59 61
Other expenses 18 11 11 11 11 11 11 12
Financial expenses (gains) except interest 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,1
EBIT 201 175 195 223 258 296 335 372
Taxes 60,2 52,4 58,5 67,0 77,3 88,9 100,4 111,7
Operating Profit 141 122 137 156 180 207 234 261
Depreciation and Amortization 476 500 485 470 454 440 425 411
Post retirement benefits 56 60 58 58 58 58 59 61
Net Working Capital 1.887 1.869 1.858 1.867 1.891 1.926 1.962 2.000
Change in NWC -18 -11 9 23 35 36 39
Cash Flow from Operations 672 699 691 675 669 670 682 694
Net Capex 516 493 472 456 443 433 422 410
FCFF 156 206 219 219 226 237 261 283
Discounted FCF 206,3 200,9 184,4 174,5 167,7 169,1 168,5
Nominal Grow th rate 0,7%
Terminal value 2217,6
Enterprise Value 3489,0
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21. Oi’s FCF 
 
22. PT’s International Investments  
 
Euro million 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
EBITDA 924 910 850 802 757 722 708 755
Depreciation and Amortization 610 640 622 603 582 563 544 526
EBIT 314 270 228 200 175 159 164 229
Taxes 107 92 78 68 60 54 56 78
Operating Profit 207 178 151 132 116 105 108 151
Depreciation and Amortization 610 640 622 603 582 563 544 526
Net Working Capital 2.469 2.666 2.502 2.362 2.276 2.168 2.118 2.231
Change in NWC 197 -164 -140 -85 -109 -50 113
Cash Flow from Operations 817 621 936 875 783 777 702 564
Net Capex 444 532 499 448 421 379 350 347
FCFF 373 90 437 427 362 397 352 217
Discounted FCF 89,8 390,1 340,2 257,8 252,2 199,6 109,9
Nominal Grow th rate 5,3%
Terminal value 1928,6
Enterprise Value 3568,2
Contax Value
Current Market Cap. 1.286 92
PT's Stake 19,4%
Exchange rate EUR/BRL 2,702
Exchage rate BRL/EUR 0,370
Total excl. Contax 1.061,0
Total incl. Contax 1.153,4
(a) These stakes are held by Africatel, w hich is controlled 75% by PT.
Million 4Q10 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 Value
Unitel (a) - stake 25% 676,1
Revenues (euro) 309 1.133 290 300 324 367 1.282
EBITDA (euro) 167 652 161 168 190 204 721
EBITDA margin 54,2% 57,6% 55,4% 55,8% 58,4% 55,4% 56,3%
MTC (a) - stake 34% 101,5
Revenues (euro) 40 149 38 37 43 42 159
EBITDA (euro) 21 79 20 20 20 20 80
EBITDA margin 51,1% 53,2% 52,0% 53,8% 47,9% 47,3% 50,0%
CVT (a) - stake 40% 59,0
Revenues (euro) 25 84 17 21 20 25 84
EBITDA (euro) 10 39 10 9 10 10 39
EBITDA margin 38,7% 45,9% 57,0% 44,1% 49,7% 40,6% 47,1%
CTM - stake 28% 164,6
Revenues (euro) 68 260 83 91 91 92 356
EBITDA (euro) 28 112 29 31 27 30 118
EBITDA margin 41,0% 43,2% 35,1% 34,6% 30,3% 32,1% 33,0%
CST (a) - stake 51% 5,4
Revenues (euro) 3 13 3 3 2 3 12
EBITDA (euro) 0 3 1 1 1 0 3
EBITDA margin 6,7% 23,8% 25,0% 27,0% 31,6% 15,0% 24,1%
Timor Telecom - stake 41.12% 54,5
Revenues (euro) 12 43 11 11 12 13 48
EBITDA (euro) 7 24 6 6 7 8 27
EBITDA margin 56,2% 56,4% 56,2% 52,1% 54,3% 60,0% 55,7%
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       23. Ratings and associated Spreads 
 
                                                           Source: Damodaran 
 
       24. Exchange Rates: BRL/EUR 
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0,2 0,649999 C 10,50%
0,65 0,799999 CC 9,50%
0,8 1,249999 CCC 8,75%
1,25 1,499999 B- 6,75%
1,5 1,749999 B 6,00%
1,75 1,999999 B+ 5,50%
2 2,249999 BB 4,75%
2,25 2,499999 BB+ 3,75%
2,5 2,999999 BBB 2,50%
3 4,249999 A- 1,65%
4,25 5,499999 A- 1,40%
5,5 6,499999 A+ 1,30%
6,5 8,499999 AA 1,15%
8,5 100000 AAA 0,65%
Interest Coverage Ratio
Rating Spread
Exchange rate BRL/EUR 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011
EUR/BRL 2,306 2,260 2,507 2,416 2,635
BRL/EUR 0,434 0,442 0,399 0,414 0,379
2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
2,702 2,850 3,029 3,202 3,471 3,712 3,712
0,370 0,351 0,330 0,312 0,288 0,269 0,269
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25. PT’s Historical Balance Sheet 
 
 
26. PT’s Forecasted Balance Sheet  
 
Euro million 2007 2008 2009 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011**
Cash and equivalents 1.835 1.125 1.518 5.107 4.494 3.505 3.867 5.668 5.668
Accounts receivable, net 1.442 1.394 1.538 3.403 3.976 3.911 3.935 1.936 1.936
Inventories, net 161 297 240 102 132 132 129 134 134
Financial Investments 565 634 614 540 394 433 505 556 556
Current Assets 4.003 3.450 3.910 9.151 8.996 7.981 8.436 8.294 8.294
Intangible assets, net 3.383 3.463 4.074 1.112 4.916 5.562 5.042 5.424 5.424
Tangible assets, net 3.585 4.638 4.844 3.875 6.430 6.402 6.134 6.229 6.229
Accrued post retirement benefits 134 2 68 2 12 13 12 14 14
Other assets 911 973 784 338 1.676 1.912 1.686 1.664 1.664
Deferred tax assets and prepaid expenses 1.106 1.189 1.161 693 1.474 1.433 1.313 1.320 1.320
Total assets 13.122 13.714 14.840 15.170 23.505 23.304 22.622 22.944 22.944
Accounts payable 1.109 1.374 1.339 723 1.287 1.212 1.137 1.446 1.446
Current Liabilities 1.109 1.374 1.339 723 1.287 1.212 1.137 1.446 1.446
Gross debt 6.217 6.696 7.046 7.206 11.922 12.380 12.408 12.281 12.281
Accrued post retirement liability 1.464 1.837 1.558 969 1.024 975 958 1.004 1.004
Other liabilities 1.878 1.777 1.603 1.063 3.074 3.051 2.989 3.105 3.105
Deferred tax liabilities and deferred income 372 834 907 600 953 1.476 1.359 1.365 1.365
Total liabilities 11.040 12.518 12.453 10.561 18.260 19.093 18.851 19.201 19.201
Equity before non-controling interests 1.338 232 1.318 4.392 4.315 3.284 2.888 2.828 2.828
Non-controling interests 744 964 1.069 217 929 927 883 915 915
Total shareholders' equity 2.082 1.196 2.387 4.609 5.244 4.211 3.771 3.743 3.743
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 13.122 13.714 14.840 15.170 23.505 23.304 22.622 22.944 22.944
Euro million 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Cash and equivalents 5.789 5.643 5.598 5.612 5.620 5.677 5.885
Accounts receivable, net 1.977 1.928 1.912 1.917 1.920 1.939 2.010
Inventories, net 136 133 132 132 132 134 139
Financial Investments 568 554 549 551 552 557 578
Current Assets 8.471 8.257 8.192 8.213 8.224 8.308 8.611
Intangible assets, net 5.390 5.347 5.289 5.243 5.195 5.154 5.143
Tangible assets, net 6.189 6.140 6.074 6.020 5.965 5.919 5.905
Accrued post retirement benefits 14 14 13 13 14 14 14
Other assets 1.699 1.656 1.643 1.647 1.649 1.666 1.727
Deferred tax assets and prepaid expenses 1.348 1.314 1.303 1.307 1.308 1.322 1.370
Total assets 23.110 22.726 22.514 22.443 22.355 22.383 22.771
Accounts payable 1.477 1.440 1.428 1.432 1.434 1.449 1.501
Current Liabilities 1.477 1.440 1.428 1.432 1.434 1.449 1.501
Gross debt 11.903 11.292 10.710 10.173 9.598 9.043 8.605
Accrued post retirement liability 1.025 1.000 992 994 996 1.006 1.042
Other liabilities 3.171 3.091 3.066 3.074 3.078 3.110 3.223
Deferred tax liabilities and deferred income 1.394 1.359 1.348 1.352 1.353 1.367 1.417
Total liabilities 18.970 18.181 17.545 17.025 16.460 15.974 15.789
Equity before non-controling interests 3.146 3.472 3.812 4.172 4.554 4.966 5.425
Non-controling interests 993 1.074 1.158 1.247 1.341 1.443 1.556
Total shareholders' equity 4.140 4.545 4.969 5.418 5.896 6.409 6.981
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 23.110 22.726 22.514 22.443 22.355 22.383 22.771
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27. PT’s Historical Income Statement 
 
28. PT’s Forecasted Income Statement 
 
Euro million 2007 2008 2009 2010 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011
Operating revenues 6.148 6.721 3.733 3.742 871 1.798 1.747 1.731 6.147
Wireline 1.962 1.931 1.948 1.929 456 461 459 467 1.843
Mobile TMN 1.543 1.594 1.518 1.387 303 307 320 316 1.245
Brazil - Oi 0 0 0 0 0 832 801 778 2.412
Other and eliminations 2.643 3.196 268 426 112 197 167 170 646
Operating costs 3.857 4.241 2.177 2.251 514 1.155 1.093 1.197 3.959
Wages and salaries 638 617 547 637 157 303 284 277 1.020
Direct costs 907 1.087 522 548 125 292 299 296 1.012
Commercial costs 1.068 1.233 423 393 73 138 141 166 518
Other operating costs 1.244 1.304 685 673 159 423 369 458 1.408
EBITDA 2.292 2.480 1.557 1.492 357 642 654 534 2.188
Post retirement benefits 1.123 1.268 717 38 12 14 14 18 59
Depreciation and amortization -65 45 90 759 196 383 365 382 1.326
Income from operations 1.234 1.167 750 695 149 245 275 135 804
Other expenses (income) 318 110 58 281 7 5 12 36 60
Curtailment costs 276 100 15 146 4 1 1 30 36
Net losses (gains) on disposal of f ixed assets (3) (19) (2) (6) 0 (0) 0 (9) (9)
Net other costs 45 30 46 141 3 4 11 15 33
Income before financial and income taxes 916 1.057 692 414 142 240 264 99 744
Financial expenses (income) (117) 129 (201) 82 (56) 84 89 96 213
Net interest expenses 197 272 227 185 (17) 99 118 98 297
Equity in earnings of aff iliates, net (126) (171) (456) (142) (80) (42) (47) (40) (209)
Net other costs (gains) (188) 28 28 38 42 28 17 38 125
Income before income taxes 1.033 927 893 332 197 156 175 3 531
Income taxes 243 231 186 78 48 48 48 (36) 108
Income before non-controling interests 835 696 789 5820* 150 108 127 39 423
Losses (income) attributed to non-controling interest (93) (120) (105) (148) (20) (25) (38) (1) (84)
Consolidated net income 742 576 685 5.672 130 82 89 38 339
Euro million 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 6.278 6.119 6.071 6.086 6.095 6.157 6.382
Wireline 1.826 1.815 1.824 1.847 1.882 1.916 1.954
Mobile TMN 1.160 1.128 1.161 1.187 1.214 1.234 1.251
Brazil - Oi 2.604 2.444 2.307 2.224 2.118 2.069 2.180
Other and eliminations 688 732 778 828 881 937 997
Operating costs 3.923 3.823 3.798 3.817 3.811 3.839 3.968
EBITDA 2.354 2.296 2.273 2.269 2.283 2.318 2.413
Post retirement benefits 60 58 58 58 58 59 61
Depreciation and amortization 1.391 1.351 1.309 1.265 1.224 1.183 1.144
Income from operations 904 887 906 946 1.002 1.076 1.209
Other expenses (income) 37 37 36 36 36 37 38
Income before financial and income taxes 866 850 870 910 965 1.039 1.171
Financial expenses (income) 299 271 264 269 283 306 353
Net interest expenses 346 316 309 314 328 351 400
Equity in earnings of aff iliates, net (145) (142) (141) (141) (141) (143) (148)
Net other costs (gains) 99 96 96 96 96 97 101
Income before income taxes 567 579 606 641 682 734 818
Income taxes 170 174 182 192 205 220 245
Income before non-controling interests 397 406 424 449 477 513 572
Losses (income) attributed to non-controling interest (79) (80) (84) (89) (95) (102) (113)
Consolidated net income 318 325 340 360 383 412 459
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29. Domestic Mobile Business: Income Statement 
 
 
 
 
Euro million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 1.543 1.594 1.518 1.387 1.245 1.160 1.128 1.161 1.187 1.214 1.234 1.251
Services rendered 1.393 1.425 1.360 1.265 1.132 1.081 1.052 1.058 1.082 1.107 1.125 1.140
Customer 1.112 1.167 1.174 1.099 1.007 991 998 1.018 1.042 1.066 1.084 1.099
Interconnection 247 231 161 142 100 70 44 30 30 30 30 30
Roamers 34 26 26 24 26 20 10 10 10 11 11 11
Sales 142 159 144 112 90 70 68 94 96 98 100 101
Other operating revenues 8 9 14 10 11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Operating costs, excluding D&A 864 912 844 749 682 643 625 659 676 691 703 712
Wages and salaries 53 52 48 48 45 41 40 41 42 43 44 44
Direct costs 283 279 259 246 220 206 201 206 213 218 222 225
Commercial costs 318 324 277 230 215 205 200 221 226 231 234 238
Other operating costs 210 257 259 226 203 191 185 191 195 200 203 205
EBITDA 679 682 674 638 563 517 503 502 511 523 532 539
Depreciation and amortisation 224 232 221 226 232 244 237 230 222 215 207 201
Income from operations 455 450 453 412 331 273 266 273 290 308 324 338
Other expenses (income) 3,7 6,0 8,5 31,5 10,5 6,9 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,4 7,5
Income before financial and income taxes 452 444 445 381 320 266 259 266 282 301 317 331
Financial expenses (income) -9,4 15,2 10,4 7,7 6,8 6,4 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9
Net interest expenses -10,5 15,0 9,7 6,5 5,8 5,5 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,9
Net foreign currency exchange losses 0,1 -0,7 -0,1 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Net gains on f inancial assets and other investments 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Net other costs (gains) 1,0 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
Income before income taxes 461,0 429,0 434,3 373,3 313,2 259,7 252,8 259,5 275,9 294,5 309,9 323,7
Minus Income taxes 123,0 114,2 113,5 102,9 94,0 77,9 75,9 77,8 82,8 88,3 93,0 97,1
Net Income 338,0 314,8 320,7 270,5 219,3 181,8 177,0 181,6 193,2 206,1 217,0 226,6
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30. Domestic Wireline Business: Income Statement 
 
 
 
Euro million 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Operating revenues 1.962 1.931 1.948 1.929 1.843 1.826 1.815 1.824 1.847 1.882 1.916 1.954
Retail 1.023 953 971 969 973 995 1.012 1.040 1.074 1.115 1.155 1.199
Wholesale 487 488 495 491 468 450 437 430 426 426 426 426
Data & corporate 266 287 301 288 265 244 230 219 210 204 198 193
Other w ireline revenues 187 203 181 181 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Operating costs, excl. D&A & PRBs 1.019 1.044 1.148 1.184 1.091 1.079 1.064 1.060 1.064 1.075 1.085 1.096
Wages and salaries 253 227 233 228 209 207 206 207 209 213 217 222
Direct costs 354 391 409 438 400 387 376 368 364 361 358 355
Commercial costs 91 113 118 127 113 119 118 119 120 123 125 127
Other operating costs 321 314 388 390 369 366 364 366 370 377 384 392
EBITDA 943 887 800 745 753 747 751 764 783 807 832 858
Post retirement benefits 324 366 435 38 56 60 58 58 58 58 59 61
Depreciation & amortisation -65 45 90 462 476 500 485 470 454 440 425 411
Income from operations 685 477 275 245 221 187 208 236 271 309 348 386
Other expenses (income) 282,4 101,2 45,5 211,2 18 11 11 11 11 11 11 12
Income before financial and income taxes 402,8 375,5 229,9 34,1 203 176 197 225 260 298 337 374
Financial expenses (income) 3,2 7,9 11,3 7,1 6,8 6,7 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,2
Net interest expenses 2,1 7,3 8,1 5,0 4,8 4,8 4,7 4,8 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,1
Net foreign currency exchange losses 1,1 1,0 -0,5 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6 -0,7 -0,7 -0,7
Net gains on f inancial assets and other investments -1,4 -2,2 -1,3 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -0,9 -1,0
Net other costs (gains) 1,4 1,8 5,0 3,7 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,7
Income before income taxes 399,6 367,6 218,5 27,0 196 170 190 219 253 291 330 367
Minus Income taxes 115,7 93,0 47,0 16,9 58,8 50,9 57,1 65,6 75,9 87,4 98,9 110,2
Net Income 284,0 274,6 171,5 10,1 137 119 133 153 177 204 231 257
118 
 
 
 
31. Oi: Income Statement (in Euros) 
 
 
Euro million 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E
Consolidated net revenues 770 802 709 748 2.745 2.604 2.444 2.307 2.224 2.118 2.069 2.180
Wireline 573 559 493 517 1.946 1.787 1.627 1.495 1.411 1.324 1.284 1.348
Mobile 189 223 198 216 744 768 772 769 771 754 747 791
Other Services 7 19 17 15 55 49 46 43 42 40 39 41
Operating costs 549 521 457 500 1.821 1.694 1.595 1.505 1.467 1.396 1.361 1.425
Cost of Services 157 160 153 154 562 515 492 462 462 439 426 440
Cost of Goods Sold 5 7 5 5 19 18 17 16 16 15 15 15
Interconnection Costs 132 130 119 125 454 439 408 387 372 355 347 365
Selling Expenses 139 145 119 132 480 442 415 392 378 360 351 370
General and Administrative Expenses 69 76 69 70 254 227 213 201 194 185 181 190
Other Operating (Revenue) Expenses, net 48 4 -7 14 52 52 49 46 44 42 41 44
EBITDA 220 280 252 248 924 910 850 802 757 722 708 755
Depreciation and amortisation 162 163 140 146 610 640 622 603 582 563 544 526
Income from operations 59 118 112 101 314 270 228 200 175 159 164 229
Equity Accounting
Financial Expenses 94 98 138 91 421 400 375 354 341 325 318 335
Financial Inc ome 66 69 77 64 276 262 246 232 224 213 208 219
Income Before Tax and Social Contribution 31 88 52 74 245 132 99 78 57 47 54 113
Income Tax and Social Contribution 11 30 18 25 84 45 34 26 19 16 19 38
Net Income 20 58 34 49 161 87 65 51 38 31 36 75
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Research Note 
 
1. Introduction 
Portugal Telecom is the largest player on the Portuguese Telecommunications industry, 
holding investments in Portugal, Brazil, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia. PT counts with an 
approximate 100 million customer base, consolidating its leadership in the Portuguese market. 
PT remains loyal to its international growth agenda .This pronounced international footprint 
through the implied diversification on its asset base has played an active role on the 
company’s expansion, not only minimizing uncertainty and risks associated to the Portuguese 
market, devastated by a strong economic downturn, but also contributing to embrace 
flourishing sources of revenues regarded as  great future opportunities.  
Furthermore, PT is not only leader on the domestic fixed and mobile market, where it enjoys 
the return of a major investment on FTTH, but also in the Brazilian wireline and broadband 
market. The company is also able to evidence a strong and visible dividend policy, good under 
shareholders viewpoint. 
Additionally, all the mentioned strengths should not be dissociated from a set of effective 
opportunities to be explored by the company which further contribute to a positive 
recommendation scenario. The consistently high EBITDA margins which can be improved due 
to FTTH, constitutes a great example of what has just been discussed. Likewise, the 
development of its International assets (mainly in Brazil and Africa), and the avail of the 
increasing fixed-mobile convergence trend, can also contribute to leverage PT’s healthy 
condition. The considerable bet on financial flexibility through the necessary deleverage 
should also be noted. 
All in all, PT stock is, from my viewpoint, a solid investment case and hence a strong pick for 
those intended at reaching an attractive combination of steady cash-flow generation and 
growth opportunities.  
2. Valuation 
It has been used a Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation as a way to achieve the appropriate fair 
value for the company, considering the cash flows for the three main business units (Mobile, 
Wireline, and Oi), as well as the international participations both in Africa and Asia.  
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Looking at each business weight on the total EV, Oi is the most significant segment, 
contributing to almost 31%, followed by the Portuguese operations’ segments which represent 
around 30% in what takes to the Wireline business and 29% to the Mobile one. The 
participations in Africa enclosed on Africatel are responsible for roughly 7%, whereas the Asian 
investments account for 2%. The remaining 1% is linked to the indirect participation on Contax 
which was determined through its market value. 
After all these considerations it was possible to reach an approximate 4,5 bn Euro figure for 
the company’s Equity value which resulted in a YE12 5,01 Euro price target, considering the 
896,5 million outstanding shares. When comparing to the price registered on September the 
5th of 2012 of 3,9Euro, this represents a 28,5% of implied upside potential and thus, the final 
recommendation is Buy. 
Figure 1: Sum-Of-The-Parts Valuation table 
 
A 7 years explicit forecast period was adopted, with estimates until 2018, assuming a constant 
growth rate for the upcoming cash flows, interiorized on the Terminal Value. A discount rate 
based on the WACC methodology was computed in order to discount the obtained free cash 
flows through the DCF models. 
Business Stake Stake Value weigh (% EV) Method
Portugal 100% 6.910 59,4%
Mobile business 100% 3.421 29,4% DCF
Wireline business 100% 3.489 30,0% DCF
Oi 25,6% 3.568 30,7% DCF
Contax 92 0,8% Market Value
Africatel 75% 842 7,2%
Unitel 18,8% 676 5,8% EV/EBITDA
MTC 25,5% 101 0,9% EV/EBITDA
CVT 30,0% 59 0,5% EV/EBITDA
CST 38,3% 5 0,05% EV/EBITDA
Timor Telecom 41,1% 54 0,5% EV/EBITDA
CTM 28,0% 165 1,4% EV/EBITDA
PT's EV 11.632
PT's Net Debt 6.114
Pension liabilities 1.025
Equity Value 4.492
Shares Outstanding (Millions) 896,5
Share Price (EUR) 5,01
Price (05 September 2012) 3,9
Implied Upside Potential 28,5%
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The cost of capital was estimated to capture the turbulent economic environment and its 
implications on the conditions for Portugal Telecom to access the financial markets. 
In order to capture the individual operating and financial risk that can be inputted to each 
specific country it was estimated a different rate modeled to each reality. Those rates are the 
result of combining all the components presented below.  
Figure 2: WACC Components 
 
As a way of testing the sensitivity of the obtained price target to the estimated WACC figure, a 
sensitivity analysis on this matter was performed, reinforcing the its relevance to the valuation 
outcome. 
 
3. Company Overview 
3.1 Company Presentation 
PT operates in many geographies in a market characterized by a rapid technological change in 
a highly competitive environment. The Company is positioned as a holding, contemplating a 
set of direct and indirectly held subsidiaries. The main companies which belong to PT are as 
follows:  (1) PT Comunicações, which operates in the wireline market. It has the largest 
telecommunications infrastructure in Portugal, the biggest client base in the sector, comprising 
more than 4 million telephone connections and a team driven by experience and know-how. It 
Portugal Brazil
Cost of Equity 11,28% Cost of Equity 14,35%
Rf 1,491% Rf 9,33%
Market Premium 10,13% Market Premium 6%
Beta 0,97 Beta 0,84
Cost of Debt 7% Cost of Debt 10%
Interest coverage ratio 1,788 Tax rate 34%
Attributed Rating B+
Spread 5,50% D(%) 30%
E(%) 70%
Tax rate 30%
WACC 12,02%
D(%) 35%
E(%) 65%
WACC 9,04%
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also offers an integrated service of voice, internet and television, through its brand Meo, 
representing a key driver for success in what takes to the residential segment. Meo assimilates 
the company’s value proposition allowing for every customer to access the intended content 
through different interfaces.  (2)TMN (Telecomunicações Móveis Nacionais, S.A.)operating on 
the mobile telecommunications sector, being the market leader in Portugal. And, in what takes 
to the operations in Brazil, (3) Oi. The idea is to expand PT’s success in the European 
telecommunications market to Brazil, as PT’s mobile business is well positioned, thanks to is 
continuous innovation-based strategy. This is made possible through valuable partnerships, 
and important investments, mainly on innovation and technology. Taking into consideration 
the weigh of Oi in the Brazilian market and its high future growth potential, this is considered 
to be crucial for the group’s financial and operational performance. 
It still has some relevant interests in other telecommunications companies in Africa and Asia, 
namely in Angola, Namibia, Cape Verde, São Tomé & Príncipe, East Timor and Macau. 
In 2011, around 42% of the Company’s consolidated revenues were from its Portuguese 
operations, whereas the remaining 58% came from the international ones. 
 
3.2 Shareholder Structure 
PT’s shareholder structure includes: RS Holding (with 10,05% of the total capital), Espírito 
Santo Group (10,04%), Telemar Norte Leste S.A. (10%), Caixa Geral de Depósitos (with 6,42%, 
representing the Portuguese Government indirect influence after the end of the “golden 
share” in 2011), Norges Bank (4,96%), UBS AG (4,96), and Brandes Investments Partners 
(3,86%). 
  
4. Business Description 
The telecommunications sector in Portugal is being marked by a continuous consolidation of 
bundled offers. The last four years were craved by a bet on the bundled offers by the majority 
of the players performing in this market, which are increasingly turning attentions to the joint 
reality of broadband, TV and voice, the so called triple-play. This action is mainly characterized 
by the presence of copper operators in TV segment, and the exploitation of the voice segment 
by cable operators. As a response to these new necessities, the main operators in Portugal 
focused part of their efforts in improving the business related to data and voice, where PT 
stands as one of the most successful cases, achieving co-leadership in the pay-TV market. 
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The Portuguese telecommunications reality does not distune from the trends evidenced 
throughout Europe, adapting its landscape with resort to investments directed towards fiber. 
In this field, Portugal Telecom, benefiting from a changed regulation (geographical 
segmentation approach), should be highlighted since it covers around 1,6 million households 
with its FTTH service. 
4.1 Portuguese Operations 
Residential Customers. This particular segment includes fixed and mobile services. Nowadays, 
as a result of the convergence in the existing offers, mobile network operators are able to 
match PT’s fixed line telephone offer and in this way target the same group of customers. 
Those operators have already gone further and are in position to practice lower prices through 
the creation of low-cost brands, which will not only impact the fixed-line business, as it will 
also attempt to reach the lower end of the market. 
One end leads to the other, and as a response to the increase in competition, operators come 
up with new solutions. In what concerns the international telephone service, which has been 
watching its revenues being damaged owing to, for instance, competition from calling cards, 
and declining call prices, the answer goes through providing unlimited communications to all 
national numbers and to a large range of international fixed locations. This overall framing 
keeps pushing PT towards an international fixed line telephone price reduction. 
The Portuguese fixed voice market is traditionally a direct access market and this trend is well 
consolidated as ANACOM’s figures show, pre-selection has registered the lowest number of 
lines in this configuration of the past ten years. According to the same source, PT has a 58,7% 
market share in this market, a slight decrease from 2010 (60,4%). PT also has around 56,7% 
market share in what concerns the outgoing traffic. 
Based on the same source’s estimations, in 2011 PT has approximately 49,4% market share, 
and is the number one provider of fixed broadband Internet services, a sector with visible 
potential (more than 2 million users) that is already growing. 
PT also performs well in other viable markets as it is the case of Pay-TV. It was initially 
regarded as a high-value market, but nowadays the strategy goes through creating new low-
end offers, and opting for a price skimming tactic making it affordable to all the market 
segments, and at the same time, in order to keep the high-value customers, offering new free 
quality content (such as video-on-demand). This is a market which enclose around 3 million 
customers (around 51,7% of the total households), where PT detains a 35% market share 
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(meaning a 5,1% increase from 2010), being the second player in this market just behind ZON 
who keeps being the market leader despite its decrease of 4% in market share from 2010 
(current market share of 53,9%). The remaining direct competition has been struggling to keep 
its residual scores. 
The figures presented above are the result of different strategies carried out by the various 
players. In PT’s case there has been a clear bet on a strategy based on a FTTH roll-out which 
proved effective enough to reach a number around 1 million households in 2011. 
Personal Customers. Portugal has one of the most dynamic markets in what takes to the 
mobile business. With more than 150 active mobile cards per each group of 100 habitants, this 
market performance has been remarkable as a result of the innumerous offers available which 
cover most of the customer needs in this field. In this market PT competes through its mobile 
operator -TMN- with two major opponents: Vodafone and Optimus which benefit from their 
multinational status that translates into higher resources availability, a set of well spread best 
practices, and cost synergies, to make tuff competition to TMN, on the mobile market, and 
broadly to PT thanks their capacity to improve performance in fixed-line services.  
In 2011, TMN assumed a leadership position with around 44% market share as a result of a 
strategy focused on strengthening its share, even more when its main competitors are betted 
on gaining territory in a near future, marketing its services belligerently.  
A revolutionary development that transformed this market in an even more competitive 
reality is linked to the introduction of the called “tribal plans”. Those plans consist of on-net 
pricing plans adaptable to each type of customers’ reality. Other innovative plans followed 
under the form of post-paid services and bundles including Internet, which allowed for all 
customers to adhere, increasing the number of minutes of usage on one hand, and negatively 
impacting per minute revenues on the other. 
The same landscape fits the mobile broadband services. It presents constant evidence of 
declining revenues not only resulting from the high level of competition but also by the tight 
regulation imposed in the telecommunications industry. An illustrative example is the constant 
terminations rates reduction, which has been a trend since 2007 (68,2% decline in the past 
four years), and will still be decreased on upcoming periods. The influence of a controlling 
regulatory activity through the reduction on the MTRs has direct impact on the ARPU, which 
will harm PT’s revenues. Other examples comprise roaming and retail data. 
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Enterprise Customers. As a result of a competitive environment, PT was forced to decrease 
leased line prices. Attempting at leveraging performance in this particular branch, PT is turning 
its attention to efficient solutions linked to the IP VPN (Internet Protocol Virtual Private 
Networks). 
Additionally, PT’s strategy goes through potentiating its past investments and canalize the 
output towards providing efficient services on a field in which it is pioneer – cloud services. 
This is a way of developing a service that is expected to register a considerable growth in a 
near future, making use of its modern Data Center and its extensive FTTH network, 
contributing to a revenue increase through reaching a wider group of customers. 
Wholesale Services. Now that most operators are adopting new alternatives to the use of PT’s 
network, direct competition in wholesale services segment is increasing, thus negatively 
impacting PT’s revenues. Most internal operators (both mobile and fixed) are using foreign 
providers of international connections to enhance their performance on this business area. 
The strongest operators are also adopting new courses of action with the same results to PT, 
they are installing their own wireline networks. 
4.2 Operations in Brazil: Oi 
4.2.1 Residential Services Segment 
Local Fixed-Line Services. Mobile telecommunication services are making themselves more 
visible, leading to a constant transfer of customers from the fixed-line reality to the mobile 
one. This trend has been magnified by their ability to price their services on a really low base. 
The mitigation of such market also results of a change in patterns regarding the type of 
customers to involve. This is historically a market directed to corporate customers, in which 
most companies have focused their attention in. But even this has changed, and competitors 
started adapting their strategies to the low-income market end, investing on economic 
bundles. Adding to this, there was a flow of price decreases in telecommunications services led 
by a decrease in the interconnection rates. This rate decrease was an incentive for new players 
to use the other providers’ existing networks instead of investing in the construction of their 
own, allowing them to practice more competitive prices than the incumbent players.   
According to ANATEL (data from 2011), Oi is the market leader in the fixed-line business with 
an estimated market share of around 72,7%, followed by Embratel with 17,4% and GVT, which 
has been investing in this area, with approximately 5%. Considering region 2, Oi keeps its 
leading position accounting for roughly 66,4% of the market, compared to the 18,5% detained 
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by GVT, and the 11% of Embratel, company from which Oi expects an increasingly intense 
competition in a near future.  
Competition is expected to come from other points such as mobile service operators which are 
gaining territory. The number of mobile subscribers in region 1 increased by almost 18% from 
2010 t0 2011, in region grew by 14%, and in region 3 by 16% in the same period. This 
occurrence allied to the low rates associated to mobile services is expected to have a 
continuing negative impact in the number of fixed-line users and consequently on the traffic 
volume too. Traffic migration from fixed-lines is a consolidating process that is probable to be 
amplified by the difference in prices within the mobile network when compared to the fixed-
line one. Oi expects a decrease in revenues from this market as a result of the use of mobile 
devices over the fixed-line ones. 
Long-Distance Services.  Under ANATEL’s estimates of the number of long-distance minutes 
(data from 2011), in region 1 the top player is TIM with a market share of 57,4%, followed by 
Embratel with 29,8%. Oi only accounts for around 9,1%. Regarding region 2 the same ranking 
prevails, with TIM registering a 48% market share, Embratel a 26,1%, and Oi having a market 
share of 17,4%. The same framing characterizes region 3. This time TIM has approximately 
34,5% market share, Embratel has around 29%, Telesp (the incumbent player in this region) 
has a considerable 20,3% market share, and Oi registers a 10,1% mark. 
As in many other geographies, in Brazil the communication rates generally drive consumption, 
this is true for long-distance calls as well. Together with the increasing offer of plans that 
include free minutes in calls to other subscribers, this may enhance customer migration and 
thus affecting Oi’s revenues. On the other hand, many customers started buying more than 
one SIM card tied to different operators in other to maximize the number of calls to all the 
operators with the least possible cost associated, which can be exploited by Oi in order to 
expand its customer base. 
Data Transmission Services. When compared to previously presented markets like the fixed-
line, the data transmission one is considerably less regulated, allowing in this way to less 
significant barriers to entry which translates into higher competition from other services 
(emphasis on the fixed-line communications).  
In what concerns the broadband market, the cable television providers make their influence 
felt mainly through the offer of integrated packages inclosing broadband, television and voice 
services to the cable television subscribers. Moreover, Oi’s predicts a continuous bet on the 
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expansion of networks incurred by its competitors which will promote a price reduction and 
the subsequent margin shrink.  
DTH services. In Brazil, subscription television has low penetration (20,8%) and limited growth 
prospects as a result of the high quality services provided by television broadcasters. Oi has 
only recently expanded this service to all states of regions 1 and 2 following a staged process. 
4.2.2 Personal Services Segment 
Competition is based on promotions offered to both pre-paid (under the form of traffic 
subsidies) and post-paid (traffic and handset subsidies) customers, and is targeted at reaching 
as much market share as possible. 
According to ANATEL, in 2011 the market share structure was as follows: in region 1 Oi was 
ranked in third place with 23,2% market share, after registering an addition of mobile 
subscribers during 2011, behind Vivo (27,2%) and TIM (26,7%),but in front of Claro which has a 
22,5% share. In region 2, Vivo kept the leader position with a 30,8% share, followed by Claro, 
accounting for 28,6%, and TIM with 26,3% market share. Oi in turn has around 14,2% market 
share in this region. In what takes to region 3, the hierarchy is the same as in region 2, with 
pretty close figures. Vivo is the number one player with 33% of the market, followed by Claro 
with approximately 26,1%, and TIM with 26,3%. Oi has circa 14,5%. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the performed valuation, it can be concluded that Portugal Telecom’s stock is 
undervalued, being the allocated recommendation a BUY. This can be mainly justified by the 
generalized negative market sentiment founded on the troubled macroeconomic environment 
involving Portugal, and expressed on its sovereign debt crisis, which is negatively driving 
investors and practitioners perspectives.    
Looking at the final outcome, a YE12 price target of 5,01Euro was obtained grounded on the 
appealing investment case proportionate by PT. The outlined fundamentals are sound and 
growth coming from a sustained international exposure is a reality.  
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11. Glossary 
ADSL- Asymmetric Digital Subscriber. Technology that allows high volume data transmission 
(broadband) over traditional phone lines. 
ANACOM- Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações. Is the regulatory authority for electronic 
communications and postal services in Portugal. 
ANATEL- Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações. Regulatory authority for the communications 
in Brazil. 
ARPU- Average Revenue Per User. Monthly average service revenues per average number of 
users in the period. 
Capex- Capital expenditure. Investments in tangible and intangible assets. 
Cash Flow- The difference between cash inflows and cash outflows for a specific period. 
CCPU- Cash Cost Per User. Monthly average operating costs minus provisions, depreciation 
and amortization, and cost of equipment sales, per average number of users in the period. 
CRM- Customer Relationship Management. 
Curtailment Costs- Workforce reduction program costs. 
Diluted Earnings per Share- Earnings per share computed using net income excluding the costs 
associated with the convertible bonds divided by the diluted number of shares. 
EBITDA- Income from operations + PRBs + depreciation and amortization. 
EBITDA Margin- EBITDA divided by Operating revenues. 
EBITDA to Net Interest- EBITDA divided by Net interest. 
Enterprises- Customer segment that includes all SOHOs, SMEs and corporate customers that 
subscribe wireline and wireless products and services.  
Euronext Lisbon- The domestic stock market upon which PT shares are listed and traded. 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)- Equals operating cash flow +/- acquisitions/sales of financial investments 
+/- net interest paid – payments related with PBR – income taxes paid +/- dividends 
paid/received +/- other cash movements. 
FTTH- Fiber-To-The-Home. Next generation network that brings fiber to the customer 
premises. 
Gearing Ratio- Equals Net debt divided by the sum of net debt and equity. 
GSM- Global System for Mobile. Internationally standardized digital radio network that allows 
both voice and data transmission. 
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HDTV- High Definition Television. Transmission of the televisions signal with a higher 
resolution than the traditional formats. 
IAS/IFRS- International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards. The 
new international accountancy standards introduced in 2005. 
Income From Operations- Equals income before financials and taxes + workforce reduction 
costs + losses (gains) on disposal of fixed assets + net other costs. 
IP- Internet Protocol. Standard that specifies the exact format of packets of data as they are 
transmitted through an Internet network. 
IPTV- Internet Protocol Television. Digital television service available over a fixed telephony 
line through a broadband connection. 
ISDN- Integrated Services Digital Network. Digital telecommunications network that allows 
simultaneous voice and data transmission over an access line. 
ISP- Internet Service Provider. Company that provides access ro the Internet. 
MMS- Multimedia Message Service. Technology allowing for data such as text, tunes, pictures, 
photos and brief video sequences to be transmitted via mobile phone. 
MOU- Minutes Of Usage. Monthly average of outgoing and incoming traffic in minutes per 
average number of users in the period. 
MTR- Mobile Termination Rate. Costs charged by mobile operators for completing outgoing 
calls on its network. 
NGAN- Next generation access network. 
Net Debt- Equals short-term debt + medium and long-term debt – cash and equivalents. 
Net Debt to EBITDA- Equals Net debt over EBITDA. 
NYSE- New York Stock Exchange. 
Operating Cash Flow- Equals EBITDA – Capex +/- change in working capital +/- non-cash 
provisions. 
Personal- Customer segment that includes all consumer customers that subscribe to wireless 
products and services on an individual basis. 
PRB- Post-Retirement Benefits Costs. 
PSTN- Public Switched Telephone Network. Traditional telephone system that runs through 
copper lines. 
Residential- Customer segment that includes all consumer customers that subscribe wireline 
products and services at home on an individual basis. 
Retail Access- RGU per access Retail accesses per PSTN/ISDN line. 
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SARC- Subscriber Acquisition and Retention Cost. Estimated as (70% of marketing and publicity 
costs + commissions + subsidies)/(gross additions + upgrades). 
SEC- US Securities and Exchange Commission. The US regulator for capital markets. 
SMS- Short Message Service. Short text messages service for mobile handsets allowing 
customers to send and receive alphanumerical messages. 
Triple-Play Offer- Integrated offer of voice television and Internet services. 
VoD- Video-on-Demand. System that allows users to select and watch videos. 
Wholesale, Others and Eliminations- Customer segment that includes all the wireline and 
wireless wholesale business for the other businesses (e.g. directories) and all intercompany 
eliminations that are related to the Portuguese telecommunications businesses. 
3G- Third generation is a generic term covering several technologies for mobile networks 
(UMTS, W-CDMA and EDGE), that integrate mobile multimedia services and allows a higher 
data transmission rates than GSM technology. 
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